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Abstract 
In Canada, Crown prosecutors and the Attorney General are not always as fair as we 
expect when making charging decisions, and therefore victims could be personally 
aggrieved by unfair and unjust decisions not to prosecute. When this happens, victims 
have limited remedy to redress the unfairness and unjustness in order to uphold their 
interests in a criminal proceeding. Conversely, the European Union, United Kingdom, 
and the United State have taken steps to let victims challenge decisions not to prosecute 
to some extent. Drawing on experiences of the abovementioned jurisdictions, I propose a 
two-level process of review for decisions not to prosecute----Internal Review and Judicial 
Review----in Canada in order to provide victims a way to have problematic decisions 
reversed. This proposal can provide a direction or framework for future reform in this 
area in Canada. 
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CHAPTER I 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a significant international trend towards increasing victims‘ 
participatory roles in the criminal justice process. Canada should place a greater degree of 
emphasis on the recognition and the protection of victims‘ interests in its criminal justice 
process in order to catch up to or comply with international standards.1 After conducting a 
thorough pre-1999 literature review on the victims‘ role in criminal justice, Young 
concluded that, after intense debates about victims‘ proper roles and functions during that 
period, authors in the 1970s and 1980s had generally agreed that increasing victims‘ 
participatory roles in the criminal process is a part of state policies.2 At that time, many 
articles suggested legislative reforms in Canada in order to guarantee victims‘ interests in 
criminal proceedings that have been recognized domestically or internationally.3 This 
later became a global movement in the late 1980s. Legislators worldwide started 
recognizing the fact that victims‘ interests should be at least taken into account in 
decision-making.4 Later, it was generally agreed that victims have significant interests in 
criminal proceedings, and the focal point was moved to how to protect these interests 
effectively.5 Therefore, much literature post-1990 suggested legislative and procedural 
reforms with the intention of incorporating victims‘ participatory roles into criminal 
proceedings. In particular, many studies have been done on perfecting the use of victim 
                                                          
1
 Department of Justice Canada, “The Canadian Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime”, Online: Department of Justice Canada:  <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-
jp/victim/guide/secn.html> [Basic Principles for Victims]. 
2
 Department of Justice Canada, The Role of the Victim in the Criminal Process: A literature Review-1989 
to 1999 by Alan N Young (Ottawa: Policy Centre for Victims Issues, Canada Department of Justice, 2001) at 
18. 
3
 Victims’ interests will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
4
 Young, supra note 2 at 18. 
5
 Ibid. 
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impact statements in criminal proceedings.6  As Professor Tobolowsky wrote:  
Unlike the situation existing prior to the Task Force Work (pre-1982), the 
relevant inquiry is no longer whether victims should have participatory 
rights in the criminal justice process. The incredibly rapid adoption of 
constitutional and legislative victims‘ rights provisions over the last fifteen 
years ensures that victims will have a participatory role in the criminal 
justice process. The relevant current focus therefore must be to ensure that 
these victim participatory rights are appropriate and meaningful in the 
context of the varied individual and societal interests involved in criminal 
prosecutions.7 
As a positive result, Canada has taken significant steps to make sure that victims are 
formally granted participation in the sentencing and parole process through using victim 
impact statements.8 However, while improving victims‘ participatory roles at later stages 
of a prosecution has been a dominant focus for years, the entry stage of whether a 
prosecution will be instituted, and all that entails for victims, still falls short of systemic 
study and attention. Other than being informed of the status of a prosecution, victims are 
generally excluded from charging decisions in Canada.  
The Crown prosecutor will make a decision based on his or her discretion after the police 
lodge a charge against a suspect. Such a decision includes whether or not to continue a 
prosecution against an accused and on what charges. For the purpose of this thesis, 
―charging decisions‖ refers only to decisions to decide whether to continue a criminal 
prosecution, either public or private, against an accused person. This thesis focuses only 
                                                          
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Peggy M Tobolowsky, “Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years after the 
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime” (1999) 25 New Eng J on Crim & Civ Confinement 21 at 103. 
8
 “Use of Victim Impact Statements at Sentencing and Parole” (10 April 2013), online: National Victims of 
Crime Awareness Week  <http://www.victimsweek.gc.ca/res/r58.html> [Use of Victim Impact Statements]. 
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on decisions not to prosecute made by the Crown prosecutor and Attorney General. The 
reason behind this will be further explained in Chapter 2 when discussing the Canadian 
charging process. To be more specific, the phrase ―decisions not to prosecute‖ refers to 
the Crown prosecutor‘s decisions to withdraw charges after the laying of charges or stay a 
prosecution permanently. In practice, the Crown prosecutor makes these decisions on 
behalf of the Attorney General. 
In the past half century, noticing that the rights of the accused in the criminal process 
might be violated by arbitrary prosecution or abuse of process by Crown prosecutors, the 
Canadian system has developed a series of doctrines and processes to deal with improper 
decisions to lodge charges, such as judicial reviews for flagrant impropriety of a decision 
to prosecute, abuse of process doctrine, and tort proceedings against a Crown prosecutor. 
However, more recently, influenced by the increasing concerns about victims‘ rights and 
interests in the criminal justice process, a few authors have been struck by the following 
thoughts: what if a Crown prosecutor improperly uses his or her discretionary power to 
discontinue a prosecution? Should a victim just accept such a decision? 
In a sense, decisions to prosecute are more likely to attract judicial scrutiny than decisions 
not to prosecute.9 The former will be followed by a whole trial process, through which 
judges can re-examine the legitimacy and accuracy of charges against the accused and 
therefore minimize the effect of prosecutorial misconduct in charging decisions. 10 
Moreover, as a part of the accused‘s procedural rights and Charter rights in a criminal 
                                                          
9
 See R v DPP, Ex parte Manning and another, [2001] QB 330 at para 23 [Manning]; Ian Dobinson, “The 
Decision not to Prosecute” (paper delivered at the 15th International Conference of the International 
Society for the Reform of Criminal Law held at Canberra, Australia, 26 - 30 August 2001), [unpublished] at 
2. 
10
 Dobinson, supra note 9 at 2. 
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proceeding, the accused is able to file motions to move to dismiss the charges or stay the 
proceeding by attacking the prosecutor‘s alleged mistakes in charging decision-making. 
In contrast, after a charge has been pressed, the decision not to prosecute lies solely on the 
prosecutorial charging discretion made by Crown prosecutors, any defects of which are 
difficult to trace. It is possible that public prosecutors make unjust and unfair decisions 
not to prosecute in certain circumstances. Because of this, victims may well be affected - 
in a most profound and personal manner - by such Crown prosecutor‘s discretionary 
power to prosecute a suspect or not. Indeed, most victims‘ recognized interests only 
appear in post-trial stages when the accused has been convicted. However, post-trial 
stages should not be singled out from the criminal process when dealing with victims‘ 
participation in criminal proceedings. Any criminal prosecution runs like a chain from the 
charging stage to the sentencing stage. Each stage in the criminal process is closely linked 
to whether or not victims can get to the post-trial stage where most of their interests lie. 
Only once every stage is conducted in a correct manner can victims be guaranteed that 
their recognized interests will be respected. As argued by Sarah N. Welling, victims 
exercise their rights in criminal proceedings on the premise that a genuine prosecution is 
taking place.11 In other words, if the termination of a prosecution is improper, victims 
could be unfairly deprived of exercising interests and rights that would otherwise have 
been recognized at a later stage in the process. Therefore, methods to protect victims‘ 
interests in criminal proceedings should be started from the very beginning of a criminal 
process. 
                                                          
11
 Sarah N Welling, “Victims in the Criminal Process: a Utilitarian Analysis of Victim Participation in the 
Charging Decision” (1988) 30 Ariz L Rev 85 at 85. 
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When unjust and unfair decisions not to prosecute occur, victims can only count on 
themselves to seek redress for the issue. Victims might start a private prosecution if the 
police refuse to investigate an alleged event or decline to press charges against a suspect. 
However, when it comes down to Crown prosecutors deciding to stop a prosecution, such 
a decision is rarely touchable by victims, and victims can do nothing unless Crown 
prosecutors change their minds. It is very rare that the accused ever wants to challenge a 
decision not to prosecute that is in his or her favor.12  
Unfortunately, in the Canadian criminal justice system, victims only have the right to 
notification and a limited right to information in the charging stage, and have the 
comparative lack of effective methods to overturn unjust and unfair decisions not to 
prosecute. Even though victims can seek remedies through a tort proceeding, on some 
occasions, civil remedies are typically not sufficient to comfort victims. The decision not 
to prosecute is one of the major turning points in the criminal process for victims. For 
victims who prefer a criminal proceeding and have reasonable grounds to believe that the 
prosecution is improperly stopped, the logical remedy they want is the re-institution of the 
criminal prosecution. The only way to do so is to have the decision not to prosecute 
reversed.  
Victims‘ review of decisions not to prosecute made by public prosecutors is not new. The 
review can be either internal, judicial, or both. This has been exercised in civil law 
countries such as the Netherlands, Poland, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
                                                          
12
 In cases where jurisdictional issues are involved, the accused might challenge the decision not to 
prosecute in one jurisdiction in order to avoid the prosecution on the same ground in another jurisdiction 
for better or favored treatment. 
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Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey for years.13  In the late 1980s, accompanied with the 
popularity of victims‘ rights in criminal justice systems around Europe, such a review of 
decisions not to prosecute gradually has become victims‘ legally recognized right in 
European regional practices.14  
By contrast, judicial review of decisions on whether to prosecute made by public 
prosecutors has traditionally been extremely limited in common law jurisdictions. 
Charging decision-making falls into the discretionary power of the Crown prosecutor, 
which is a branch of government, and therefore reviewing prosecutorial discretion by 
judges may raise the issue of separation of powers. 15  However, in recent decades, 
influenced by civil law traditions and the European Union (EU)‘s recent practice, the 
United Kingdom (UK) has adopted a review system in its domestic system.16  In the 
United States (US), some states have provided private challenges to prosecutorial 
decisions on whether to prosecute in certain circumstances and qualified challengers are 
not limited to accused persons. This is because of increased concerns about the victims‘ 
interests in criminal proceedings and the danger of public prosecutor‘s unfettered 
discretionary power. 
Judicial review of a decision not to prosecute is theoretically available for victims in 
                                                          
13
 Matti Joutsen, “Listening to the Victim: The Victims’ Role in European Criminal Justice System” (1987-
1988) 34 Wayne L Rev 95 at 109 -112; Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima, Project Victims in Europe, 
Implementation of the EU Framework Decision on the standing of victims in the criminal proceedings in the 
Member States of the European Union (Portugal: Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima 2009) at 44 
[Implementation of the EU Framework Decision] 
14
 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R(85)11 (1985), art B7 [Victim’s Rights 
Recommendation]; EU, Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, [2012] OJ, L 315/57 at 69 [Victims’ Rights Directive]. 
15
 Robert J Frater, Prosecutorial Misconduct (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2009) at 20. 
16
 “Victims' Right to Review Scheme” (Jun 2013), online: The Crown Prosecution Service 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_right_to_review/index.html> [Review Scheme] 
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Canada, but its use as a remedy to overturn unjust and unfair decisions not to prosecute is 
very limited and ineffective. Only in extremely rare circumstances could victims succeed 
in judicial review applications. In fact, such applications have never succeeded in 
Canada.17 This is in part because the Canadian judiciary is extremely reluctant to question 
the exercise of discretion by Crown prosecutors and the Attorney General, and therefore 
Canada‘s courts have been employing a relatively high standard of review.18  
The lack of effective remedies to overturn unjust and unfair decisions not to prosecute 
establishes a point that victims cannot effectively protect their recognized interests from 
unjustifiable violations by the Crown prosecutor. Hence, I believe that a reform to help 
victims review the decision not to prosecute is necessary. 
It should be noted that such a reform does not intend to give victims veto rights. Canadian 
legislators have emphasized a point that the promotion of victims‘ participatory roles aims 
at giving victims voices in criminal proceedings, not veto power. 19  To provide an 
effective remedy for victims to question decisions not to prosecute does not necessitate 
giving them a veto in charging decision-making. Even in the judicial review or internal 
review process, victims should have no power to veto a decision not to prosecute. Victims 
can only convince competent authorities to exercise their power to reverse a decision not 
to prosecute through presenting legal arguments, together with solid evidence, in a formal 
proceeding. 
                                                          
17
 Frater, supra note 15 at 41. 
18
 Frater, supra note 15 at 20-24. 
19
 The House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Victims’ Rights - A Voice, not 
a Veto (October 1998) (Shaughnessy Cohen, MP) (Victims ask for a voice at each stage of the criminal 
justice process, not a veto power). 
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1.1 Use of the term “victim” 
Some people might prefer the term ―alleged victims‖ because calling a complainant 
―victim‖ might insinuate the guilt of an alleged offender to a judge, jury and the public, 
which seems to be a violation of offender‘s right to be presumed innocent. However, in 
my opinion, it is important to treat complainants with respect, and it is very offensive to 
refer a complainant as an ―alleged victim‖. In addition, the use of the term ―victim‖ in the 
charging stage where the guilt of the accused has not yet been proven has been generally 
accepted. In the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power (UN Declaration), a complainant may be considered a ―victim‖ in the 
charging stage: 
A person may be considered a victim, under this Declaration, regardless of 
whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or 
convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the 
perpetrator and the victim.20 
In accordance with the Declaration, the Canadian government also adopted the Canadian 
Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime (the Canadian Statement)21 
requiring governments and ministers at all levels to guarantee fair treatment of victims in 
the criminal justice process. At that time, no definition of the term ―victims‖ was written 
down in the Basic Principles. It can be assumed that Canada implicitly follows the 
definition used in the UN Declaration.  
For the purpose of victim impact statements in sentencing, section 722 (4) of the Criminal 
                                                          
20
 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, GA Res 40/34, 
UNGAOR, 40th Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/40/34, (1985), annex A, art 2 [emphasis added]. 
21
 Basic Principles for Victims, supra note 1. 
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Code of Canada formally defined victims as ―a person to whom harm was done or who 
suffered physical or emotional loss as a result of the commission of the offence‖.22 
According to the plain meaning of this definition, the existence of ―victims‖ and the real 
commission of a crime seem inseparable. Perhaps, realizing the limitation of this 
definition on providing rights to complainants in the pre-conviction phase, the definition 
of ―victim‖ in the Criminal Code have started including the ―victim‖ of an alleged offence 
since 1999.23  
It is true that the definition in section 722 (4) remains in use, in spite of the different 
wordings, in most documents about victims‘ rights adopted prior to 1999 such as 
legislation relating to victims' rights in most provinces and territories and the Corrections 
and Conditional Release Act.24 However, even without declaring the inclusion of alleged 
victims, in the legislation and the Basic Principles for Victims, some principles and rights 
are nevertheless extended to pre-conviction stages, such as the right to notification, the 
right to information, and the right to protection.25  For example, some information is 
meaningful only if it is provided in early stages of the criminal justice process, such as the 
status of the investigation, the scheduling, progress, and final outcome of the proceeding. 
                                                          
22
 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 722 (4) [Criminal Code]. 
23
 Ibid, s 2; Bill C-79, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (victims of crime) and another Act in consequence, 
1st Sess, 36th Parl, 1999, cl 1. 
24
 An Act Respecting Assistance for Victims of Crime, RSQ, c A-13.2, art 1 [Quebec, An Act Respecting 
Assistance for Victims of Crime]; The Victims' Bill of Rights, CCSM c V55, s 1 (1) [Manitoba, The Victims’ Bill 
of Rights]; Victims of Crime Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c 9 (Supp), s 1 [Nunavut, Victims of Crime Act]; Victims 
of Crime Act, RSNWT 1988, c 9 (Supp), s 1 [Northwest Territory, Victims of Crime Act]. The term “victim” is 
written down in the relevant legislations to include alleged victims only in Manitoba, Nunavut, Northwest 
Territory and Quebec. 
25
 Victims of Crime Act, RSA 2000, c V-3, s 2, 4; Victims of Crime Act, RSBC 1996, c 478, ss 2-4, 6 [British 
Columbia, Victims of Crime Act]; The Victims of Crime Act, 1995, SS 1995, c V-6.011, s 2.1; Victims Services 
Act, SNB 1987, c V-2.1, s 2-7; Victims of Crime Services Act, RSNL 1990, c V-5, ss 5-7; Nunavut, Victims of 
Crime Act, supra note 25, s 5; Victims' Bill of Rights, 1995, SO 1995, c 6, s 2 [Ontario, Victims’ Bill of Right]; 
Victims of Crime Act, RSPEI 1988, c V-3.1, s 2; Quebec, An Act Respecting Assistance for Victims of Crime, 
supra note 25, arts 4-6; Manitoba, The Victims’ Bill of Rights, supra 25, ss 3-5, 7, 11-14; Northwest 
Territory, Victims of Crime Act, supra note 25, s 5. 
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If there is no victim until the guilt of an accused is proven, so-called ―victims‘ rights‖ 
should not appear in pre-conviction stages given that the subject of such rights does not 
exist at all in these stages. These legislatures nevertheless indiscriminately describe the 
holder of these rights as the ―victim‖. If applying the ―non-victim‖ theory, the existence 
of these rights as ―victims‘ rights‖ and their implementation will sound absurd. For these 
reasons, it seems that, in practice, Canada is inclined to treat ―alleged victims‖ as 
―victims‖ in order to ensure their exercise of rights in the criminal justice system. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis will be constructed as follows. In Chapter 2, I will start with demonstrating the 
charging process in the Canadian criminal justice system and show why decisions not to 
prosecute made by Crown prosecutors and the Attorney General are of particular interest 
to me. Then I will continue to reveal several current problems in the Canadian legal 
system concerning victims receiving effective remedies for improper decisions not to 
prosecute. I will firstly demonstrate the potential misconduct of Crown prosecutors during 
the charging decision-making process. Because of the comparative lack of studies about 
prosecutorial behaviours of Crown prosecutors in Canada, the conclusion largely relies on 
American resources and several Canadian resources concerning other related areas, such 
as juries‘ judgements on cases and racial profiling occurring in police operation. Then, I 
will show victims‘ lack of sufficient effective remedies to protect their interests in four 
aspects: (1) in charging stages, in most situations, victims are no more than information 
receivers and have no procedural rights; (2) civil proceedings are not always sufficient to 
satisfy victims‘ psychological needs; (3) complaining about decisions not to prosecute 
through informal channels seems less effective than formal channels such as internal 
11 
 
 
review and judicial review; and (4) judicial review is not easily accessible to victims for 
challenging decisions not to prosecute.  
In Chapter 3, I will justify my proposal of providing victims opportunities to challenge 
decisions not to prosecute with two reasons. First, victims are personally affected by 
decisions not to prosecute. The decision not to prosecute is one of the important links for 
victims to enjoy their interests and rights at the trial and post-trial stage. Therefore, a state 
should recognize these interests in the charging stage. Moreover, in Canada, victims enjoy 
equal protection in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.26 Second, 
victims can obtain satisfaction and closure through challenging a decision not to 
prosecute. Because victims‘ participation in the charging stage is not commonly 
discussed, there is a dearth of resources directly linked to victims‘ interests and rights in 
the stage. Some conclusions drawn in this chapter are inferred from the resources that are 
not directly linked to this topic. 
In Chapter 4, I will draw attention to foreign examples of victims‘ challenges to decisions 
not to prosecute made by public prosecutors. This will include the practices in the EU, the 
UK and the US. The practices in these areas are important for forming the proposed 
reform in the next chapter. The research in this section is mainly doctrinal. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I will explain the proposed reform in detail based on the research I 
explored in previous chapters. I propose a two level review process, internal review and 
judicial review, for victims to complain about improper decisions not to prosecute. A 
special unit should be set up for the internal review process in the Crown prosecutor‘s 
                                                          
26
 Charter of human rights and freedoms, RSQ c C-12 s 15 [Charter]. 
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office in each city. Victims could receive full explanations of decisions not to prosecute in 
writing after the request for a reversal of the original decision is denied. In this case, 
Crown prosecutor‘s re-institution of a prosecution resulting from an internal review 
should not be considered an abuse of process challengeable by the accused. The proposed 
review process only reviews the decision not to prosecute if a prosecution is stopped 
completely and permanently. Termination of a prosecution resulting from a deal made 
between the Crown prosecutor and the accused would not be reviewable in this system. 
Then, judicial review would remain available to victims, but only after the complaint fails 
in the internal review. Victims should start a review proceeding within a limited period of 
time after they are notified of the decisions not to prosecute. In order to provide victims 
more opportunities to make successful challenges to decisions not to prosecute, the 
originally limited standard of review should be extended to include all ―flagrant 
impropriety‖, ―reasonableness‖, and ―correctness‖ standards. In addition, Crown 
prosecutor‘s discretionary power to terminate a prosecution should be set out in a statute. 
A reviewing court could compel a prosecution, direct a reconsideration or quash a 
decision not to prosecute based on different standards of review. Finally, considering the 
possible negative impact on the accused caused by this proposed reform, certain remedies 
to reduce the impact are also suggested at the end of Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER II 
2 Problems in the Current System 
2.1 Charging process and Charging Decision 
In Canada, Crown prosecutions start at the laying of charges. The document listing the 
charges is known as an ―Information‖ which is a written document sworn by an informant 
before a Justice. According to section 504 of the Criminal Code, ―anyone who, on 
reasonable grounds, believes that a person has committed an indictable offence may lay 
an Information in writing and under oath before a justice‖.27 The term ―anyone‖ allows 
civilians to act as informants according to the requirements that are set out in section 504. 
Once the information is filed, a Justice will hear and consider the allegation made by an 
informant and other relevant evidence, and subsequently issue process if he or she 
considers that a case for so doing has been made out according to sections 507 and 
507.1.28  According to section 2, anyone, including victims and their counsel, can be 
qualified as prosecutors to proceed with a prosecution in accordance with this Code.29 
As a crime is considered an act against the state, in most situations, the Crown prosecutor 
will conduct a public prosecution against a suspect on behalf of the public it represents. A 
public prosecution normally starts from the laying of charges by the police. Before the 
accused‘s first appearance in court, the Crown prosecutor will take over the case from the 
police and commence the prosecution. It is rare that the police assume a role as 
                                                          
27
 Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 507. 
28
 Ibid, s 507 
29
 Ibid, s 2: 
“Prosecutor” means the Attorney General or, where the Attorney General does not 
intervene, means the person who institutes proceedings to which this Act applies, and 
includes counsel acting on behalf of either of them 
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prosecutors to proceed with the case, especially in indictable cases.30 In most Canadian 
jurisdictions, it is standard procedure for the Crown prosecutor to review the investigative 
files pertinent to the charges made by the police, after the charges have been laid but 
before the accused‘s first appearance, in a timely fashion for a post-charge screening.31 
The post-charge screening is used to make sure that the laid charges meet the minimum 
criteria for a case to go forward. In British Columbia, Quebec, and New Brunswick, the 
police must obtain the approval of the Crown prosecutor before laying charges.32  
In cases where Crown prosecutors or the police fail to act on a case, private prosecution is 
an option for victims to initiate a prosecution against their violators. Initiation of a private 
prosecution is not normally conditional on the Attorney General‘s consent.33 Such a right 
has been referred as ―a valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on 
                                                          
30
 In some jurisdiction, like Newfoundland, the police still carry a number of summary cases. 
31
 Frater, supra note 15 at 18; See also Steven Penny, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal 
Procedure in Canada (Markham: LexisNexis, 2011) at 447- 448;  Province of Ontario Ministry of Attorney 
General, “Crown Policy Manual” (21 March 2005), online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/crim/cpm/2005/ChargeScreening.pdf>; Criminal 
Justice Branch, Ministry of Attorney General, “BC Crown Counsel Policy Manual (Charge Assessment 
Guidelines)” (2 October 2009), online: British Columbia <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-
service/policy-man/pdf/CHA1-ChargeAssessmentGuidelines-2Oct2009.pdf>. 
32
 Frater, supra note 15 at 18; Penny, Rondinelli & Stribopoulos, supra note 31 at 446, n 53. See also, Law 
Reform Commission of Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecutions: the Attorney General and the Crown 
Prosecutor (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1990) at 69-71 [Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecution]; Criminal Justice Branch, Ministry of Attorney General, “BC 
Crown Counsel Policy Manual (Charge Assessment Decision -Police Appeal)” (18 November 2005), online: 
British Columbia <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-service/policy-man/pdf/CHA1.1-
ChargeAssessmentPoliceAppeal-18Nov2005.pdf> (“It is expected that the police will lay an Information 
only after the approval of charges by Crown Counsel, or, if charges are not approved, upon exhaustion of 
an appeal of that decision by the police”); New Brunswick Attorney General, “Attorney General’s Policy - 
Public Prosecutions“, online: New Nouveau Brunswick Canada 
<http://www2.gnb.ca/content/dam/gnb/Departments/ag-
pg/PDF/en/PublicProsecutionOperationalManual/AttorneyGeneralsPolicy.pdf> (“On completion of the 
investigation, if the police are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to lay an information, they will 
formulate a charge, or charges, based on their assessment of the case and then forward a full report or 
court brief to the appropriate Crown Prosecutor’s office for pre-charge review”). 
33
 MacIssac v Motor Coach Ind Ltd, [1982] 5 WWR 391, 70 CCC (2d) 226 (Man CA) (The court held that a 
private prosecution could take place even without the consent of the Crown prosecutor); See also R v 
Dowson (1983), 7 CCC (3d) 527, [1983] 2 SCR 144 [Dowson] (The Attorney General can intervene into a 
private prosecution and stop it only after the initial review of an Information by a Justice is completed). 
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the part of authority‖.34 However, like most common law countries, private prosecution is 
secondary to public prosecution, and the right to private prosecution needs to give way to 
the interests of justice, if necessary.35 For this reason, the Attorney General is granted a 
broad supervisory power over a private prosecution and the exercise of this power is 
recognized as a fundamental part of the Canadian justice system.36 The Attorney General 
may attend the hearings concerning the allegations and the evidence presented by the 
informant under section 507.1.37 Then he or she can withdraw the charges38 or can stay 
the proceeding based on its discretion according to section 579.39 Since 2002, the Crown 
must be given notice of, and an opportunity to participate in, a pre-inquiry to determine if 
a private prosecution should proceed.40 However, it is also important to maintain the 
autonomy of the private informant in conducting a private prosecution. For this reason, 
the Attorney General only intervenes in a private prosecution when it is necessary, and the 
                                                          
34
 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] AC 435 at 477, [1977] 3 ALL ER 70 (HL) [Gouriet]. 
35
 R v Bradley (1975), 9 OR (2d) 161 at paras 27, 24 CCC (2d) 482 (Ont CA) [Bradley]:  
The Attorney-General, and his agent the Crown Attorney, represent the Sovereign in the 
prosecution of crimes. The role of the private prosecutor, permitted by statute in this 
country, is parallel to but not in substitution for the role of the Attorney-General, and 
where the two roles come into conflict, the role of the Crown's persecutor is paramount, 
where in his opinion the interest of justice require that he intervene and take over the 
private prosecution. 
36
 Dowson, supra note 33 at 535-6 (The court held that “[t]he right of a private citizen to lay an 
information, and the right and duty of the Attorney General to supervise criminal prosecutions are both 
fundamental parts of our criminal justice system”). 
37
 Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 507.1 
38
 Law Reform Commission, Private prosecutions (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986) at 
15-16 
39
 Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 579; R v Osiowy (1989), 50 CCC (3d) 189, 77Sack RI sub nom, Osiowy v 
Linn, PCJ (CA) [Osiowy]  (The Attorney General has authority to intervene and stay a private prosecution); 
Bradley, supra note 35 at para 27 ( “Where the interests of justice require, the Attorney General may 
intervene and take over a private prosecution of a summary conviction offence”); Hamilton v British 
Columbia (Attorney General) (1986), 30 CCC (3d) 65, [1986] BCJ no756(BCSC) [Hamilton] (An intervention 
by the Attorney General in a private prosecution is not a violation of s 7 of the Charter); R v Faber (1987), 
38 CCC (3d) 49, [1987] RJQ 1763 (Que SC) [Faber] (A decision to stay does not infringe s 7 or s 15 of the 
Charter). 
40
 Joan Brockman & Rose V Gordon, An Introduction to Canadian Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 4th ed 
(Toronto: Nelson Education, 2011) at 80 
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intervention strictly follows the policy guideline.41 
2.1.1 Discontinuance of the prosecution 
A public prosecution will not take place if a criminal investigation is terminated. As it is 
extremely rare for public prosecutors to conduct investigations and lay charges, decisions 
to stop a criminal investigation are mainly made by the police based on their discretion. 
Termination can happen at any stage of the investigation, prior to the laying of charges.  
Normally, discontinuance made by the police during an investigation is not considered 
final for victims. As mentioned above, in most situations one remedy is that victims can 
institute a private prosecution if they so desire. In order to proceed with a private 
prosecution, victims can hire private investigators and counsel, submit information to a 
justice by themselves and play a role as prosecutors at trial. Therefore, even though the 
right to a private prosecution is limited and private prosecution might be very expensive, 
when a case ends during an investigatory stage, the Canadian system indeed gives a 
remedy to victims unless and until the Attorney General or the Crown prosecutors decide 
to intervene and stop it.  
Since the Criminal Code permits anyone to lay charges if he or she has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed by an accused person, legally, 
everyone is supposed to have discretionary power equally to lay charges regardless of 
social status or position.42 That is to say, theoretically, even in British Columbia, Quebec 
                                                          
41
 Department of Justice Canada, The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook (Ottawa: Department of 
Justice Canada, 2002), Part VI, c 26, online: Public Prosecution Service of Canada <http://www.ppsc-
sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/fpd/toc.html> [Deskbook]. 
42
 Only for a limited number of offences are the Attorney General’s consent required before charges are 
laid. Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 7 (prosecuting a non-national), s 83.24 (terrorism offences), 136 (3) 
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and New Brunswick,43 the police or other individuals can lay a charge, bypassing the 
Crown prosecutor. Therefore, only after a charge has been laid does the discretionary and 
supervisory power of the Crown prosecutor and Attorney General become powerful and 
dominant in a charging decision in a legal sense.44  
The Crown prosecutor‘s power to withdraw charges is a power derived from the common 
law. The Crown prosecutor has absolute and exclusive control over the withdrawal of 
charges prior to a plea or a preliminary inquiry.45 However, after a plea has been taken at 
trial or evidence heard at a preliminary inquiry, previous consent from a presiding judge 
is required before a charge can be withdrawn. Furthermore, it is comparatively rare that 
the Crown prosecutor would seek to withdraw a charge after plea.46 The same charge 
often cannot be laid if that charge is withdrawn.47  
Through another procedure, the Crown has the statutory power to direct a stay of 
proceedings, if deemed necessary, based on section 579 of the Criminal Code.48 Unlike a 
withdrawal of charges, a proceeding can be re-commenced within a maximum one year 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(giving contrary evidence), 174 (3) (public nudity), 283 (2) (parental abduction of child), 318 (3) 
(advocating genocide), 319 (6) (public incitement of hatred), 347 (7) (criminal interest rate). 
43
 In these three provinces, as a procedural rule, the police needs to acquire a Crown prosecutor’s 
approval before he or she could lay a charge. 
44
 Charging standards and charging discretion will be discussed in detailed in the later charters. 
45
 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecution, supra note 32 at 99-100; Judith A 
Osborne, “The Prosecutor's Discretion to Withdraw Criminal Cases in the Lower Courts” (1983) 25 Can J 
Crim 55 at 58; David Vanek, “Prosecutorial Discretion” (1987-1988) 30 Crim LQ 219 at 224, n 7. 
46
 Vanek, supra note 45 at 225. 
47
 R v Karpinsfi, [1957] SCR 343;R v Leonard, Ex parte Graham (1962),133 CCC 230, 38 WWR 300 (Alta 
SCTD); Brockman & Gordon, supra note 40 at 76. 
48
 Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 579 (1):  
The Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for that purpose may, at any time 
after any proceedings in relation to an accused or a defendant are commenced and 
before judgment, direct the clerk or other proper officer of the court to make an entry 
on the record that the proceedings are stayed by his direction, and such entry shall be 
made forthwith thereafter, whereupon the proceedings shall be stayed accordingly and 
any recognizance relating to the proceedings is vacated. 
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without laying new charges49 and a defendant cannot invoke a plea of autrefois acquit.50 
A stay can happen in any stage of the proceeding, before judgement, in the absence of the 
permission from a presiding judge. After a period of one year, if the Crown prosecutor 
does not re-commence the proceeding, the prosecution will be deemed to have never 
commenced. In practice, most stays are permanent and it is difficult to determine whether 
the Crown prosecutor intended to stay a proceeding permanently or just temporarily.  
The Attorney General has the authority to stay a private prosecution in order to protect 
public interests. It might assess the Information laid by the private prosecutor based on its 
own charging guidelines and decide whether to stay a proceeding or not.51 It should be 
noted that most private prosecutions are stopped because the Attorney General concludes 
that there is ―no reasonable prospect of conviction‖ or ―no evidence‖.52 The Attorney 
General believes that a prosecution, without a reasonable prospect of conviction or 
sufficient evidence, is not carried out in the public interest.  
                                                          
49
 Ibid, s 579 (2):  
Proceedings stayed in accordance with subsection (1) may be recommenced, without 
laying a new information or preferring a new indictment, as the case may be, by the 
Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for that purpose giving notice of the 
recommencement to the clerk of the court in which the stay of the proceedings was 
entered, but where no such notice is given within one year after the entry of the stay of 
proceedings, or before the expiration of the time within which the proceedings could 
have been commenced, whichever is the earlier, the proceedings shall be deemed never 
to have been commenced. 
50
 R v Tateham (1982), 70 CCC (2d) 565, 9 WCB 22 (BCCA). See also: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 
Controlling Criminal Prosecution, supra note 32 at 100. A plea of autrefois acquit (Law French for 
"previously acquitted") means the defendant claims to have been previously acquitted of the same 
offence,  and that he or she therefore cannot be tried for it again. 
51
 Deskbook, supra note 41, Part VI, c 26. 
52
 See e.g. Chen v Alberta (Attorney General), 2007 ABQB 267, [2007] AJ no 458 [Chen]; Ahmadoun v. 
Ontario (Attorney General) (2012), 281 CCC (3d) 270, [2012] OJ no 639 [Ahmadoun]; Kostuch v Alberta 
(Attorney General), (1995), 101 CCC (3d) 321, 43 CR (4th) 81 (Alta CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused 105 
CCC (3d) vi, 133 DLR (4th) vii [Kostuch]; Mitchell v Canada (Attorney General) (1999), 15 Admin LR (3d) 70, 
175 Nfld & PEIR 181 (Nfld SCTD) [Mitchell]; R v Parsons, 2000 BCSC 1408, 78 CRR (2d) 254; R v Laforme 
(2003), 57 WCB (2d) 40, [2003] OJ no 845 (Ont SCJ) [Laforme]; McHale v Ontario (Attorney General), 2011 
CarswellOnt 5984, 239 CRR (2d) 73 [HcHale]. 
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2.2 Charging Decision-making is Sometimes Problematic 
Decades ago, when the accused‘s interests were put in danger due to unavoidable 
uncertainties in charge decision-making, strong prosecutorial discretionary power was 
diminished, making it easier for the accused to fight against state power. The doctrine of 
―abuse of process‖ was introduced into the context of criminal law after the 1964 decision 
in Connelly v Director of Public Prosecution, in which Lord Devlin suggested that a court 
should have the authority to stay a prosecution when the use of the prosecutorial power 
by a prosecutor caused grave injustice to the accused.53 The Supreme Court of Canada 
affirmed this doctrine in the 1985 decision of R v Jewitt.54  
Nowadays, this doctrine is frequently invoked by the accused to fight against the Crown 
prosecutor‘s charging decisions, such as use of the criminal process to collect a debt, pre-
charge delay, multiple trials, the use of direct indictment, improper relationship with other 
branches of government, improperly-motivated proceedings, a lack of independence in 
the charging decision, splitting the Crown‘s case, improper re-institution of proceedings, 
and other misconduct that amounts to ―abuse of process.‖ Other doctrines also emerged to 
deal with those situations where Crown prosecutors maliciously deviated from the legal 
rules to bring a charge against a suspect arbitrarily. To react to maliciously selective 
prosecution, as early as 1951, the Canadian justice system recognized that prosecutorial 
discretion could be interfered with if some oblique motive, which influenced decision-
                                                          
53
 Connelly v Director of Public Prosecution, [1964] AC 1254, [1963] 3 WLR 839 (HL). 
54
 R v Jewitt (1985), 21 CCC (3d) 7 at 13-14 [1985] 2 SCR 128 (SCC) [Jewitt]:  
[T]here is a residual discretion in a trial court judge to stay proceedings where 
compelling an accused to stand trial would violate those fundamental principles of 
justice which underlie the community’s sense of fair play and decency and to prevent 
the abuse of a court’s process through oppressive or vexatious proceedings. 
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making, could be  shown. 55  In recent decades, charging decisions made by Crown 
prosecutors can be subjected to the scrutiny of courts or law societies where they breach 
their statutory or common law duties, or where there is misconduct amounting to an 
―abuse of process‖ on the part of Crown prosecutors in charging decision-making. These 
doctrines can show that Crown prosecutor‘s misconduct in charging decisions have raised 
concerns to the Canadian criminal system to some degree. 
Charging guidelines might have some effects on preventing Crown prosecutors from 
acting outside the boundary of their duty. However, sometimes, personal feelings and 
motives concerning an alleged crime, alleged defendant, and victims might prevail when 
Crown prosecutors making charging decision even though the guidelines try to rule out 
such feelings. 56  Many empirical studies have been undertaken to understand public 
prosecutors‘ patterns in charging decision-making, with studies in the US having been 
especially well developed. After referring to a vast number of research studies on public 
prosecutors‘ behaviours in charging decision-making in the US, Bradley Joseph 
Michelsen gave a brief summary of the way in which evidentiary sufficiency and public 
interest criteria might affect the public prosecutor‘s decision-making.57 According to his 
summary, even though public prosecutors should not attempt to win a case at any cost, 
they are indeed driven by increasing conviction rates. The quote that follows indirectly 
indicates that public prosecutors might be reluctant to take a case in which the evidence is 
comparatively weak but still meets the charging guideline.  
                                                          
55
 R v Lemay (1951), 102 CCC 1 at 6, [1952] 1 SCR 232. 
56
 The sentence “Crown counsel's personal feelings about the accused or the victim” has been included as 
“irrelevant criteria” in every charging guideline. 
57
 Bradley Joseph Michelsen, Elected Texas District and County Attorneys’ Perceptions of Victim 
Involvement in Criminal Prosecutions (MA Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of Texas at 
Arlington, 2007) [unpublished] at 12-14. 
21 
 
 
 ... prosecutors are more likely to file charges when a serious offense was 
committed. In addition, there is an increased probability that a prosecutor 
will decide to charge a suspect with a crime when strong evidence exists in 
a case. Prosecutors are also more likely to pursue a case when the suspect 
is a repeat offender and the culpability of the defendant is evident58 
This phenomenon becomes worse when it is combined with the following non-legal 
factors summarised by Michelsen:  
With regards to suspect characteristics, prosecutors are more likely to file 
charges against non-white suspects. Additionally, studies have shown that 
prosecutors are more likely to pursue a case when a black suspect commits 
an offense against a white victim  ... Studies have shown that prosecutors 
are more likely to charge a male suspect than a female suspect... Schmidt 
and Steury found that prosecutors are more likely to charge suspects who 
are unemployed. Victim characteristics could affect prosecutors charging 
decision. According to Stanko, prosecutors use victim characteristics, not 
legal factors, to determine if conviction is likely to occur in a particular 
case. Furthermore, prosecutors usually devote limited resources to cases 
that have victims who will be perceived by the judge and jury to be ―stand-
up‖ witnesses. In assessing a victim‘s credibility, prosecutors rely on 
society‘s perception of who is credible and not deserving of victimization. 
For instance, Myers and Hagan found that prosecutors more often file 
criminal charges when the victim is older, white, male, and employed. 
Female victims who deviate from traditional society norms of female 
behavior, or engage in ―precipatory‖ behavior, are deemed less credible. 
Another important factor that has shown to influence prosecutors‘ charging 
decisions is the relationship between the victim and the suspect. Several 
studies have shown that prosecutors are less likely to file charges when the 
victim and the offender knew each other. Myers and Hagan suggested that 
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 Ibid at 12 [footnote omitted]. 
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a victim‘s prior relationship with the offender may raise some questions 
about the truthfulness of the victim‘s story and may lead the victim to 
refuse to cooperate as the case moves through the criminal process ... [In 
rape and sexual assault cases], [s]tudies indicated that prosecutors are less 
likely to file criminal charges when a rape victim has a non-traditional 
work history, such as exotic dancer, masseuse, or prostitute. Similarly, 
research has shown that prosecutors are less likely to peruse sexual assault 
case when victims have a history of risk taking behavior, such as 
hitchhiking, drinking, or drug use. Studies also have revealed that 
prosecutors are less likely to pursue a sexual assault case when the victim 
has a questionable reputation or moral character.59 
In this case, the public prosecutors are likely to assess the prospect of conviction and 
allocate prosecutorial resources partly based on the characteristics of the suspect, victims, 
and their relationship. One of the concerns in the criminal justice system is that people 
might not always apply the law objectively and impartially. Of course, as a part of the 
prosecutorial strategy, these factors are frequently used by public prosecutors to predict 
the credibility of witnesses before a judge or juries in order to determine the evidential 
sufficiency of a case. However, Michelsen categorizes these factors as a non-legal 
influence on public prosecutors when deciding whether to continue a case. This is 
because public prosecutors are more likely to have personal judgements and biases 
against victims and the nature of an alleged offense due to these factors and, as a result, 
are reluctant to continue a case regardless of other available evidence.60 This indeed risks 
the possibility that public prosecutors might draw an unfair or wrong conclusion in 
deciding whether to prosecute.  
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 Ibid at 13-14 [footnotes omitted]. 
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 Michelsen, supra note 57. 
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Even though this research was conducted in the US, it reflects a common social 
phenomenon and human characteristic that, although public prosecutors have been trained 
to be legal professionals, they are not able to avoid personal feelings in charging decision-
making. Charging guidelines exist in order to regulate the charging decision-making 
process so that charging decisions can be made as objectively and fairly as possible. 
Nevertheless, they are not capable of making public prosecutors abandon completely their 
personal feelings and attitudes towards the cases when making charging decisions 
because thoughts and feelings cannot be regulated. Therefore, Michelsen‘s research, as 
well as other American research, is valuable in indicating and inferring the prosecutorial 
behavior in charging decision-making in Canada. 
There is a dearth of comprehensive and methodologically sophisticated empirical research 
directly dealing with prosecutors‘ behavioral patterns in charging decision-making in 
Canada, but the existing documents show that non-legal factors might play a role in 
Crown prosecutor‘s charging decision-making when combined with other factors. The 
nature of a crime and the character of the accused can have an impact on Crown 
prosecutors‘ judgements on whether to prosecute or not. B A Grosman found that Crown 
prosecutors were likely to withdraw charges in minor sexual offences if ―the notoriety of 
the offence and the social status of the accused will likely result in suffering greatly out of 
proportion of the seriousness of the offence‖ and the withdrawal was not a result of the 
prosecutors‘ evaluation of the cases‘ merits, but moral consideration of the potential 
damage to the accused‘s future if convicted of a notorious offence. 61  In supporting 
Grosman‘s research, Judith A Osborne found that, when a complainant failed to appear in 
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 B A Grosman, The prosecutor; an inquiry into the exercise of discretion (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 1969) at 37-39. 
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court as scheduled, the nature of a crime and the character of the accused would play 
significant roles in Crown prosecutors withdrawing charges. In one of his collected cases, 
which was about the indecent exposure, the complainant did not appear in court. 62 
Consequently, the Crown prosecutor withdrew the charge instead of requesting an 
adjournment to give him more time to subpoena the complainant. It was revealed that 
such a withdrawal was made solely based on the Crown prosecutor‘s belief that the 
accused did not commit the offence on purpose based on his family background.63  
The Crown prosecutor might be influenced by other external circumstances, such as 
political trends and increasing criminal complaints in the country. Through studying the 
prosecution of criminal conspiracy, Wes Wilson expressed his concerns about politically 
motivated prosecutions of criminal conspiracy. 64  He pointed out that, because of the 
vague and broad definition of ―conspiracy‖ and loose rules of evidence, there is an 
increasing threat that Crown prosecutors might utilize criminal charges to suppress 
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 Osborne, supra note 45 at 67-68. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 Wes Wilson, “The Political Use of Criminal Conspiracy” (1984) 42 UT Fac L Rev 60 at 68: 
In State security legislation and criminal offences such as sedition, it is characteristically 
the case that wide discretion is afforded the State in prosecuting perceived threats. 
When this is compounded by the vagueness, uncertainty, and prosecutorial discretion 
embodied in criminal conspiracy, the potential threat to civil liberties and the possibility 
of utilizing the charge to suppress political dissent is increased. This is of particular 
concern in that the government is the sole determiner of what constitutes the interests 
of the State and what is a threat to its security … Reliance on the good faith of the State 
and the just exercise of prosecutorial discretion is frequently put forward as an apology 
not only for conspiracy law in relation to "security" legislation, but in defence of 
conspiracy doctrine as a whole - a rationalization of its most flagrantly unfair flaws, and a 
response to anyone who would suggest anything in the way of reform beyond tinkering 
with isolated problem areas. Yet an unjust law is always an unjust law, and it does not 
become any less so from infrequent application. In times of social upheaval, or in cases 
of panicked over-reaction to perceived threats, the State has not hesitated to apply the 
most powerful coercive instruments at its disposal. If a law is unjust, or has the potential 
for indiscriminate application to deprive citizens of their civil rights in times of social 
unrest, that law should itself be attacked (footnote omitted). 
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political dissent.65 David Vanek worried that the pressure caused by heavy caseloads can 
push Crown prosecutors to take advantage of their discretionary power to dispose of cases 
on their daily calendars by using short cuts.66 In fact, according to the report of the 
Canadian Federal-Provincial Task Force on Victims of Crime, in plea-bargaining 
processes, there were many instances where charges were withdrawn without proper 
consideration of the available evidence.67 Crown prosecutors‘ subjective opinions towards 
a case are also a factor. Lucinda Vandervort found that, in Canada, Crown prosecutor‘s 
personal attitudes played a significant role in charging decision-making in sexual assault 
cases.68 
In Canada, it appears that sometimes Crown prosecutors prosecute someone for a 
particular act, but do not prosecute others who have done the very same thing. When 
talking about possible selective prosecution in Canada, Rober W Hubbard, Peter M Brauti 
and Candice Welsch believe that selective prosecutions indeed have been launched in the 
country. However, because the challenges on the grounds of selective prosecution 
experienced a low success rate, most of the challenges were disguised by other grounds of 
―abuse of process‖.69 Even though there is a lack of actual cases, some scholars, such as 
Frater, Welling, and Mackinnon, believe that malicious and selective non-prosecution 
does exist.70  
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It also can be inferred from some studies in similar fields such as the behaviours of the 
police and judge/juror that decisions made by Canadian Crown prosecutors may also be 
influenced by personal bias or discrimination, and therefore they are not always as square 
and fair as we expect. Personal biases and discrimination against certain groups of people 
do exist in Canada as a part of the culture.  
In a study of mock juror ratings of guilt in Canada, Jeffrey E Pfeifer and James R P 
Ogloff concluded that prejudicial attitudes, based on ethnicity, do indeed exist in Canada 
today.71 They found that bias against English Canadians and good impressions of French 
Canadian women could affect juror‘s subjective perception of victims at trial.72 As well, 
the study also shows that the determination of guilt could be influenced by the ethnic 
background of the victims.73 In another study, Pfeifer discovered that accused persons 
with high social status are less likely to be found guilty than their counterparts with low 
social status, regardless of their race. However, when the accused have the same social 
status, the Black individual is more likely to be found guilty than the White individual.74 
Evelyn M Maeder, Annik Mossière and Liann Cheung found that the judgments of the 
mock jury in domestic violence cases might be influenced by the race and gender of the 
jury, which cause attitudinal and perceptional differences towards to the nature of the 
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defendant and the alleged crime at issue.75  
In a research study on whether Toronto police officials engage in ―Racial Profiling‖, 
similarly, Ron Melchers found that ―it was highly plausible that, once all legally relevant 
factors have been accounted for, differences in the treatment of groups according to race 
will remain‖, and concluded that ―the possibility of discrimination cannot be excluded‖.76 
In addition, police who have racial biases are more likely to stop an investigation solely 
based on their bias without carefully assessing all available relevant evidence, according 
to Oscar H Gandy and Lemi Baruh.77 Ray Kuszelewski and Dianne L Martin considered 
that some of the police misconduct is caused by biases and assumptions about race, class 
and gender.78 For example, complaints made by vulnerable and low status victims are 
easy to be set aside.  
Similar to the above-mentioned two fields, some scholars doubt the existence of the 
―complete impartiality‖ of judges in actuality even though so many rules have been set to 
require judges to act impartially. R Abella argued that judges‘ own values, assumptions, 
and experiences can significantly affect their judgements on an issue. 79  A similar 
argument was also made by Lord Justice Scrutton.80 These studies suggest that some non-
                                                          
75
 Evelyn M Maeder, Annik Mossière & Liann Cheung, “Canadian Mock Juror Attitudes and Decisions in 
Domestic Violence Cases Involving Asian and White Interracial and Intraracial Couples” (2012) 28 (4) JIV 
667. 
76
 Ron Melchers, “Do Toronto Police Engage in Racial Profiling” (2003) 45 (3) Can J Criminol Crim 347 at 
362-363. 
77
 Oscar H Gandy & Lemi Baruh, “Racial Profiling: They Said It Was Against the Law!” (2006) 3(1) UOLTJ 297 
at 303-304. 
78
 Ray Kuszelewski & Dianne L Martin, “The Perils of Poverty: Prostitutes' Rights, Police Misconduct, and 
Poverty Law” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 835 at 847-848. 
79
 R Abella, “The Dynamic Nature of Equality” in S L Martin & K E Mahoney, eds, Equality 
and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 3 at 8-9. 
80
 T E Scrutton, “The Work of the Commercial Courts” (1921) 1 Cambridge LJ 6 at 8:  
This is rather difficult to achieve in any system. I am not speaking of conscious 
impartiality; but the habits you are trained in, the people with whom you mix, lead to 
28 
 
 
legal factors, such as personal bias, values, assumptions, cultural backgrounds, and 
experiences, could play significant roles in Crown prosecutors‘ charging decision-making.  
It is impossible to regulate subjective perceptions with legal rules just as the law cannot 
control what people think. Studies about social science suggest that general belief or 
stereotypes associated with the characteristics of the stranger‘s group have an essential 
influence on people‘s decision-making and judgment on a person unknown to them.81 
This is supported by the observation of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, which 
states ―practical experience and psychology both confirm that anyone can stereotype, 
even people who are well meaning and not overtly biased.‖82 People may strongly believe 
in such stereotypes if they have similar previous experiences or constantly receive such 
information through prevailing pop-culture or media.83  Studies suggest that decision-
makers are likely to rely on group stereotypes if they have to make a vast number of 
decisions in a timely fashion, especially in cases where potential criminal or terrorist 
activities are concerned.84 
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Non-legal factors might lead to an irrational and unjust decision not to prosecute that will, 
in turn, cause great injustice and unfairness to victims. Traditionally, in the Canadian 
criminal legal system, victims‘ interests are subsumed in the state‘s interests. I believe 
that, even though the Crown prosecutor is not acting on behalf of victims, in most 
occasions, they will not deliberately inflict harm on those victims. However, in a case 
where Crown prosecutors appear to commit misconduct when deciding not to prosecute a 
case or to stop a private prosecution, victims‘ interests will be put in danger and victims 
will be unjustifiably deprived of the state protection they deserve. 
2.3 Insufficient remedies and rights 
When a prosecutor wrongs victims, victims have limited power to redress these wrongs 
because of the lack of sufficient and effective remedies and procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings. 
2.3.1 Information Receiver  
In current system, victims are merely information receivers. Not only cannot victims 
receive full information regarding their cases, but they also have no power to respond to 
the information. As stated in the preamble to the Ontario Victims‘ Bill of Rights, ―the 
justice system should operate in a manner that does not increase the suffering of victims 
of crime and that does not discourage victims of crime from participating in the justice 
process‖.85 However, many scholars have commented on the fact that victims‘ rights in 
Canada are comparatively passive and vague than they should be, and the rights do little 
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to alter the victim‘s traditional power position.86 This is so in charging decisions. The 
principle of giving victims information about the status of an investigation, the 
scheduling, progress and outcome of the proceedings is almost duplicated word by word 
from the Canadian Statement in most provincial victims‘ bills of rights without 
elaboration. Legislation concerning victims‘ rights should provide detailed information 
about how this principle is to be put into force. It should at least give the reader a sense 
that such a principle is genuinely enforceable in the current framework of the criminal 
justice system. For example, if victims should be able to access the information about the 
progress of a particular criminal proceeding pertinent to the alleged crime, should 
corresponding agents provide the information to victims automatically or only upon their 
requests? Not every victim knows where and how to ask for the information. What type 
of information related to the progress of criminal proceedings should be available to the 
victims? The corresponding agents can reply to the victim simply by saying ―we decide 
not to proceed with your case because of insufficient evidence.‖ It seems that the agent 
has complied with the principle, but in fact, victims might feel the information 
insufficient. If the agent fails to comply with the principle, what are the remedies for the 
victims and should that agent be disciplined? If there is no sanction for the violation, the 
enforcement of such a principle could be highly ineffective.  
Only in Ontario and British Columbia do the statutes mention that victims can receive 
information on the reasons behind charging decisions. Section 6 of the Victims of Crime 
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Act of British Columbia87 lays down in a mandatory tone that ―the reasons why a decision 
was made respecting charges must‖ be given to victims at their request,88 and section 2 
(1) of Ontario‘s Victims‘ Bill of Rights also states that ―[v]ictims should have access to 
information about: … the charges laid with respect to the crime and, if no charges are 
laid, the reasons why no charges are laid…‖89 However, even these two provisions do not 
provide any comprehensive information about how detailed reasoning should be given to 
victims. In Ontario, the ―right‖ that is put in the name of the ―right of victims‖, together 
with others put down in its Victims‘ Bill of Rights, is considered a ―principle‖ rather than 
an enforceable ―statutory right‖. It was held in Vanscoy v Ontario that ―[t]he Act is a 
statement of principle and social policy, beguilingly clothed in the language of legislation. 
It does not establish any statutory rights for the victims of crime.‖90 
It seems that the criminal justice system has attempted to treat victims of crime with due 
respect by informing them of decisions not to prosecute without undue delay. In fact, the 
decisions not to prosecute themselves and the lack of acceptable explanation might afflict 
victims with emotional distress when victims (at least for most victims who want a 
criminal prosecution) are struck by such unexpected bad news. The victims will be upset 
if Crown prosecutors refuse to give them acceptable explanations for decisions not to 
prosecute. The situation will get worse if the victims realise that no sufficient and 
effective remedies can be sought if the decisions are unjust and unfair.  
As a development, Manitoba incorporates victims‘ consultative roles in charging 
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decision-making. Section 14 of its Victims' Bill of Rights generally encourages Crown 
prosecutors to consult victims when making a decision on whether to lay a charge.91 The 
effect of the consultation sometimes is not so significant. Sometimes, conflicting opinions 
between victims and Crown prosecutors might be buffered through sufficient 
communication, in which victims may be convinced by Crown prosecutors that 
prosecutions are not in their best interests before the actual decisions not to prosecute is 
delivered. However, where the conflict cannot be solved and victims have reasonable 
grounds to believe that a decision not to prosecute is improper, the consultative power 
does not give victims much help. In other words, it might give them help, but it leaves 
them without any available recourse or control. In conclusion, the Manitoba system is 
trying to incorporate victims‘ input in charging decision-making, but the result is not as 
helpful as it should be for victims. As a result, victims are still mere information 
receivers. Kent Roach described this phenomenon as the following:  
 [P]olice and prosecutors could treat the new consumer [victims] politely 
and give them information about what was happening. Nevertheless, 
victims would likely remain frustrated by the lack of control over the end 
product and by their involuntary status as consumers of criminal justice.92 
Of course, a criminal justice system is not a department store that might accept every little 
petty complaint from its consumers. However, where there is a patent miscarriage of 
justice on the part of the Crown prosecutor in deciding whether not to prosecute, the 
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system should provide a forum to its consumers ---- victims ---- to complain about it and 
give appropriate remedies.  
2.3.2 Civil Proceedings 
If victims are denied access to the criminal justice system because of the prosecutors‘ 
refusal to initiate a prosecution, they can still theoretically initiate a tort proceeding 
through which they can claim monetary compensation and injunctive reliefs. However, 
tort proceedings are not always accessible to victims and, when they are accessible, their 
outcomes and effects are not always sufficient to replace the criminal ones. Indigent 
victims cannot afford a tort proceeding, so they can only rely on the public prosecution. 
As well, in situations where the defendant is much richer than the victim, the defendant 
has rich resources and power to help him defend the civil suit. Sometimes public 
prosecution can be used to even the scale between the rich and the poor. By contrast, in 
some situations, victims may walk away empty handed after a tort suit when the 
defendant is impecunious, which will be a Pyrrhic victory for victims. 
According to one theory, the criminal prosecution can better protect the victims‘ personal 
safety. It is true that many scholars propose deterrent effect is just what tort law is for 
primarily. However, in reality, as commented by s Kenneth L Wainstein, tort remedies 
lack deterrent force, which makes them less effective in preventing the offender from 
repeating his or her acts against victims.93 This is supported by other studies that show the 
ineffectiveness of civil injunctive reliefs, such as restraining orders. 94  Furthermore, 
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regarding pecuniary sanctions,95  the rich defendant will choose to commit the tort if 
benefits of the tort outweigh the potential monetary loss if he or she loses in a tort suit. 
For the poor, they might attempt to commit the tort if they can be better off through such 
action, and they would not worry about the possible tort claim because they are not able 
to pay for the pecuniary remedy anyway. In that case, they might choose to take 
opportunities. From another perspective, a potential civil claim brought by victims could 
be a trigger for an offender to threaten victims or to commit other violent acts against 
them during or before a civil proceeding. Even though the same could happen as a result 
of criminal proceedings, victims enjoy less protection during civil proceedings than 
during criminal proceedings. This is because, as a general principle, victims of crime are 
entitled to basic protection at all stages of a criminal proceeding.96  
More importantly, in some cases, tort proceedings are insufficient to meet victims‘ 
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psychological needs. It cannot be denied that some victims might care more about 
monetary compensation. For these victims, monetary remedies in tort proceedings are 
indeed more tempting. Victims‘ preference for monetary remedies could always be a case, 
no matter in commercial crimes or non-commercial crimes. However, that does not 
diminish the significance and necessity of the criminal prosecution for other victims. 
Damages caused by some types of acts, such as rape, murder, torture, cannot be recovered 
merely by monetary relief, and not every victim prefers monetary compensation.  
Victims who prefer criminal prosecution might want retribution on their violator(s) and 
social acknowledgement of their suffering. Retribution is still one of the main goals of 
criminal law that is used to ―balance the scale‖ by punishing criminals when a victim is 
improperly taken advantage.97 It is true that sometimes victims might feel let down by the 
sanctions imposed on offenders because they never receive the retribution they want. 
However, in order to better include victims in the judicial process, which would provide 
victims with a greater possibility of satisfaction in sentencing and its outcome, the 
Canadian criminal justice system has granted victims‘ rights to submit an impact 
statement to a sentencing judge. Most judges consider that victim impact statements are 
helpful and relevant in determining proper sentences.98 Furthermore, in some situations, 
the feeling of catharsis might appear as early as at the time that the accused is charged.99  
As well, as many have argued, the guilt and criminal accountability of the offender can 
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only be legally proven by a criminal judgement,100 and according to Jamie O'Connell, 
"[i]f [criminal] trials symbolize society's acknowledgement and condemnation of what 
survivors suffered, those who participate in them... may feel especially acknowledged and 
validated."101 In this sentence, O‘Connell might specifically refer to victims‘ participation 
at trial, but victims‘ involvement in criminal proceedings is not limited to the trial stage. 
The victims‘ right to submit a victim impact statement can also have the same effect, and 
the realization of this benefit depends on the institution of criminal proceedings.  
Tort law is built on the corrective justice theory, which is concerned about wrongful loss 
and wrongful gain and is to protect a distribution of holdings (or entitlements) from 
distortions that arise from those unjust enrichments and wrongful loss.102 It is true that 
―right‖ and ―wrong‖ fit within corrective justice theory naturally. The issuance of the tort 
remedies establishes the fact that defendant‘s acts against victims are a violation of a 
norm governing people‘s interaction in a society.103  That is the justification why the 
victims are entitled such remedies.104  Even though the outcomes of tort proceedings, 
admittedly, are dependent on the finding of wrongdoing, it is argued that they still 
comparatively lack social condemnation of the accused and acknowledgement of victims‘ 
suffering.105 The tort proceeding is aimed at restoration for victims, and the establishment 
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of fault is to justify victims‘ entitlement to compensation. This reflects the fact that, even 
though a victim succeeds in a tort claim, the remedies can hardly be legally categorized as 
a sanction imposed on the defendant for his fault. Even though the tort outcome might 
sometimes show the act is committed intentionally and with the sort of moral 
wrongdoing, the level of its condemnation of the defendants‘ wrongful act is lower than a 
criminal conviction. For this reason, some victims might feel tort proceedings cannot 
completely replace the significance of criminal proceedings.106 
2.3.3 Informal Complaint 
In Canada, there is an informal procedure through which victims can write a letter to the 
Attorney General requesting a reconsideration of the decisions not to prosecute. For 
example, in Labrador Métis Nation v Canada107 and Gentles v Ontario,108 both applicants 
made a written submission to the Attorney General after they were informed of the 
decision not to prosecute, hoping the Attorney General would change his mind. In both 
cases, the Attorney General insisted on dropping the case after victims‘ counsel re-
presented the case to him. They only filed an application for judicial review when their 
attempt failed. In an informal complaint, the Attorney General and Crown prosecutor still 
monopolize the decision-making power and they are not obliged to reconsider the 
complained decisions. When a decision not to prosecute is maintained, victims cannot tell 
whether their complaints have been carefully considered without a formal procedure, 
given that there is no legal consequence if it is not an obligation of the Crown prosecutor 
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to review its decision based on the complaint made by victims.  
2.3.4 Difficulties of Access to Current Judicial Review 
In theory, victims can seek judicial review of the decision not to prosecute from a 
competent court.
109
 In this manner, victims might have a decision not to prosecute made 
by the Crown prosecutors or the Attorney General reversed. Even though nowadays 
prerogative discretion is theoretically reviewable under certain circumstances, the 
judiciary is extremely reluctant to interfere with the Crown prosecutor‘s exercise of 
discretion in charging decisions. In fact, in recent decades, the Crown prosecutors‘ 
discretion to decide whether to prosecute has been subject to challenge. However, 
permissible grounds and standards of evidential proof have been too rigorous for victims 
to ever achieve success in judicial review proceedings.110 Even though the standard of 
review for other discretionary administrative decisions has been lowered in the context of 
administrative law, the change does not extend to judicial review of the decision not to 
prosecute. In past applications, victims have attempted either to seek an order in a nature 
of certiorari to quash a decision to stay a private prosecution
111
 or to seek an order in a 
nature of mandamus to compel the Crown prosecutor to prosecute.
112
 However, these 
applications ended up with no finding of abuse of discretion. 
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The judicial review for charging decisions has not caught up with the development of that 
for other administrative discretionary decisions. Victims are unlikely to succeed in the 
application for judicial review of the decision not to prosecute for several reasons. First, 
the judiciary is extremely reluctant to interfere with the Crown prosecutor‘s exercise of 
discretion in deciding whether to prosecute. Second, the standard of review and proof are 
very rigorous. Third, victims can rarely find conclusive evidence in order to support their 
arguments.  
In order to guarantee that the Attorney General and the Crown prosecutor can function 
effectively and efficiently in charging decision-making, some discretionary powers are 
given to them in situations where there is a need to discontinue a case. The nature of the 
charging decisions was described in Krieger v Law Society of Alberta: 
In making independent decisions on prosecutions, the Attorney General 
and his agents exercise what is known as prosecutorial discretion. This 
discretion is generally exercised directly by agents, the Crown attorneys, 
as it is uncommon for a single prosecution to attract the Attorney General's 
personal attention. 
"Prosecutorial discretion" is a term of art. It does not simply refer to any 
discretionary decision made by a Crown prosecutor. Prosecutorial 
discretion refers to the use of those powers that constitute the core of the 
Attorney General's office and which are protected from the influence of 
improper political and other vitiating factors by the principle of 
independence. 
… 
Without being exhaustive, we believe the core elements of prosecutorial 
discretion encompass the following: (a) the discretion whether to bring the 
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prosecution of a charge laid by police; (b) the discretion to enter a stay of 
proceedings in either a private or public prosecution, as codified in the 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 579 and 579.1…(d) the discretion 
to withdraw from criminal proceedings altogether…113 
2.3.4.1 Judicial Reluctance to Interfere 
Judges appear to believe that the court is not in a position to deal with prosecutorial 
charging decisions for several reasons. First, the interference with the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to prosecute can raise the issue of separation 
of powers.
114
 In R v Balderstone et al, Monnin CJM stated as follows: 
The judicial and executive must not mix. These are two separate and 
distinct functions. The accusatorial officers lay informations or in some 
cases prefer indictments. Courts or the curia listen to cases brought to their 
attention and decide them on their merits or on meritorious preliminary 
matters. If a judge should attempt to review the actions or conduct of the 
Attorney General – barring flagrant impropriety - he could be falling into a 
field which is not his and interfering with the administrative and 
accusatorial function of the Attorney General or his officers. That a judge 
must not do.
115
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added]. 
114
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Relatedly, courts do not want to be responsible for the institution of the prosecution.
116
 
Once the court opens the door for the judicial review of charging decisions, increasing 
applications to seek judicial review of such decisions will be brought to the court and the 
court will become the ultimate place to decide whether to prosecute.  
Second, it is also a concern that judges might lose their independence and impartiality if 
they are given overly broad judicial power over the exercise of discretion by Crown 
prosecutors and the Attorney General.
117
 Once judges get the power to control the 
institution of a prosecution, they are likely to become ―supervising prosecutors‖ and start 
considering administrative issues, which may or may not include many non-legal 
considerations. Some of these issues might not be appropriate for a court to consider. 
Allowing judges to consider these issues will undermine the court‘s objective 
independence and impartiality in deciding the merits of a case that is brought to it merely 
based on legal considerations.  
Third, many scholars and judges consider that discretion is necessary for a criminal 
justice system to function efficiently. A court second-guessing the Crown prosecutors‘ 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion will narrow the discretionary power of Crown 
prosecutors in making charging decisions: 
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to 
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the 
strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the 
Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the 
Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the 
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kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision 
in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. 
Examining the basis of prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, 
threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives 
and decision effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement 
policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly 
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.
118
 
Crown prosecutors and Attorney General are considered the most competent and 
experienced authorities in making charging decisions because they have mastered the 
complexity of charge decision-making through day-to-day practice.
119
 The assessment of 
the same set of existing factual and legal materials by two equally reasonable persons 
could result in both a decision to prosecute and a decision not to. Both decisions might be 
equally reasonable or reasonable within a range of possibility. In this case, the court 
should respect and uphold the choice made by the Crown prosecutor who is specialized in 
the field.  
Finally, the system always has numerous legitimate reasons to reject a check on the 
prosecutorial discretion, but it seems to me it just wants to protect the prerogative position 
and power of the Crown prosecutor. It can be attributed to people‘s inertia to change their 
traditional practice - unfettered discretionary power of the Crown prosecutor to institute a 
prosecution. 
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2.3.4.2 High Standard of Review 
In principle, decisions not to prosecute are reviewable by the court, but for the 
aforementioned reasons, courts give the highest order of deference to the judgment of the 
Crown prosecutor or the Attorney General in making those charging decisions, and 
―flagrant impropriety‖ must be proven by an applicant for judicial review to succeed. 
Looking into behavioural problems of the Crown prosecutor is not equal to probing into 
the reason behind a decision. Courts examine only conduct amounting to ―flagrant 
impropriety‖ of the Crown prosecutor in the charging decision-making process, which 
make a charging decision look suspicious and questionable immediately. It will not probe 
into the deeper cause or consider different factors attributing to the decision not prosecute. 
Misconduct on the part of Crown prosecutors and the Attorney General that constitutes 
―flagrant impropriety‖ has been described in Kostuch v Alberta (Attorney General): 
We agree with the statement of Miller A.C.J. in Re W.A. Stephenson 
Construction (Western) Ltd. (1991) 81 Alta L.R. (2) 214, 121 A.R. 219 
(Q.B.), 66 C.C.C. 201 that flagrant impropriety can only be established by 
proof of misconduct bordering on corruption, violation of the law, bias 
against or for a particular individual or offence.
120
 
The definition has been quoted and followed by subsequent cases repetitively. In Perks v 
Ontario, the Court defined ―flagrant impropriety‖ as ―misconduct bordering on corruption, 
violation of the law, bias or improper motive‖. 121  In Gentles v Ontario, judicial 
intervention is permissible if ―it is shown that the Attorney General's actions were 
flagrantly improper, or prompted by improper motives or bad faith, or were so wrong as 
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to violate the conscience of the community‖.122 In spite of the different wording, ―flagrant 
impropriety‖ refers generally to those behaviors and actions committed by the Crown 
prosecutor and Attorney General that were summarised in Kostuch during the charging 
decision-making process. Currently, grounds amounting to ―flagrant impropriety‖ are 
strictly limited to the above-mentioned situations, and ―flagrant impropriety‖ is the sole 
standard automatically applied in judicial review applications for decisions not to 
prosecute in most Canadian courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada.
123
 This 
standard of judicial review is indistinctively employed for compelling a prosecution and 
quashing a decision to stop a private prosecution. 
Various arguments have been raised to expand the definition of ―flagrant impropriety‖ on 
the part of the Crown prosecutor and Attorney General, but none of them has ever 
succeeded. Courts have always ruled in favor of the Crown prosecutor and Attorney 
General.  
The court rejected Charter rights violations as permissible grounds to review charging 
decisions. In Kostuch v Alberta (Attorney General),
124
 the counsel of the applicant argued 
that the stay of the private prosecution deprived the applicant of his liberty of access to a 
court of law and justice, and created a state-imposed psychological stress for him, which 
was a violation of section 7 of the Charter (Charter s 7). The court rejected the argument 
on the grounds that Charter s 7 did not give the citizen unlimited rights to conduct a 
private prosecution and that the rights of the accused should be taken into consideration. 
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A similar argument was made in Gentles v Ontario
125
 where the court referred to the 
reasoning in Kostuch and found no violation of Charter s 7. The court dismissed the 
application for review because the applicant did not raise any issues concerning ―flagrant 
impropriety‖, which would allow the court to intervene, and Charter s 7 violations do not 
constitute ―flagrant impropriety‖. In McHale v Ontario (Attorney General), 126  the 
applicant filed an Information alleging the putative accused had committed common 
nuisance contrary to section 180 of Criminal Code by failing to deploy police whose job 
it was to prevent the riot, and the prosecution was later stayed by the Crown prosecutor. 
The applicant claimed that, by staying the prosecution, the Crown prosecutor had showed 
bias in favor of the police, which breached the Criminal Code as the obstruction of justice 
and a violation of section 15 of the Charter. The court followed the ruling in R v Power
127
 
and held that Charter rights violations did not constitute grounds to allow the court power 
to review a prosecutorial decision and grant extraordinary remedies.  
Allegations of violations of aboriginal rights were also made to challenge decisions not to 
prosecute, but never succeeded. In Labrador Metis Nation v Canada (Attorney 
General),
128
 the applicant alleged that a stay of a private prosecution against the Province 
of Newfoundland and Labrador impaired aboriginal rights and interests because the 
Attorney General failed to consult aboriginal people. The prosecution was about potential 
violations of the Fisheries Act
129
 because of the Province‘s construction of a bridge and a 
causeway over river that was claimed under the aboriginal right or title. The court found 
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the argument unsustainable on several grounds: First, unlike the decision to construct the 
bridge and causeway, the stay of the private prosecution would not directly affect or 
impair aboriginal right or title. As well, the duty of consultation is aimed at promoting an 
aboriginal right, but the nullification of a stay would not have promoted the aboriginal 
right at issue. Second, a duty to consult would improperly influence the Attorney General 
exercising discretionary power in terminating a prosecution. Third, the Crown 
prosecutor‘s manual only required the Crown prosecutor to recognize the duty of 
consultation, which was different from imposing an obligation to consult.
130
 Other 
allegations such as a simple ―error of law‖ were also dismissed. In Zhang v. Canada 
(Attorney General), the Federal Court of Appeal held that a simple ―error of law‖ did not 
constitute ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the Crown prosecutor in charging 
decision-making.
131
 The aforementioned cases show that the court allows only those 
limited instances of ―flagrant impropriety‖ mentioned at the beginning of this section, a 
highly deferential and limited standard of review.   
By contrast, courts in Quebec seem to be applying a broader definition of ―flagrant 
impropriety‖. The scope of review extends to the decision per se. If a decision is patently 
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unreasonable, it amounts to ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the Crown prosecutor in 
decision-making, which allows the court to interfere with discretionary decisions. In 
Bérubé c Québec (Procureur général), the Court held: 
The stay of proceedings ordered by the chief deputy, in accordance with 
his discretionary power, was not subject to judiciary review save in cases 
of abuse of process, of "flagrant impropriety" or if the decision proved 
"carrément déraisonnable" … However, a decision labelled "carrément 
déraisonnable" was equivalent to a "flagrant impropriety". In other words, 
the applicant bore the burden of proving that staying the proceedings was a 
decision "carrément déraisonnable", to the point that it constituted a 
flagrant impropriety equivalent to an abuse of process likely to blemish the 
image of justice.
132
 
Under this definition, some unsuccessful applications might have succeeded. For example, 
in Mitchell v Canada (Attorney General),
133
  the court found that the existing evidence 
only showed the lack of diligence on the part of the prosecuting authority, which was not 
sufficient to form prima facie flagrantly improper behaviour. However, the lack of 
diligence on the part of a prosecuting authority might have established a reasonable 
ground to believe that the resulting decision was patently unreasonable, which would 
have permitted the court‘s intervention. In my opinion, it would be very strange that a 
decision resulting from prosecutors‘ flagrantly improper actions constitutes miscarriage 
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of justice, but wrong or patently unreasonable decisions resulting from other reasons do 
not.  
However, the definition used in Quebec is not accepted in other jurisdictions in Canada. 
In Kostuch v Alberta, the court doubted whether ―patent unreasonableness‖ was 
appropriate to be categorized as ―flagrant impropriety‖.134 In Johnson v Saskatchewan 
(Attorney General), the court dismissed the applicant‘s argument because manifestly 
unreasonable stay of the private prosecution did not constitute permissible grounds for a 
court to intervene into prosecutorial discretion.
135
 Similarly, in R v Laforme, the court 
found that not all wrong or incorrect decisions made by the Crown not to prosecute 
resulting from flagrant impropriety can justify the court‘s intervention into prosecutorial 
discretion. 
136
 In sum, in most regions of Canada, the standard for judicial review for a 
decision not to prosecute is still very high, and other standards of review used in the 
context of administrative law, such as ―patent unreasonableness‖, ―reasonableness‖, and 
―correctness‖, are ruled unsuitable for a court to interfere with the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.
137
 
2.3.4.3 Lack of Supporting Documents and Jurisprudence 
High evidential standards and the lack of existing successful claims are also major 
hurdles for victims to succeed in an application for a judicial review. Most applications 
result in a judicial declaration that there is ―no evidence of flagrant impropriety‖.  
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Just as stated by JA Finlayson in R v Durette, the applicant had a burden to provide 
sufficient and clear evidence to support his allegation against the Crown prosecutor 
before the court was willing to look into the exercise of the discretionary power of the 
latter, otherwise the court would assume that the Crown prosecutor had properly carried 
out their duties.
138
 Finlayson further laid out the evidential standard for this type of 
judicial review: 
Such an allegation must be supportable by the record before the court, or if 
the record is lacking or insufficient, by an offer of proof. Without such an 
allegation … [T]he allegation of improper or arbitrary motives cannot be 
an irresponsible allegation made solely for the purpose of initiating a 
"fishing expedition" in the hope that something of value will accrue to the 
defence. The mere fact that the Crown made a decision does not, without 
more, form a basis for an allegation of bad faith. Nor does it require a trial 
judge to allow an evidentiary hearing to inquire into why the discretion 
was not exercised differently.
139
 
This evidential standard is cross-referred to and accepted in the judicial review of 
decisions not to prosecute.
140
 In any case, speculation or mere conjecture is not sufficient 
to establish ―flagrant impropriety‖.141  
However, it is very difficult for the applicant to find direct and conclusive evidence for 
the application for judicial review to succeed. For one reason, this is due to the nature of 
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those permissible grounds for judicial review mentioned in the previous section, which 
makes the permissible grounds difficult to prove. For example, in some other cases, 
applicants argued that Crown prosecutors were acting in favor of the accused, where the 
accused persons were police officers, because of their close and ongoing working 
relationship with the latter.
142
 In McHale v Ontario (Attorney General),
143
 the court could 
not find a pattern of Crown prosecutors having bias favoring the police in past cases that 
involved police as the accused, and stated that such an allegation could not be solely 
based on speculation. Of course, the court could not find the bias in the past cases. This is 
because, even though similar arguments had been laid before courts, no court had ever 
ruled in favor of the applicants. In addition, if such ―bias‖ has turned into day-to-day 
practice and an unwritten rule of cooperation between the police and the office of the 
prosecutor, it leaves no tangible evidence to establish such ―bias‖. As well, this practice 
might seem normal and acceptable in the eyes of judges. This leaves victims no choice 
but to rely on speculation: when I see it, I know it.  
No applicant has ever applied for judicial review of decisions not to prosecute on the 
grounds of corruption, which requires the applicant to establish a clear case of corruption 
on the part of the Crown prosecutor when he or she made such charging decisions. That 
would be no different than asking the applicant to prove that the Crown prosecutor is 
guilty for corruption before the court is willing to examine the decision not to prosecute. 
That would be a very high standard of proof. As well, by reviewing cases concerning 
decisions not to prosecute, I have an impression that the courts, in their judgements, are 
more willing to put emphasis on their reluctance and unsuitability to review a charging 
                                                          
142
 Thiessen, supra note 111; Laforme, supra note 52; HcHale, supra note 52; Ahmadoun, supra note 52. 
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decision made by the Crown prosecutor than to seriously consider whether or not the 
evidentiary standard for the applicant to seek a judicial review is realistic and enforceable.  
For another reason, the Crown prosecutor is not even obliged to provide reasons for 
charging decisions to the accused person who has a right to discovery as a part of his or 
her fair trial rights.
144
 As Frater noted, ―where the Crown does choose to give reasons, 
sometimes it gives a fair amount of detail in its explanation, and sometimes it gives a 
more perfunctory response‖.145 It is even harder for the victims to find solid evidence 
because they do not even have procedural rights at the charging stage and their rights to 
information, in most provinces, do not cover the reasons behind the decision not to 
prosecute. To make things worse, the court in Johnson v Saskatchewan (Attorney General) 
clearly stated that ―the applicant was not an accused therefore any allegation as to a lack 
of disclosure is not a factor to be taken into account‖ in the application of judicial review 
for the decision not to prosecute.
146
 
2.3.4.4 Limited Ground to Review 
The accused has more grounds to challenge a charging decision. Apart from ―flagrant 
impropriety‖ and ―malicious prosecution‖, the accused can request a court to stay a 
proceeding based on other grounds of ―abuse of process‖, which has the same effect as 
quashing a discretionary decision to prosecute made by the Crown prosecutor.
147
 In fact, 
most successful challenges were brought based on these grounds because the court had 
extraordinary judicial power to control the court process in order to protect the accused 
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from the misconduct of the prosecutor and uphold the principle of justice. This power is 
upheld in a root case R v Young:
148
 
I am satisfied on the basis of the authorities that I have set forth above that 
there is a residual discretion in a trial court judge to stay proceedings 
where compelling an accused to stand trial would violate those 
fundamental principles of justice which underlie the community's sense of 
fair play and decency and to prevent the abuse of a court's process through 
oppressive or vexatious proceedings. It is a power, however, of special 
application which can only be exercised in the clearest of cases.
149
 
―Flagrant impropriety‖ can be a basis for finding both breaches of statutory or common 
law power in the context of administrative law and abuse of process in the context of 
criminal law. In most cases, applicants of judicial review of decisions not to prosecute 
allege that the Crown prosecutors breached their statutory or common-law power by 
acting flagrantly improperly when dropping a case. Recently, smart applicants have 
attempted to rely on the doctrine of abuse of process to seek certiorari against the Crown 
prosecutor‘s stop of a private prosecution because the court has more power to intervene 
on these grounds. However, the attempt failed in Ahmadoun v Ontario,
150
 in which the 
court denied the applicant‘s formal standing to seek a certiorari to stop the Crown 
prosecutor from entering a stay of a private prosecution on the grounds of ―abuse of 
process‖. The court reasoned that, because the Crown prosecutor had intervened into a 
private prosecution, the applicant was no longer a ―prosecutor‖, but a mere ―victim‖ or 
―witness‖ that was not a party to the proceedings. As a non-party, he had no standing to 
accuse the conduct of the prosecutor based on the ―abuse of process‖ doctrine. It quoted 
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the statement in R v Jewitt
151
 and stressed that the doctrine was ―a judicial discretion to 
enter a stay of proceedings to control prosecutorial behaviour prejudicial to accused 
person‖. In other words, the doctrine is to prevent the Crown from overpowering the 
accused in the criminal proceeding. As the private prosecutor is no longer a party of the 
criminal proceeding after the Attorney General intervenes, the private prosecutor cannot 
claim to be a victim of the Crown prosecutors‘ abuse of the court‘s process. Therefore, 
there is no victim in such an allegation unless the accused is willing to join the private 
prosecutor‘s allegation. This is nonetheless highly unlikely. Hence, the grounds for the 
victims to challenge a charging decision are further limited. 
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CHAPTER III 
3 Victims should have the opportunity to challenge a 
decision not to prosecute 
3.1 Victims’ Interests in Criminal Process are at Stake 
If there is a social value in allowing victims the right to make impact statements at the 
post-conviction stage, that value is lost when the Crown prosecutor improperly decides 
not to prosecute. This means that the social value is at stake at the ―discretionary 
decision-making stage‖. Undoubtedly, victims have real interests after a guilty verdict is 
entered. Sarah Welling, as one of a few scholars who advocate victims‘ participation in 
charging decision, identified victims‘ indirect interests in charging decisions when she 
tried to evaluate the victims‘ interests versus the interests of the accused and the public 
prosecutor in charging decisions: 
[V]ictims do have an indirect interest in the charging decision because the 
conviction and sentence are dependent upon the charging decision, and 
victims have significant interests in the conviction and sentence. With 
regard to sentencing, the victim has a financial interest because restitution 
is usually a possibility. Another interest in the sentence is psychological. 
The victim may desire retribution in the form of a severe sentence. The 
victim may also wish to incapacitate the defendant: if the sentence 
includes incarceration, the defendant will no longer be a threat to the 
victim. With regard to the conviction, the victim‘s interests are twofold. 
First, the conviction sets limits on the potential sentence and therefore 
implicates the victim‘s sentencing interests. Second, the conviction 
decision itself carries a symbolic significance for the victim because it is 
society‘s judgment that the person who harmed the victim is criminal. 
Thus the victim has an indirect interest in the substance of the charging 
55 
 
 
decision because it affects both the conviction and sentencing decisions.152 
In recognition of victims‘ interests in the post-conviction stage, victims have been granted 
a right to participate, in several ways, in criminal proceedings. The most symbolic and 
formal participatory role granted in Canada concerning victims‘ rights is to allow them to 
fill out an impact statement and present it before a court, narrating the nature of the harm 
that they have suffered as a result of the accused acts. 153  Currently, victim impact 
statements can be provided during sentencing, 154  section 745.6 hearings, 155  a ―not 
criminally responsible‖ or ―unfit to stand trial‖ disposition hearing, 156  and a parole 
hearing.157 Empirical study shows that a majority of victims will be dissatisfied with the 
disposal of their cases if they are not given an opportunity to present an oral victim 
impact statement in court proceedings.158  In addition, in most provinces, victims are 
eligible to receive criminal compensation. Even though a criminal conviction is not 
always necessary, such a conviction is a conclusive proof of the commission of a crime.159 
If the Crown prosecutor drops a criminal prosecution, it might also negatively affect the 
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assessments for the eligibility of governmental compensation during the hearings.160 
Furthermore, the trial process itself is also meaningful to victims. In some cases, an open 
court trial may contribute to the restoration of victims‘ dignity. As noted by Carlos Nino 
during the military junta trials in Argentina,  
What contributes to re-establishing [the victims'] self-respect is the fact 
that their suffering is listened to in the trials with respect and sympathy, the 
true story receives official sanction, the nature of the atrocities are publicly 
and openly discussed, and their perpetrators acts' [sic] are officially 
condemned.161  
Even though Carlos Nino‘s original purpose of making this comment was to support 
victims‘ participatory roles at the trial stage, the comment explains why an open court 
trial is meaningful for victims. In a trial, the Crown prosecutor is not victims‘ counsel 
who should represent the interests of the victims. However, when conducting a 
prosecution, he or she does present victims‘ side of story to a trial judge (or trial judges). 
The public can feel and hear victims‘ stories in open court. By testifying in a court and 
following the trial, even in the absence of a formal standing in the trial process, victims 
may ―find meaning in being heard, in having a witness who affirms that [their abuse] did 
happen, that it was terrible, [and] that it was not their fault‖.162 The reason behind citing 
this statement here is not to try to argue for victims‘ formal participatory roles at trial, but 
to show that an open court trial can be meaningful to victims. Of course, defense lawyers 
may attack victims during the trial and an acquittal might be finally entered. However, if 
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an accused is convicted, the trial proceeding can contribute a level of healing to victims.   
It is true that the healing effect of trial process is largely conditional on the conviction of 
the accused. Of all criminal prosecutions, there is never a hundred per cent conviction 
rate, nor a hundred per cent acquittal rate. That means victims have a chance to receive 
this healing effect through a criminal prosecution. This chance should not be taken away 
improperly merely based on the supposition that the victims might not have benefited 
from the trial process because the accused might not have been convicted at the end. 
It is not meaningless to emphasize the existence and importance of victims‘ interests at 
the trial and post-trial stage. Just because these interests are not directly affected in the 
charging stage,
163
 it does not mean a charging decision will not affect the victim‘s 
interests. In fact, these interests are so significant that a decision that can determine 
whether or not a victim might pursue the interests in the future should be made with due 
prudence. If a decision not to prosecute is entered, a criminal process is considered closed, 
which means that no trial and sentence will follow. In cases of the permanent termination 
of the prosecution, although the decision not to prosecute is not legally or factually 
synonymous with acquittal, the decision may be perceived as a ―not guilty‖ verdict by 
those victims or the general public who are not trained as  legal professionals. Therefore, 
it cannot be said that victims‘ interests will not be significantly and personally affected by 
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a decision not to prosecute. Of course, there are other considerations that can be weighed 
against victims‘ interests in the Canadian justice system, such as public interests, national 
security, etc. However, if these considerations cannot be justified, victims‘ interests can 
be considered unreasonably impaired by prosecutorial inaction.   
3.2 The state should not ignore victims’ interests in criminal 
proceedings 
Professor William McDonald criticized the fact that victims were losing protection in the 
modern criminal justice system: 
The age-old struggle of civilization has been to persuade people not to take 
justice into their own hands but rather to let their vengeance and righteous 
indignation be wrought by the law. Western civilization had by the Middle 
Ages succeeded in substituting private prosecutions for blood feuds. The 
next step was to replace private prosecution with public prosecution, while 
asking the victim to forego whatever satisfaction he might derive from 
personally prosecuting his transgressor and settling for the more intangible 
satisfaction of knowing that justice would be done. Now, the modern 
criminal justice system operates in an age of computers and instant 
telecommunications, disposing of large numbers of cases without trial and 
without bothering to give the victim even the minimal satisfaction of 
knowing what happened to his case and why.164 
So should a state ignore victims‘ interests? Some scholars have attempted to use social 
contract theory to drive an assertion that victims enjoy state‘s protection. 165 The basic 
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idea of social contract theory is that citizens surrender certain natural rights to a state in 
exchange for certain protections from that state. According to Hobbes, individuals in a 
state of nature are free to take any action, in their own judgement and reason, to protect 
themselves and their property, and this is an attribute of the nature of humankind.166 In 
general, Hobbes‘s social contract theory describes a situation where individuals are forced 
to submit some of their natural rights to an armed authority in order to promote co-
existence and security. Locke argued that individuals are not forced, but consent to 
surrender their natural rights to a trustful and neutral authority in exchange for neutral and 
equal protection.167 If this authority fails to protect people who confer that authority and 
power, its exercise of power is not legitimate.168 If a state merely deprives its citizens of 
their interests and rights without returning anything or without justification, it is a 
dictatorship.169  
Wainstein contends that, based on this theory, a state should be responsible for shielding 
citizens from crime because it monopolizes prosecutorial resources.170 For a state, merely 
criminalizing any action that might harm individuals‘ interests and rights is not enough to 
protect individuals. Effective implementation of the law is necessary, which means, when 
there is an allegation of violations of rights and interests, effective investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment should be carried out either by the individual or state. The 
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law is a dead letter without government to enforce them effectively. Effective 
investigation, prosecution, and punishment can deter potential lawbreakers by sending a 
message that they will take consequences for their breaches of the law.  
Several scholars such as Josephine Gittler, Richard L Aynes and Wayne A Logan have 
contended that victims of crime should not be re-victimized by the justice system for the 
latter‘s improper inaction.171 According to Wainstein, if a state fails to fulfil its duty to 
protect its citizens from victimization, it can no longer monopolize law enforcement and 
prosecution. 172  Of course, when a public prosecutor makes a decision whether to 
prosecute, he or she must consider the big picture, namely, whether a prosecution 
promotes public interests at large. However, if the prosecution is dropped without a 
legitimate reason, this is equal to the state‘s failure to protect victims from crime and, as a 
result, victims‘ interests will be completely ignored. In this case, as Wainstein said, the 
state loses its exclusive right to determine whether or not to prosecute and victims should 
therefore be allowed to invoke judicial power to reverse the decision not to prosecute in 
order to defend for their interests. 
In Canada, the criminal justice system is a government-paid public service. After all, its 
budget partly comes from taxpayers, the citizens. If victims are unreasonably blocked 
from accessing the criminal justice system, it is no different from being unable to enjoy 
the benefits of insurance for which they have paid premiums, which might further 
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frustrate the victims and increase their suffering. This is also contrary to the objectives of 
promoting victims‘ rights in Canada.173  
Even though the courts have emphasized that ―the criminal process is not the preserve of 
the private individual‖,174 they never state that the interests of private individuals should 
be completely ignored. In Kostuch v Alberta (Attorney General),175 the Attorney General 
stepped in and terminated a private prosecution based on the lack of evidentiary proof. 
The termination resulted in an application of judicial review, and the court dismissed the 
application: ―[i]n deciding whether to prosecute, the Attorney General must have regard 
not only to the interests of the person laying the charges, but also to the rights of the 
person charged with an offence, and to the public interest.‖176 This sentence has been 
cited in many subsequent cases to emphasize the duty of the Attorney General to maintain 
fundamental justice for the public. However, if it is read from another perspective, the 
court has recognized that private persons have interests in a criminal prosecution. The 
Attorney General and its agents are supposed to try their best to balance the various 
interests arising out of a decision whether or not to prosecute. In any cases, victims‘ 
interests should be an important factor for the Crown prosecutor to decide whether to 
prosecute or not.  
In conclusion, Canada should protect victims from re-victimization by instituting a 
criminal prosecution in good faith, or by allowing a private prosecution, if possible, 
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against alleged lawbreakers unless there are legitimate reasons not to do that. Victims‘ 
interests should be taken into account in charging stages. This not only means that the 
Crown prosecutor should try their best to consider victims‘ interests when deciding 
whether to prosecute, but also means that the system should provide remedies to victims 
when their interests are impaired because of improper prosecutorial action.  
3.2.1 The Attorney General, Crown Prosecutors and Charging 
Guidelines 
3.2.1.1 Role of the Attorney General and the Crown prosecutors  
The power of the Attorney General and Crown prosecutors in Canada are entrusted by the 
Crown. The Attorney General traditionally acted as a legal adviser to the Crown, as well 
as the government. His or her principal function has been, and still remains, to prosecute 
alleged criminals. The proper role of the Attorney General in the prosecution of an 
offense is well described in J L'Heureux-Dubé‘s comment in R v Power: 
As will be developed in more detail further in these reasons, the Attorney-
General is a member of the executive and as such reflects, through his or 
her prosecutorial function, the interest of the community to see that justice 
is properly done. The Attorney-General's role in this regard is not only to 
protect the public, but also to honour and express the community's sense of 
justice.
 177
 
In order to share the increasing workload of the Attorney General in other fields, Crown 
prosecutors are appointed as agents of the Attorney General to proceed with criminal 
prosecutions. The role of the Crown prosecutor was summarised in R. v. Boucher:  
It cannot be overemphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is 
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not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown 
considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. 
Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is 
presented; it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength, 
but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion 
of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in 
civil life there can be none charged with greater responsibility. It is to be 
efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the 
seriousness, and the justness of judicial proceedings.178 
For decades, the phrases ―the community‘s sense of justice‖ and ―reflects the interest of 
the community to see that justice is properly done‖ have been specifically referred to the 
necessity of convicting an accused person through an impartial and fair trial. While 
hoping prosecutors keep the community safe by putting away criminals, the public also 
expects a fair procedure in the criminal justice system.  
However, ―the community‘s sense of justice‖ should be broader than that. In particular, in 
recent decades, the public has gradually paid increasing attention to victims‘ interests in 
criminal proceedings. It is appropriate to contemplate the broader interpretation of ―the 
community‘s sense of justice‖ of including whether or not victims‘ interests have been 
properly considered through making a decision pertinent to the prosecution. As well, the 
phrase also suggests that a decision should not be contrary to victims‘ interests unless 
reasons behind such a decision are reasonably acceptable by the public. For the public, 
not having their interests represented in the prosecution of a crime is almost as horrible as 
being accused of a crime they did not commit. For most average citizens, there are more 
chances to become a victim than to be prosecuted by the state in their whole lifetime. If 
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the public cares about victims‘ interests and rights in criminal proceedings, once victims‘ 
interests are disregarded improperly or mistakenly by the Crown prosecutor, the public 
would not consider that they have seen justice properly done through such a decision. The 
comment has been put down in the charging guidelines of some provinces, which states 
that, in order to strengthen public confidence in the criminal justice system, Crown 
prosecutors should act as ―a minister of justice with duty to make sure that the criminal 
justice system operates fairly to all: the accused, victims of crime, and the public‖.179  
3.2.1.2 Charging Guideline 
In the 1980s, prosecution policy was summarized, put into writing, and published. As 
James Vorenberg has suggested, ―the lack of general rules or a record of action taken in 
individual cases has made it extremely difficult to show clearly deviations from the 
norms.‖180  Not until the mid-1980s did a description of charging guidelines exist in 
Canada.181 In 1990, recognizing that ―[a]n equitable justice system requires a reasonable 
degree of consistency in the circumstances in which prosecutions take place‖, the Law 
Reform Commissioner of Canada made a recommendation of publishing charging 
guidelines.182 Based on the studies of prosecutor‘s repetitive practices in making charging 
decisions, two core factors were identified significant to a legitimate charging decision 
and should be included in the guideline: ―reasonable prospect of conviction‖ and ―public 
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interest‖.183 Currently, in order to promote fairness, transparency, and accountability in 
charge decision-making, most provinces and the federal prosecution service have created 
detailed guidelines for charging decision-making and have made the guidelines public. 
The crown prosecutor can drop a case, if (1) there is no reasonable prospect of conviction 
based on the existing evidence, (2) it is not in public interest to pursue the case, or (3) 
both (1) and (2) are met.  
According to David Layton, the interpretation and implementation of the charging 
guidelines should be consistent with the following basic principles: 
 …To begin with, charging guidelines must strive to prevent the conviction 
of the innocent and the unjustifiable trammelling of individual rights. 
Nonetheless, in proper cases Crown counsel should be resolute in 
conducting prosecutions with an eye to bringing offenders to justice. As 
well, charging decision standards should avoid illegitimately usurping the 
function of the trier of fact and overriding the legitimate community 
interest in seeing justice done in a public forum. Prosecutorial guidelines 
must also avoid inflexibility that, despite best intentions, can cause 
injustice by failing to accommodate the particular circumstances of each 
case. Ultimately, the fundamental concern is to encourage prosecutors to 
act fairly, impartially and consistently in making charging decision.184 
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A fixed charging guideline is important to give the public basic information about how a 
charging decision is made. It also tells the public that the Crown prosecutor will not apply 
one charging policy today and another tomorrow. As well, it sends a message to the 
accused that their cases are handled in the same manner as others. Meanwhile, the 
guideline should also leave sufficient room for Crown prosecutors to make a charging 
decision based on their discretion in a particular case. Without flexibility, the Crown 
prosecutor may not perform his duty efficiently and handle the uniqueness or special 
needs raised in each single case properly.185 However, the Crown prosecutor is supposed 
to comply with the basic norms that govern whether or not to initiate a prosecution. The 
credibility of the Crown prosecutor and the confidence of the public in the criminal 
justice system will be undermined if the Crown prosecutor ignores or wrongfully 
implements the published charging guideline. This is partly because the public will live 
within a state of fear of not knowing when and how they may be charged.  
When Crown prosecutors discharge their charging functions following these guidelines, 
the abovementioned principles should be accommodated and promoted by their decisions. 
When a Crown prosecutor assesses evidentiary sufficiency, he or she should not attempt 
to determine whether an accused is innocent or guilty. As well, the Crown prosecutors‘ 
objective is not to win a case at any cost. Instead, he is responsible to present all 
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available, relevant, and admissible evidence necessary to judges so that the latter are able 
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. 186  In other words, the Crown 
prosecutor cannot wrongfully replace a standard of ―likelihood of conviction‖ to 
―substantial prospect of conviction‖ or ―conviction without reasonable doubt‖ in order to 
pursue a high conviction rate or for any other reason. It is inappropriate to drop a charge 
by employing a higher standard. How to determine whether a case has ―reasonable 
prospect of conviction‖ is still quite subjective. Correctly assessing the admissibility, 
reliability, and credibility of evidence relies on working experiences, a level of expertise 
concerning charging decision-making, a degree of impartiality to the case and the 
judgement of the Crown prosecutor. For example, a new prosecutor might draw an 
immature conclusion due to the lack of experience. As well, bias and personal attitude to 
the case can also influence the judgement. In addition, if a Crown prosecutor has 
reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused, but still believes there is a realistic 
prospect of conviction, the prosecution is likely to be dropped. 
Victims‘ interests are also relevant to the charging decision nowadays, which should also 
be properly taken into account. When Layton mentioned, ―the unjustifiable trammelling 
of individual rights‖ in his statement above, he specifically referred to a defendants‘ 
constitutional rights. However, times have changed and defendants‘ rights and interests 
are not the sole concern in the criminal process. The interpretation of ―individual rights‖ 
should not fall behind. Nowadays, the importance and relevance of victims to the criminal 
process have been generally recognized in Canada. It is also true that the interests of 
justice and the public are still paramount in criminal proceedings. This requires the 
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Crown prosecutors to make a decision not to prosecute carefully balancing all relevant 
factors. When dropping a case, they should carefully consider whether the interests of 
justice and the public are so significant in the case that they are willing to set aside the 
interests and rights of the potential victims. 187  In fact, this principle is specifically 
included in the charging guidelines of a few provinces: 
According to the Decision to Prosecute (Charge Screening) in Nova Scotia: 
The decision to prosecute or to discontinue a prosecution is the most 
important decision that a prosecutor makes in the criminal justice process. 
Such decisions must reflect sound knowledge of the law and careful 
consideration of the interests of victims, the accused and the public at 
large.188 
According to Withdrawing a Charge or Stopping the Prosecution of an Offence in 
Saskatchewan: 
Crown Prosecutors always consider the impact that a criminal prosecution 
may have on the victim when deciding whether it is in the public interest 
to prosecute.189 
According to the Deciding to Prosecute in Manitoba: 
Crown attorneys have a responsibility to treat victims of crime with 
compassion and respect. As much as is practicable, Crown attorneys strive 
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to be mindful and sensitive to the needs and wishes of victims.190 
There is the lack of empirical research reflecting on how Crown prosecutors‘ ways of 
thinking and behaving have been improved in the charging decision-making process in 
these three provinces. Victims‘ interests and entitlements has been ignored or suppressed 
for hundreds of years in Canada. It is always hard for a developed system to accept new 
changes, in particular the ones that are contradicted to its original value, principles and 
practice, within a short period of time. The adaption of charging guidelines in these 
provinces shows a positive sign that victims‘ interests and entitlement at the charging 
stage start gaining weight in some areas in the country. 
Finally, the most important thing is that Crown prosecutors have to interpret and 
implement these guidelines in charging decision-making in good faith. Theoretically, 
public prosecutors should be presumed to act consistently with the principles of justice by 
discharging their duties with fairness, objectivity, and integrity, the public. 
3.3 Victims have right to equal protection 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognizes citizens‘ most fundamental 
rights, entrenched in the Constitution of Canada, which is the supreme law in Canada. It 
protects these important rights and freedoms by requiring governments to legislate and 
operate in a manner of not violating the rights listed in the Charter.191 In most situations, 
violations are likely to render impugned legislation and operations invalid.192 It ensures 
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that the government is not above the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. In a 
criminal law dimension, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was traditionally 
understood as a constitutional guarantee for citizens to fight against the state‘s arbitrary 
criminal prosecutions. 
Section 15 of the Charter provides citizens the right to equal protection. According to this 
section, an individual should not be singled out as a target for a prosecution or any other 
things based on impermissibly discriminatory grounds, such as race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.193 A court is allowed to 
intervene if a violation of section 15 is proven in a clear case. In R. v. O’Connor, the court 
stated that it could stay a proceeding for the accused as an appropriate remedy when his 
rights under the Charter suffer irreparable damage.194 In cases of this type, the courts 
generally accepted selective prosecution based on above-mentioned grounds as valid 
grounds that constitute an abuse of court‘s process on the part of the Crown prosecutor. 
However, most cases were ultimately dismissed due to the applicants‘ failure to provide 
evidentiary proof. 
Victims are also entitled to protection under the Charter. Concerning a decision not to 
prosecute, victims have ―equality rights‖ under Section 15 of the Charter: 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, 
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
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origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.195 
The right to equal protection is not exclusive to the accused. Individuals are equally 
protected by law, and therefore, they are supposed to have the equal right to access to the 
criminal justice system when they are harmed by lawbreakers. It is true that the Crown 
prosecutor, as a ―minister of justice‖, can deny individual‘s access to criminal 
proceedings in order to preserve other higher-valued interests, such as the rights of the 
accused and public interests. However, under no circumstance can the Crown prosecutor 
refuse to commence a prosecution, either by himself or by the victim, based on the 
discriminatory grounds listed in Section 15.  
3.4 Victims can obtain satisfaction and closure  
3.4.1 Satisfaction 
In the studies about victims‘ satisfaction with justice when participating in sentencing, 
scholars split ―satisfaction with justice‖ into two parts: outcome satisfaction (satisfaction 
with the sentence) and process satisfaction (or satisfaction with the criminal justice 
system as a whole).196 Restitution and punishment can correct an inequitable relationship 
between victims and offenders, in which the victims‘ dissatisfaction of disadvantages 
caused by the crime committed by the offenders, can be alleviated. 197  Meanwhile, 
victims‘ participation in sentencing may increase their feelings of control over the 
sentencing process and receiving opportunities to raise their voices before an authority 
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before the decisions are made, can promote a sense of procedural justice.198 The studies 
reach the conclusion that victims‘ participation in criminal justice processes can enhance 
their satisfaction with justice.199 
Because victims have not been granted a formal role in charging decision-making, there 
are few scientific studies directly about their satisfaction in participating in charging 
decisions. However, some research, as showed in the following paragraphs, suggests that 
allowing victims to complain about charging decisions can increase their satisfaction with 
charging decisions made by Crown prosecutors. Usually, citizens should have confidence 
in Crown prosecutors and believe that they are performing their duties with due diligence. 
Once they are involved in an event where their interests are in danger, people are likely to 
become cautious. The right to challenge the decision not to prosecute might make victims 
feel secure because they know they can appeal if the Crown prosecutor makes 
unreasonable decisions. In addition, such a right might promote communication between 
the Crown prosecutor and victims, and as a result, victims may feel validated, respected, 
considered, and consulted by the criminal justice system and find themselves being 
treated fairly by the system.  
A key feature of procedural justice is that it provides a cushion of support when people 
feel fairly treated, making unfavourable decisions more palatable.200 In other words, if a 
Crown prosecutor treats a victim with dignity and respect and is able to gain victim's 
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confidence, most victims might still have the feeling of being treated fairly, even when the 
prosecutor makes an unpopular decision. This is particularly important in the criminal 
justice system where the participation of victims cannot always guarantee favourable 
outcomes.201 As a result, non-prosecution should be more easily accepted by the victims 
who have participated in the non-prosecution decision-making. In contrast, as shown in 
other research, victims who are excluded from the criminal justice process may 
overemphasize the outcome of the criminal procedure202 because the outcome is all that 
the victims have through the whole prosecution. Once unfavorable results come out, 
victims are likely to be more disappointed and frustrated at the criminal justice system. 
Hence, victims who are merely notified about the non-prosecution of their cases and 
receive questionable decisions not to prosecute are likely to overemphasize the fact that 
the system fails to do justice for them. An unreasonable refusal to charge a suspect may 
lead the victims to feel strongly that there has been no official acknowledgement of their 
suffering. 
3.4.2 Closure 
The term ―closure‖ has come to connote several different and poorly differentiated 
concepts. It is partly associated with death penalty cases in which victims can speak out 
about the harm caused by their offenders in an open courtroom. Currently, it is also used 
to support the use of victim impact statements, claiming that speaking publicly about 
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one‘s loss can promote a sense of catharsis, which can constitute a feeling of closure.203 
More generally, closure has also come to stand for the constellation of feelings—peace, 
relief, a sense of justice, the ability to move on—that come with finality.204  
Allowing victims to challenge decisions not to prosecute helps them achieve closure 
psychologically, so they can move on with their lives, especially when the decisions are 
finally upheld in court proceedings. Non-prosecution is not always roundly rejected by 
victims. However, some victims might want to activate prosecutions against their 
violators when the prosecutions are discontinued by Crown prosecutors or other relevant 
authorities, especially in a situation where victims have reasonable grounds to question 
the discontinuance but they are not able to make any effort to change it. They do so 
because they are unlikely to otherwise alleviate the trauma of the accused‘s alleged act 
from their minds.  
When substituting private prosecution with public prosecution, some activists made an 
effort to persuade average citizens to believe that justice will be done for them by their 
state and therefore it is not necessary to have justice done by themselves.205 That is to say, 
they no longer need to seek justice and closure by their own because the state would 
provide this for them. However, in such situations, a sense of distrusting Crown 
prosecutors might stem from a refusal to prosecute, especially if the refusal is flagrantly 
improper, and a belief of ―justice will be done‖ will fall apart. For example, when 
commenting on whether broadening self-defence laws might encourage vigilantism in 
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Canada, Prime Minister Stephen Harper considered that vigilantism should not be 
condoned, but that the public felt a need to protect itself because the law does more to 
protect criminals than to protect victims:  
It has become increasingly unclear what we can legally do to protect 
ourselves and our property. In the view of many Canadians, the scales of 
justice have tipped too far away from the right of self-defence, and toward 
the protection of criminals.206 
As a negative result of the public‘s losing confidence in the criminal justice system, even 
though the decision not to prosecute is the actual finality for victims in a criminal law 
dimension, they might not feel closure psychologically from such a decision and, in 
extreme cases, might choose to seek closure in their own way.207  
Closure can be the result of both putting in effort and having a chance to have their 
concerns heard and considered by a neutral third party. When a dispute occurs, the 
conflicting party, which is in an disadvantageous position, in this case, victims, are likely 
to entrust adjudicatory power to a third authority to determine the facts and are prone to 
accept findings delivered by such a third authority. It also can be said that a second 
opinion is more acceptable to victims. When the second opinion is the same as the first 
one, it can corroborate with the first opinion, which can create a psychological effect that 
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the result is more trustworthy. As well, regardless of how the decision is resolved, victims 
may feel less offended for having put effort into preventing a decision that is against their 
will.208 Allowing victims to seek redress in a courtroom as a last resort, on one hand, can 
symbolize ―ending the case in their own hand‖, and on the other hand, promote fairness 
and acceptability of the decision not to prosecute. Either can contribute to a sense of 
closure that is helpful for victims to move on and rebuild the credibility of the criminal 
justice system in victims‘ minds, which can reduce the risk of victims taking justice into 
their own hands. 209  It may also prevent victims from victimizing others besides the 
offender. For example, mental health issues are also significantly related to violence in the 
family. 
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CHAPTER IV 
4 Private Challenge of the Decision not to Prosecute in 
Other Jurisdictions 
Private challenges to decisions not to prosecute made by public prosecutors have been 
exercised in different jurisdictions in a variety of ways, either to protect victims‘ interests 
by giving them the right to review such a decision (such as in European countries) or to 
promote an equitable criminal justice system by limiting wide discretionary power of the 
public prosecutors (such as the US). In different jurisdictions, the challenges can take 
place internally in the office of the public prosecution, in front of the judiciary, or both. 
4.1 European Protection 
4.2 Regional Protection 
European countries have an established history of recognizing the necessity of victims 
having a role in charging decision-making. Beginning in the late 20th century, European 
intergovernmental organizations started advocating that and requiring their Member 
States to implement the victims‘ rights legislation in their jurisdictions. In 1985, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Member States of the Council of Europe adopted a 
Recommendation No. R (85) 11(the Recommendation) pertinent to victims‘ role in the 
framework of criminal law and procedure.210 In this Recommendation, the Committee 
raised three points about how to protect victims‘ interests in charging decisions: 
1) issues involving victims‘ financial restitution should be considered when the 
decision whether or not to prosecute is made;211 
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2) the final decision about whether or not to prosecute should be automatically 
provided to victims unless they indicate that they do not require such 
information;212 and 
3) as an alternative right to a private prosecution, victims should have the right to 
seek a review of a decision not to prosecute by a competent authority.213 
The right to seek a review of the decisions not to prosecute was first proposed in the 
Recommendation in 1985 as an alternative method for victims to deal with prosecutorial 
inaction. However, over the next 26 years, this right was not formally included in 
subsequent European binding instruments regarding victims‘ rights in criminal 
proceedings. Before 2009, only 21 out of the 27 Member States of the European Union 
(EU) had formal procedures, or at least general frameworks, in their domestic systems 
that allowed victims to review decisions not to prosecute made by public prosecutors.214 
In 2011, the right to review a decision not to prosecute was brought up again regionally 
when the EU intended to replace its old directive with a new one in order to include more 
comprehensive and viable victims‘ rights. In article 10 of the draft of a new Directive, it 
was proposed that ―Member States shall ensure that victims have the right to have any 
decision not to prosecute reviewed‖,215 accompanying with a corresponding rationale in 
its Explanatory Memorandum: 
The purpose of [Article 10] is to enable the victim to verify that 
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established procedures and rules have been complied with and that a 
correct decision has been made to end a prosecution in relation to a 
specific person.216  
The proposed right was finally adopted and included in Directive 2012/29/EU, dated 25 
October 2012.217 The new Directive was a new instrument, which formally established 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime. Article 11 
highlights the obligation of Member States to ensure victims‘ right to review the decision 
not to prosecute: 
 “1. Member States shall ensure that victims, in accordance with their role 
in the relevant criminal justice system, have the right to a review of a 
decision not to prosecute. The procedural rules for such a review shall be 
determined by national law. 
…… 
3. Member States shall ensure that victims are notified without 
unnecessary delay of their right to receive, and that they receive sufficient 
information to decide whether to request a review of any decision not to 
prosecute upon request. 
4. Where the decision not to prosecute is taken by the highest prosecuting 
authority against whose decision no review may be carried out under 
national law, the review may be carried out by the same authority.‖218 
Unfortunately, there is still no common standard pertaining to when victims can exercise 
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this right, and to what degree a competent authority is able to interfere with the decision 
not to prosecute. For example, the Directive does not expressly indicate what types of 
review should be granted, be it a judicial review or an internal one. Paragraph 4 of the 
Directive seems to restrict the potential review to the internal investigation within the 
prosecutor‘s office. ―The review may be carried out by the same authority‖ nonetheless 
seems to suggest that a decision not to prosecute taken by the highest prosecuting 
authority may also be reviewed by a different authority, such as a reviewing judge. 
However, the EU recognizes that many of its Member States have different national 
mechanisms for implementing victim‘s right to review, and is willing to allow those 
Member States to continue to use their mechanisms provided they do not contravene the 
EU‘s framework for such a right. In addition, to supplement this right, the Directive 
further strengthens victim‘s right to seek an explanation related to a decision not to 
prosecute in its article 6: 
1. Member States shall ensure that victims are notified without 
unnecessary delay of their right to receive the following information about 
the criminal proceedings instituted as a result of the complaint with regard 
to a criminal offence suffered by the victim and that, upon request, they 
receive such information: 
(a) any decision not to proceed with or to end an investigation or not to 
prosecute the offender… 
3. Information provided for under paragraph 1(a) … shall include reasons 
or a brief summary of reasons for the decision concerned …219 
Even without the Directive, to provide reasons for a decision not to prosecute seems to be 
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a general policy or practice in most European countries. For instance, in Sweden even 
though it is not a written policy, reasons behind decisions not to prosecute are generally 
provided and, in practice, public prosecutors are encouraged to provide detailed reasons if 
possible, especially in felony cases.220 Dutch policy is in favor of giving details to victims 
and, under some circumstances, a decision not to prosecute and relevant reasons will be 
released to the public via various media sources.221 In Norway, explanations are provided 
to both victims and their families.222 Even countries with common law traditions, such as 
Northern Ireland, England and Wales, and Scotland, have developed the tendency to 
provide victims with reasons for a decision not to prosecute. In Northern Ireland, there is 
a propensity to make detailed reasons available to victims.223  
4.2.1 Practice in Civil Law Countries  
Victims in European countries are more active due to the existence of various means in 
their national schemes. Matti Joutsen, a director of the Helsinki Institute for Crime 
Prevention and Control, summarized several methods that victims can use to deal with 
non-prosecution decisions made by prosecuting authorities in European countries. 224 
According to him, the most basic way is to communicate in some way with the 
corresponding prosecutor, such as writing a letter, asking the prosecutor to reconsider and 
reverse the original decision not to prosecute. This method is commonly accepted in most 
European jurisdictions.225 Secondly, a few jurisdictions provide standard procedures for 
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victims to request a superior prosecuting authority to direct a reconsideration or compel a 
prosecution, and allow the victims to challenge the decision not to prosecute in a 
competent court as a last resort. Finally, in a few jurisdictions, the right to seek review of 
a decision not to prosecute is not necessary because victims have an absolute right to 
institute a private prosecution.226   
In the Netherlands, as a judicial control over prosecutorial discretion, a request for 
mandamus can be filed to a court of appeal by anyone that has an interest in the 
prosecution, including victims.227 A Dutch court is authorized to examine decisions not to 
prosecute on the grounds of legal considerations, such as the application and 
interpretation of applicable law, and the correctness and proportionality during the 
exercise of discretion.228 As a part of administrative control in the prosecution office 
concerning the charging decision-making process, victims can write to a higher 
prosecutorial authority requesting a review of the decision not to prosecute made by the 
subordinate.229 
In Germany, a procedure known as ―Klageerzwingungsverfahren‖ is enacted230 through 
which victims may first appeal to the supervisor of the prosecuting authority on the 
grounds limited to technical issues, such as evidentiary sufficiency that is essential for 
prosecution to take place. Then, if the supervisor still refuses to compel prosecution, the 
legal representative of the victims may appeal to a court on their behalf. The victim is 
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considered a subsidiary prosecutor if the court compels prosecution.231 A similar court 
proceeding is used in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Spain, and Turkey to allow victims 
to seek a court‘s adjudication and compel a prosecution.232  
In Austria, victims are also entitled to appeal a decision to a court, but the court can only 
direct a prosecutor to review the original decision. The court does not have the power to 
compel a prosecution.233 Nevertheless, in Austria, like in a few of the European countries, 
an appeal to a court is not necessary because victims can initiate a private prosecution that 
a public prosecutor cannot object to or intervene in.234 One deficiency is that victims have 
to bear all the costs, including their own costs, court costs and defense costs in the event 
that the prosecution fails.235 Similarly, in Finland, victims‘ right to prosecute overrides 
prosecutorial actions carried out by the public prosecutors, where victims may initiate a 
prosecution regardless of the public prosecutor‘s decisions.236 
4.3 United Kingdom (UK) 
Both the Canadian legal system and UK legal system were developed from the English 
common law in terms of both substance and procedure, although it is important to keep in 
mind that substantial changes occurred later on. The development of the English law 
should accordingly be of interest to the Canadian legal system. The legal system in the 
UK is different from the Canadian one primarily because it has been influenced by 
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various EU legal practices. For instance, the UK has incorporated some civil law 
elements into its domestic law, which makes it significantly increase victims‘ rights in 
criminal proceedings. In the UK, victims of crime have a number of ways to appeal and 
challenge the decision not to prosecute. Unlike most common law countries, three 
interests, namely the interests of the State, the accused and the victims, have to be taken 
into account and carefully balanced when deciding whether or not to pursue a case,237 
although on some occasions the interest of the state may outweigh the others. The 
decision not to prosecute made by the public prosecutor can be subject to internal review 
conducted by the relevant office of prosecution service and to judicial review by an 
administrative court. Both procedures are discussed in the sections that follow. 
4.3.1 Internal Review 
A recent case entitled R v Killick 238  is a milestone case that put forward the 
implementation of victims‘ right to seek a review of the decision not to prosecute 
internally. In June 2007, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) had decided not to 
prosecute Mr. Killick. Later, counsel for the victims filed a series of complaints seeking 
both internal and judicial review, which finally led to the review of the original decision 
within the CPS. The review process took more than two years in part because the CPS 
was reluctant to conduct a review based on an informal ―complaint‖ made by the victims. 
The court in this case pointed out some defects of the prosecution system concerning the 
implementation of victims‘ right to seek review: 
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Although in form the request was made as "a complaint", what was sought 
was a reconsideration by an interested person of the decision. Far from the 
CPS being able to refuse to do this, it was bound to do it. In the first place, 
the CPS has made clear that it will review if a "complaint" is made. 
Second, it has for some time been established that there is a right by an 
interested person to seek judicial review of the decision not to prosecute; it 
would therefore be disproportionate for a public authority not to have a 
system of review without recourse to court proceedings. Third, it is clear 
that in considering whether to prosecute the prosecutor has to take into 
account the interests of the State, the defendant and the victim – the three 
interests in a criminal proceeding as identified for example by Lord Woolf 
CJ in R v B [2003] 2 Cr App R 197 at paragraph 27. As a decision not to 
prosecute is in reality a final decision for a victim, there must be a right to 
seek a review of such a decision, particularly as the police have such a 
right under the charging guidance.239  
This paragraph reveals several important points that were affirmed by this court: 
1) The CPS has an obligation to consider victims‘ request for the reconsideration of 
the decision not to prosecute; 
2) An internal review scheme is necessary so that victims do not always have to seek 
recourse from the court in the form of judicial review; 
3) Victims‘ interests should be carefully considered when evaluating a decision 
whether or not to charge; and 
4) It is essential to recognize the significance of the decision not to prosecute as an 
end of criminal prosecution for the victims. 
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In June 2013, a new Victims' Right to Review Scheme was initiated in England and Wales 
to institute victims‘ right to internal review similar to what was proposed in the EU 
Directive and the case of Killick in 2011.240 The scheme establishes a formal complaint 
procedure for victims to request an internal review in the event that victims are 
unsatisfied with a decision not to prosecute. A fresh review of evidential sufficiency and 
public interests concerning the cases will be conducted using the internal review process. 
The scheme includes three instances of complaint. In the first instance, the decision not to 
prosecute will be reviewed by the CPS or Central Casework Division, and full 
explanations will be provided if the decision is not reversed. Then, victims can appeal the 
decision to the Appeals and Review Unit and to the relevant Chief Crown Prosecutor or 
Head of a Casework Division if it fails again. The decision not to prosecute made by the 
relevant Chief Crown Prosecutor or Head of a Casework Division will be considered final 
for the internal review process. If the Crown prosecutor has called no evidence in court or 
the case has passed the statutory time limitation, only an apology can be issued to the 
complaining victims. This is because in the UK the Crown prosecutor is not allowed to 
re-institute a prosecution in these two situations. The information about this scheme is 
automatically provided to victims by relevant authorities. Northern Ireland also has a 
similar internal review system in their prosecution service, even though the structure is 
not as comprehensive as those in England and Wales are.241 
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4.3.2 Judicial Review 
Even though an internal review scheme has been established in the United Kingdom, a 
judicial review in administrative court as the last resort for victims is still in effect. In the 
UK, the discretionary power of the public prosecutors can be compromised when the 
court finds a need to maintain the rules of law and justice by directing Crown prosecutors 
to reconsider the decisions on whether to prosecute a complaint. In fact, the court feels 
responsible to do that. In R. (on the application of Corner House Research and Others) v 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO, an 
investigatory and prosecutorial authority) stopped an investigation against BAE Systems 
(a company) for its questionable military aircraft contracts with the Saudi government. 
The SFO decided to discontinue the investigation because of Saudi government‘s threat to 
terminate all contractual relationships with the UK. A counter-bribery non-profit 
organization Corner House Research requested the court to intervene and review the 
decision, and the court held as follows: 
The courts protect the rule of law by upholding the principle that when 
making decisions in the exercise of his statutory power an independent 
prosecutor is not entitled to surrender to the threat of a third party, even 
when that third party is a foreign state. The courts are entitled to exercise 
their own judgment as to how best they may protect the rule of law, even 
in cases where it is threatened from abroad. In the exercise of that 
judgment we are of the view that a resolute refusal to buckle to such a 
threat is the only way the law can resist.242   
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4.3.2.1 Standard of Review 
In England and Wales, administrative courts employ different standards in reviewing 
decisions to prosecute and not to prosecute. The courts apply a strict standard of review to 
the decision to prosecute. In R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, the court held that the 
decision to prosecute could only be judicially reviewed by a competent court in the 
presence of demonstrable fraud, corruption, and mala fides.243 ―Fraud, corruption, and 
mala fides‖ on the part of the Director of Public Prosecutor (DPP) in deciding to pursue a 
prosecution could significantly increase the risk of forcing an innocent person to go 
through a criminal proceeding, and a court has the responsibility to prevent the criminal 
justice system from being arbitrarily used against individuals. It would be better to quash 
the decision to prosecute before the court proceedings commence so that the unnecessary 
suffering of the accused caused by the improper prosecution can be minimized. Even 
though several courts agreed to expand the permissible standard theoretically to ―acting 
perversely or contrary to the Code for Crown Prosecutors‖, the courts in practice are 
attitudinally reluctant to intervene for these expanded grounds. 
The existence of subsequent criminal trials as an alternative remedy is a critical reason for 
the court to refuse to probe into the deeper cause of the decision to prosecute without first 
demonstrating fraud, corruption, and mala fides in the DPP‘s decision-making process. 
The accused could file a motion to stay a prosecution in light of the abuse of process 
doctrine during the prosecution.244 In Sharma v Antonine, judicial review was sought to 
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prevent an allegedly politically motivated prosecution against the Chief Justice of 
Trinidad and Tobago who was charged with attempting to pervert the course of justice. 
The request was rejected for the reason that the criminal process should be the right 
forum in which to address the decision to prosecute and the criminal court has jurisdiction 
over it: 
It is clear that the criminal courts would have the power to restrain the 
further pursuit of any criminal proceedings against the Chief Justice if he 
could on the balance of probabilities show that their pursuit constitutes an 
abuse of the process of the court: cf R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' 
Court, ex p Bennett [1993] 3 LRC 94 at 108 where Lord Griffiths 
explained the rationale in the following passage: 
If the court is to have the power to interfere with the prosecution in the 
present circumstances it must be because the judiciary accept a 
responsibility for the maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a 
willingness to oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance 
behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the rule of law. My 
Lords, I have no doubt that the judiciary should accept this responsibility 
in the field of criminal law.245 
Unlike ―Fraud, corruption, and mala fides‖, procedural mistakes are not serious enough to 
constitute an arbitrary prosecution that would be patently unreasonable and unjust, or 
significantly inconsistent with the principle of justice. Counsel for the accused can make 
an effective defence for his or her client in court. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
We stress that the Legal Services Commission and those advising prospective applicants 
for judicial review should always realise that judicial review is very rarely appropriate 
where an alternative remedy is available. If such a remedy is available, a judicial review 
application should not be pursued. 
245
 Cf R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett, [1993] 3 LRC 94 at 108 cited in Sharma v. 
Antoine [2006] UKPC 57 at para 31. 
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As well, the administrative court also considers that the process to seek judicial review 
will cause a delay for a criminal trial, which might put the accused into a worse position, 
especially when such an application is dismissed or leave to appeal is granted. 246 
Therefore, the court is very harsh when dealing with applications for a review of the 
decision to prosecute. 
The grounds permissible for judicial review for decisions to prosecute are still applicable 
for judicial review for decisions to discontinue one. However, courts are willing to apply 
a comparatively lower threshold when considering a review for a decision not to 
prosecute. This is because a high standard of review for decision not to prosecute will 
leave victims with no effective remedies to deal with flawed decisions. The decision not 
to prosecute will not be followed by a criminal trial or other proceedings that can check 
the legitimacy of such a decision. In R v DPP, ex parte Manning, Lord Bingham CJ 
supplied a comprehensive reasoning: 
In most cases the [decision not to prosecute] will turn not on an analysis of 
the relevant legal principles but on the exercise of an informed judgment 
of how a case against a particular defendant, if brought, would be likely to 
fare in the context of a criminal trial before (in a serious case such as this) 
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 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Allen, [1997] STC 1141:  
…It is obvious that if leave to move is granted, especially after proceedings have actually 
been commenced in the Magistrates' Court, those proceedings will be delayed and this 
court is unlikely to be able to adjudicate before the issue of abuse of process could have 
been heard and determined by the Crown Court. Furthermore, if the applicant does not 
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reach the Crown Court. So by choosing to seek judicial review the applicant will have 
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be peremptorily refused at the leave stage with appropriate sanctions in relation to 
costs.  
See also: Kebilene, supra note 243 (“The effect of the judgment of the Divisional Court [judgment of 
judicial review]was to open the door too widely to delay in the conduct of criminal proceedings”). 
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a jury. This exercise of judgment involves an assessment of the strength, 
by the end of the trial, of the evidence against the defendant and of the 
likely defences. It will often be impossible to stigmatise a judgment on 
such matters as wrong even if one disagrees with it. So the courts will not 
easily find that a decision not to prosecute is bad in law, on which basis 
alone the court is entitled to interfere. At the same time, the standard of 
review should not be set too high, since judicial review is the only means 
by which the citizen can seek redress against a decision not to prosecute 
and if the tests were too exacting an effective remedy would be denied.247 
This reasoning and principle was upheld in subsequent cases.248 While ―fraud, corruption, 
and mala fides‖ remain valid grounds for judicial review of the decision not to prosecute, 
249  the court frequently uses a lower standard in assessing whether the exercise of 
discretion by the DPP is lawful. For this reason, this type of application has experienced 
some degree of success in the country. The basic principles that should be considered 
when determining whether to overturn a decision not to prosecute were established in R. 
v. DPP Ex parte Chaudhary: 
[Judicial review can occur] if and only if it is demonstrated to us that the 
Director of Public Prosecution acting through the Crown Prosecution 
Service arrived at the decision not to prosecute: 
1) Because of some unlawful policy… 
2) Because the Director of Public Prosecutions failed to act in 
accordance with his or her own settled policy as set out in the 
Code; or 
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3) Because the decision was perverse. It was a decision at which no 
reasonable prosecutor could have arrived.250 
4.3.2.1.1 Error in Law 
The court can examine the application and interpretation of the law by the CPS to guide 
itself in determining whether or not to prosecute. In R v DPP, ex parte Chaudhary, 251 the 
applicant C reported that her husband, who was a police officer, sodomised her repeatedly 
without her consent, but the CPS dropped the case because it found lack of evidence 
pertaining to consent and that consensual buggery between two males over 21 in private 
is not an offence. In the CPS‘s affidavit, it claimed that it had satisfied the evidentiary 
criteria for the alleged offence, but prosecuting the alleged offender on the ground of 
consensual buggery in private, which is not an offence based on the age of the applicant 
and the accused and is insufficient proof of not giving consent, is contrary to public 
consideration. When examining the explanation given by the CPS, the court found the 
CPS had either confused or conflated consensual buggery and non-consensual buggery, 
which were two different and separate offenses, when assessing the evidentiary 
sufficiency criterion. According to the court, the CPS should bear in mind that the 
evidentiary sufficiency criterion should be satisfied in relation to non-consensual buggery, 
which was alleged by the applicant. In contrast, it assessed the evidence merely based on 
consensual buggery, which made it look as if consensual buggery and non-consensual 
buggery were the same offenses. As a result, the CPS‘s decision to discontinue this case 
was irrational.  
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Similarly, in R v DPP, ex parte Jones,252 the DPP dropped the case because it considered 
―gross negligence manslaughter‖ not dangerous enough to constitute a crime and the 
evidence was insufficient to support ―subjective recklessness‖. The court rejected the 
DPP‘s justification because it considered the DPP was wrong when it reasoned that ―gross 
negligence manslaughter‖ did not constitute an indictable criminal act. In these cases, the 
administrative court allows itself to assess whether the DPP and the CPS has correctly 
applied the law.  
When making charging decisions, the DPP might have doubts about the interpretation of 
the relevant law when the law is ambiguous and/or confusing. In these situations, he or 
she might interpret the law in favour of victims to avoid freeing a potential criminal, and 
therefore choose to prosecute the accused for cautions. When the DPP takes such 
cautions, his defense lawyer can, at worst, make arguments towards an effective defense 
concerning whether there are errors in interpreting the law at trial. However, when the 
DPP‘s discretion to interpret the law is mistakenly used or abused to drop a case, it might 
cause injustice to victims because of the victim‘s lack of means to bring the issue before a 
criminal court. In addition, judges, who indeed have common law power to interpret the 
law, might be better suited to determine whether a law has been interpreted within a range 
of possibility. That is why victims should at least have a chance to have such discretion 
reviewed in a reviewing court as the last remedy to make an argument about the DPP‘s 
misinterpretation of the law, and have that error corrected.  
The question is what type of the interpretation of the law can be considered incorrect, 
which makes a decision not to prosecute unreasonable and allows the court to set it aside. 
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The UK jurisprudence does not clarify this issue. Should a reviewing judge overturn a 
decision not to prosecute just because he or she has a different interpretation of the law? I 
believe the answer is no. It is the job of a trial judge to determine what the law is, and the 
job of a reviewing judge is to see whether the interpretation of the law by the DPP is 
plausible when making a decision to continue or drop charges.  
Surely, the DPP should have discretion in interpreting the law that is going to apply in his 
or her case if only the interpretation is not obviously unreasonable. This would mean that 
the DPP should have legitimate bases, such as case law, legal commentary or other 
documents and supports, to make them believe that the accusation against the accused is 
not well-supported or/and the judge will likely interpret the law in the same way in court. 
When the law is unclear on the alleged act, the DPP may choose to act cautiously by 
prosecuting the person who performs this act and leave to the court to make the final 
decision on whether an act falls under the scope of the law. One might argue that, even 
though the accused can be exonerated of all responsibilities for the alleged act through 
effective defense, the prosecution might still damage the reputation of the accused, which 
might have huge negative impact on the accused‘s life and career. However, in my 
opinion, once the prosecuting authority‘s bases to initiate a prosecution are supported by 
some documents, it is hard to say that the interests of the accused are improperly or 
arbitrarily impaired. In fact, in most cases, the accused is himself or herself responsible 
for the investigation and prosecution against him or her because of he or she deliberately 
taking opportunities by exploring profits from the gray area of the law in the first place. 
In addition, it would be very inefficient if the DPP has to consult the court regarding how 
to interpret the law in every case in which the law is vague. If the DPP does that, the 
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consultation would be meaningless when a judge makes a different interpretation 
concerning the law after hearing the accused‘s arguments. However, if the interpretation 
of the law is ascertained during the consultation, the defense of this issue will become 
meaningless. In this way, the accused will lose the opportunity to make an argument 
about the interpretation of the law in court. Therefore, in my opinion, the prosecuting 
authority should have a workable margin for their errors in interpreting the law when 
deciding whether or not to prosecute. A decision not to prosecute can only be considered 
perverse on the ground of erring in law when the prosecuting authority‘s interpretation 
appears to be clearly unreasonable, perverse or completely ungrounded. 
4.3.2.1.2 Evidential Insufficiency 
In the Manning case, 253  the court examined the reasonableness of the prosecutor in 
applying an ―evidential sufficiency‖ criterion when deciding not to pursue a case.254 In 
order to deal with this issue, the court summarized five points for charging decision-
making in the current case.255 The court considered these points were so obvious that any 
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 The victim was remanded in prison custody awaiting trial for an offence of violence, and later died of 
asphyxia while under restraint following an altercation with two officers. His death was investigated by 
the police and the papers were referred to the Crown Prosecution Service. Upon examination, a specialist 
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 Ibid at para 41-42:  
…In the end we are, however, satisfied that there are five points which Mr N as 
defendant would have to overcome if he were to defeat the prima facie case which in 
Mr Western's judgment lay against him and these were points which Mr Western did 
not address and resolve. Put in their simplest terms these points are: 
(1) If Mr N's account were accepted, there would be no explanation of how 
the injury to the throat of the deceased and the interruption of his breathing 
occurred. It was on this basis that Mr Western concluded that Ms T could not 
be taken as a truthful witness and was therefore a witness whom the Crown 
need not call. 
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reasonable person would have taken them as an objective appraisal of the prospect of 
conviction. It considered that the failure to carefully consider these five points would 
make the decision not to prosecute unreasonable because it makes the evidentiary 
threshold for this case higher than ―realistic prospect of conviction‖ laid down in the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors. The court emphasized that it would defer to the judgment of 
the experienced prosecutors on whether a jury is likely to convict. In fact, it is difficult to 
say, when listing these five points, whether the court had incorporated its wisdom in 
determining a reasonable way to assess ―evidentiary sufficiency‖.  
Again, in another case of R. (on the application of B) v DPP,256 the victim‘s left ear was 
bitten off by the alleged offender during an incident that took place in a coffee house, and 
was later personally assaulted by him. The victim reported the incident to the relevant 
authority and, as a result, a prosecution was instituted. However, the prosecution was 
stopped the night before the trial because the CPS received a negative opinion from an 
expert about the victim‘s mental history, which made the CPS consider the victim an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(2) If Mr N's account were rejected it is very difficult to see how it could be 
regarded as simply mistaken, particularly having regard to his evidence of 
constantly talking into the ear of the deceased during the journey to the 
servery and of the deceased himself on occasion speaking. 
(3) If Mr N's account were rejected as untruthful, as Mr Western judged Ms T's 
account to be, there was no evidence to contradict the evidence of the 
prisoners who said they saw the head of the deceased held in a headlock. 
(4) There was no evidence to suggest that contact was accidental or non-
continuous, and that possibility was directly contradicted by Mr N's own 
evidence. 
(5) There was no medical evidence to suggest that accidental, non-continuous 
contact between Mr N's forearm and the neck of the deceased could have 
caused or contributed significantly to the death of the deceased. 
In our judgment these are matters which should have been taken into account on an 
objective appraisal of the prospects of success of a prosecution if brought, and the 
failure to take them into account vitiates the Director's decision. It also appears to us 
that Mr Western (inadvertently, we feel sure) applied a test higher than that laid down 
in the code. We accordingly quash the decision. 
256
 R (on the application of B) v Director of Public Prosecutions, Equality and Human Rights Commission 
intervening, [2009] EWHC 106 (Admin) [R (on the application of B) v DPP]. 
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unreliable witness that might not survive in front of the jury at trial. The court considered 
that the CPS magnified the expert‘s negative opinion regarding victim‘s mental history 
and tended to believe in the unfounded stereotyped concept that a complainant could not 
be regarded as a credible witness on any matter if he or she had a history of mental 
problems. It concluded that, if a case were originally well founded enough to be brought 
to a court, it would be irrational if it was dismissed merely based on the fact that the 
credibility of one witness was in question. In this case, the court had in fact had a second 
opinion on how the DPP should have weighed the evidence in assessing whether a case 
should be continued or not. However, it is inappropriate for the court to judge how the 
CPS assesses and balances relevant factors and evidence at its own discretion and then 
develop an alternative viewpoint on the outcome (decision not to prosecute). However, 
this type of approach has been widely accepted in dealing with evidentiary insufficiency 
for decisions not to prosecute in the UK.257  
The DPP is restricted from using ―evidentiary sufficiency‖ to intervene in a private 
prosecution. The court can review a decision to discontinue a private prosecution even 
when the DPP takes over and stops the prosecution because it does not meet the 
evidentiary sufficiency threshold laid down in the Code for the Crown Prosecutor. In the 
case of R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Duckenfield,258 the court determined 
what standard the DPP or the CPS should apply when taking over and stopping a private 
prosecution. In this case, the representative of victims‘ families charged two retired senior 
police officers with manslaughter and wilful neglect of duty in the 1989 Hillsborough 
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disasters259 in which many people were killed. The two police officers requested the CPS 
to take over the prosecution and stop it, but the request was refused by the CPS. The court 
upheld the CPS‘s ―clearly no case to answer‖ approach, which means that ―the DPP only 
intends to stop private prosecutions on this ground where no reasonable decision maker 
could conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the case to go forward‖260. The court 
reasoned that to ―stop a private prosecution merely on the ground that the case is not one 
which he would himself proceed with ... would amount to an emasculation of [right to 
private prosecution] and itself be an unlawful policy‖,261 and a private prosecutor did not 
need to follow the Code for the Crown Prosecutor when deciding to institute a case. The 
DPP should not apply its own evidentiary sufficiency criterion to a private prosecution. 
This point was established in R (on the application of Charlson) v Guildford Magistrates' 
Court and The South Western Magistrates' Court And Walsh (Interested Party).262 This 
rule for the DPP‘s intervention into a private prosecution had not been changed for years. 
Recently, in R (Gujra) v CPS,263 the question of whether the DPP can impose its own 
evidentiary sufficiency criterion in making charging decisions on a private prosecutor was 
re-examined. The majority of the court agreed that judicial review should not be granted 
if the CPS or the DPP complied with its Code when deciding to halt a private prosecution. 
However, Baroness Hale of Richmond and Lord Mance JJSC dissented. They considered 
private prosecution a safeguard for individuals to activate a prosecution against their 
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violators when a public prosecutor had some evidence but dropped a case out of caution 
or for other reasons. According to these two judges, allowing the CPS to have a final 
word on evidentiary sufficiency of a case will diminish the effectiveness of the private 
prosecution and violate individuals‘ rights. Just as Baroness Hale of Richmond explained 
in the case: 
The possibility of judicial review of the prosecutor's decision is not a good 
enough safeguard [to protect individual rights], as this case demonstrates 
only too clearly. Just as a reasonable prosecutor could take the view that 
the case should proceed, a reasonable prosecutor could take the view that it 
should not. The possibility of bringing a private prosecution, however 
remote to most people, is a much more effective safeguard. Now that the 
new policy has effectively removed it, the victims of crime will have little 
prospect of challenging the prosecutor's decisions… That obligation [to 
provide positive protect laid down in the ECHR] is not fulfilled if a private 
prosecution, which a reasonable prosecutor could consider more likely 
than not to succeed before a reasonable court, can be prevented because 
another prosecutor takes a different view.264 
4.3.2.1.3 Procedural Fairness 
English courts allow judicial review for the decision not to prosecute on the grounds of 
procedural unfairness in certain circumstances. One of the prominent aspects of the 
Manning decision is that the court stressed that not giving clear explanations for a 
decision not to prosecute an unlawful killing case was a violation of article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): 
…the right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights. It is put at 
the forefront of [the ECHR]. The power to derogate from it is very 
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limited …Where such an inquest following a proper direction to the jury 
culminates in a lawful verdict of unlawful killing implicating a person 
who, although not named in the verdict, is clearly identified, who is living 
and whose whereabouts are known, the ordinary expectation would 
naturally be that a prosecution would follow. In the absence of compelling 
grounds for not giving reasons, we would expect the Director to give 
reasons in such a case: to meet the reasonable expectation of interested 
parties that either a prosecution would follow or a reasonable explanation 
for not prosecuting be given, to vindicate the Director's decision by 
showing that solid grounds exist for what might otherwise appear to be a 
surprising or even inexplicable decision and to meet the European Court's 
expectation that if a prosecution is not to follow a plausible explanation 
will be given.265  
Later in 2006 in R (on the application of Peter Dennis) v DPP, the court upheld the 
Manning reasoning and ruled that a court was allowed to review a decision not to 
prosecute ―where an inquest jury has found unlawful killing, the reasons why a 
prosecution did not follow have not been clearly expressed‖.266   
4.3.2.2 Relief sought 
In the UK, while there is a relatively lower standard for the judiciary to review a decision 
not to prosecute than Canadian counterpart, this remedy is limited. It seems that the court 
cannot compel a prosecutor to perform an affirmative action, such as compelling a 
prosecution. In R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene,267 where the DPP refused to give consent to a 
private prosecution against terrorists, Lord Hope argued that judicial review should not be 
granted in this type of case because the court cannot order the DPP to give consent, which 
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was the sole possible remedy that could be sought in this type of case. However, in 
judicial review of the decision to discontinue a public prosecution, the court cannot only 
nullify a decision not to prosecute, but also direct the prosecutor to reconsider such 
decision. Of course, it cannot control the outcome of the reconsideration.268 The decision 
not to prosecute still depends on the prosecutor‘s discretion, and it is possible that a 
prosecutor can maintain his or her original decision after the reconsideration.  
Two points are worth discussing in this situation. First, if the court can direct a 
prosecution to review a decision, does it mean that the court has some power to force a 
prosecutor to perform an action? If the court has such power, in cases where it can be 
certain that the decision not to prosecute is incorrect,269 why can it not just compel a 
prosecution in order to prevent the prosecutor from insisting upon maintaining his or her 
incorrect decision after reconsideration? Even though it will be very rare, if the prosecutor 
maintains the original decision, victims might repeatedly make an application for judicial 
review if they continue believing that the new result is still incorrect or unreasonable. In 
this case, it is possible that the review proceeding becomes endless. Of course, it is 
unrealistic for average victims to spend so much money and time on one case. Moreover, 
in some cases, even though a non-prosecution decision is in dispute because some 
mistakes or improper acts on the part of the Crown prosecutor are found in the decision-
making process, the decision might be unreasonable but correct because the Crown 
prosecutor may accidentally reach a correct conclusion of not prosecuting through the 
problematical decision-making process. This can result in the maintenance of the decision 
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not to prosecute after a reconsideration because the conclusion of not prosecuting a case 
appears to be an correct answer although the original decision not to prosecute is 
concluded based on questionable reasons.  
In addition, in most situations, it is less likely that the maintenance of the decision not to 
prosecute would result from the DPP or the CPS persisting in his or her incorrect or 
irrational reasoning through which no proper reconsideration actually took place when 
making the second decision not to prosecute. However, it is still possible that, in cases 
where the DPP is corrupt, acts in bad faith or discontinues the prosecution for improper 
purposes, he or she would deliberately ignore the instructions from the reviewing judge. 
In these situations, if a court cannot compel the DPP to prosecute, the result of its order to 
direct a reconsideration is no different than the request of the victims sent to the CPS for a 
reconsideration of their case through an internal review. Therefore, extraordinary 
responses such as compelling a prosecution are necessary under exceptional 
circumstances. Compelling a prosecution could be more effective than directing a 
reconsideration for the court to deal with the abovementioned situations at its discretion.  
Second, it makes little sense if a prosecutor still does not prosecute a case after a court 
nullifies a decision not to prosecute. Does this not mean that the decision not to prosecute 
is still in effect? It can be argued that the decision not to prosecute challenged by victims 
in court has been quashed, but the non-prosecution actually results from the CPS‘s second 
decision not to prosecute, which is still in effect. This is not a violation of the court‘s 
order. However, it is difficult to tell whether a prosecutor has made a second decision or 
has just insisted on not prosecuting. If it is the second situation, the court‘s order is 
violated. If the order were violated, it would seem that a court is not able to impose any 
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sanction on the DPP or the CPS other than to re-direct a consideration of a decision not to 
prosecute. This goes back to the first question pertaining to whether the court can force a 
public prosecutor to prosecute. Although this remains problematic, the English court 
seems reluctant to address this issue. 
Furthermore, in UK, if the Crown prosecutor has called no evidence in court, such a 
decision not to prosecute is not reversible in court. In R. (on the application of B) v. DPP, 
even though the court found that the decision not to prosecute was not reasonable, it had 
no power to reverse the decision because the prosecution had offered no evidence.270 
Instead, in order to provide satisfaction to the victim through its judgement, the court 
provided the victim with monetary compensation to account for the deprivation of an 
opportunity to initiate criminal proceedings.271 This is problematic. First, what if a victim 
is not seeking monetary compensation but would only be satisfied with a criminal 
proceeding? In this situation monetary compensation does not provide adequate 
satisfaction. Secondly, it risks the possibility that ―offer no evidence‖ can be a means for 
the DPP to block the victim from seeking reversal of his decision not to prosecute.  
4.4 American Experience 
American practices and jurisprudence have an undeniable impact on the development of 
Canadian legal system. The District Attorney (DA, prosecuting authority in the US) in the 
US traditionally has exclusive jurisdiction in deciding whether to initiate a prosecution 
and this role has not changed for over 200 years. The DA‘s discretionary power to make 
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charging decisions was originally absolute and unreviewable by courts.272 Courts in the 
US are reluctant to review the DA‘s decision to decline a prosecution for three main 
reasons: 1) the constitutional principle of separation of powers prohibits the judiciary 
from intervening in the administration of executive power, including prosecutorial 
decisions; 273  2) prosecutorial discretion is necessary for the prosecuting attorney to 
effectively distribute limited prosecutorial resources for public good through decision-
making;274 and 3) prosecutorial discretion helps to allocate limited budgetary resources 
effectively and reduce the workload for the expensive and over-burden criminal justice 
system.275 
However, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, concerns about 
unfettered prosecutorial discretion were studied and a number of old criticisms re-
appeared. Some scholars have expressed their worries regarding the DA‘s absolute power 
to determine the fate of private individuals by discharging its duty to decide whether to 
prosecute might lead to potential abuse or arbitrariness against them.276  Others have 
argued that, rather than performing the executive function of determining who should be 
charged, the DAs might in fact replace the court‘s function by interpreting the applicable 
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law or judging whether an alleged offender was guilty or not before a trial takes place.277  
In addition, as others have also argued, prosecutorial discretion might conceal 
malfunction in the criminal justice system, which exacerbates the above-mentioned 
situation. The public prosecutor might try to avoid complicated judgements and reasoning 
for charging decisions, and therefore frame discretionary power as a necessary means to 
speed up the system and promote public good.278 This can easily create secrecy within the 
charging decision-making process because it is hard to trace the legitimacy and rationality 
behind the decisions even though such decisions look suspicious. Secrecy makes public 
prosecutors feel safe to act in whatever way suits their own purposes. The lack of fear of 
the consequence of misconduct in charging decision-making increases the possibility that 
charging decisions are rendered unjust and unfair.  
Later in the 1980s, these criticisms provided a proper justification to those who advocated 
for victims‘ participation in the charging stage. For example, Wainstein claimed that 
improper discontinuance of a criminal prosecution could re-victimize victims of crime.279 
As a result, efforts were concentrated towards reviewing jurisprudence and legislation 
with regards to the possibility of checking on charging decisions by private parties in the 
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 Roger P Joseph, “Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute” (1975) 75 Colum 
L Rev 130  at 130: 
Refusal to prosecute... may minimize the effect of or negate altogether duly enacted 
statutes and regulations, thus infringing upon or qualifying the lawmaking power of 
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 James Vorenberg, “Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials”, 1976 Duke LJ 651, at 652: 
[Discretion] hides malfunctions in the criminal justice system and avoids difficult policy 
judgments by giving the appearance that they do not have to be made. It obscures the 
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compassion and wisdom are at work. The result has been some compassion (often 
matched or exceeded by unfairness) and very little wisdom. 
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 Wainstein, supra note 93 at 730-731.  
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US.280  
Currently in the US, even though courts are still prone to refrain from interfering with the 
DA‘s decisions concerning whether or not to prosecute and give high deference to the 
DA‘s exercise of discretion, prosecutorial discretion is in principle reviewable in 
exceptional circumstances.281 In some states, judges are granted power to address an 
unjustified decision not to prosecute challenged by the person who is directly affected or 
aggrieved, including victims. No matter what is the real cause of these changes, it 
signifies that victim‘s private challenges to unjust and unfair charging decisions are 
gradually increasing in the US.282  
4.4.1 Compelling a prosecution 
When a DA refuses to file a charge, a mandamus can be sought as a remedy in court to 
compel a prosecution. Stuart P. Green found that several states in the US have clearly 
granted the court power to force a DA to commence a prosecution in exceptional 
circumstances in the corresponding legislation.283 For example, in Michigan, Colorado, 
Nebraska and Pennsylvania, a judge has the power to compel a prosecution if necessary. 
According to section 767.41 of Michigan Compiled Laws,  
The court may examine the [statement of reasons for not filing 
information], together with the evidence filed in the case and if, upon 
examination, the court is not satisfied with the statement, the prosecuting 
                                                          
280
 See Logan, supra note 106; Wainstein, supra note 93; Green, supra note 206; Hudson, supra note 162 
at 58. 
281
 Armstrong v. United States, 517 US 456 (1996) [Armstrong]. 
282
 Hereinafter when I refer to the practice in US, I mean the states in the US where a judicial review for 
decision not to prosecute is allowed. 
283
 Green, supra note 206 at 488 (The author pointed out that, in some American states, individual could 
lodge a private action against prosecutorial inaction, which is implicitly laid down in the relevant 
legislations). 
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attorney shall be directed by the court to file the proper information and 
bring the case to trial.284 
This provision is duplicated in the legislation of Nebraska and Colorado.285  
Owing to the significance of prosecutorial discretion in charging decision-making, a high 
standard of review is employed for a private citizen to challenge a decision not to 
prosecute and seek a mandamus to compel a prosecution. A private person needs to 
provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that a refusal to initiate a prosecution is 
an abuse of discretion. A mandamus is considered an extraordinary remedy to compel a 
public officer to perform his duty laid down in the law. When making a charging decision, 
the DA‘s duty is to use his or her discretionary power to decide what case to be brought to 
the court. Usually, it is inappropriate to use a mandamus to force a public officer to act in 
a situation where he has a legal option of refusing to act based on his discretion.286 That 
will amount to the court using discretionary power to make a decision for the public 
official. Therefore, it is commonly agreed that the legitimate grounds to compel a 
prosecution is limited to ―abuse of discretion‖. In Tanenbaum v D'Ascenzo, the court 
explained that, ―where … by an arbitrary exercise of authority there has been in fact no 
                                                          
284
 Mich Comp Laws Ann, s 767.41 (West 2006). 
285
 Neb Rev Stat, c 29-1606 (1998); Colo Rev Stat, s 16-5-209 (West 2008). 
286
 Nader v Hughes, 643 A (2d) 747 at 753 (Pa Cmwlth 1994) (“We observed that mandamus is appropriate 
to ‘compel the public official to perform acts which are required or obliged to be performed and which do 
not involve an exercise of discretion or judgment’”); Maxwell v Board of School Directors of School District 
of Farrell, 112 A (2d) 192 at 195 (Pa 1955) (“A Court cannot compel such official to exercise his discretion 
in a manner which will produce a result which the Court may deem wise or desirable”); Pennsylvania 
Dental Association v Insurance Department, 512 Pa 217 at 227-28 (1986): 
In short, mandamus is chiefly employed to compel the performance (when refused) of a 
ministerial duty, or to compel action (when refused) in matters involving judgment and 
discretion. It is not used to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular 
way, nor to direct the retraction or reversal of an action already taken. Mandamus is a 
device that is available in our system to compel a tribunal or administrative agency to 
act when that tribunal or agency has been "sitting on its hands". 
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actual exercise of discretion‖,287 a mandamus is actually used to urge a decision-maker to 
exercise his discretion, which is different than exercising the discretionary power for the 
decision-maker or having a ―second thought‖ about the decision-maker‘s original 
decision. In these cases, the court can compel the DA to bring a case against the suspect. 
An ―objective reasonableness‖ test is not appropriate in a proceeding where a mandamus 
is sought as a remedy.288 A reviewing judge‘s responsibility is not to find whether or not 
he will reach a different conclusion based on the same evidence than the DA might do.289 
This is because two equally reasonable people might reach two opposite conclusions 
based on the same facts and the judge should not take over the DA‘s duty to decide who 
should be prosecuted.290 It has been well established that ―abuse of discretion‖ can be 
reflected in the disputed decision per se and the intent of the DA. If a decision appears to 
be so manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair that a reasonable person would have 
had reached a completely opposite conclusion or would have had never adopted the 
course of action in the first place, the decision-maker is abusing his discretion.291 As well, 
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 Tanenbaum v D'Ascenzo, 356 Pa 260 at 263 (1947) [Tanenbaum]. 
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 Sandoval v Farish, 675 P 2d 300 at 303 (Colo 1984) [Sandoval]. See also Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co v 
AT&T Corp, 320 F (3d) 1081 at 1092 (10th Cir 2003) ("By providing specific examples of common types of 
share transfer restrictions that are certainly permissible, the statute saves courts- and corporations and 
shareholders - the trouble of conducting the reasonableness inquiry that would otherwise be necessary"); 
Cf People v Ellison, 14 P (3d) 1034 at 1039 (Colo 2000) (Statute offers example of methods "that would 
cause a reasonable person to be aware that his license was under restraint"). 
289
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(1976). 
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 Lawley v Dep't of Higher Educ, 36 P (3d) 1239 at 1252 (Colo 2001): 
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exercising its discretion in such manner after a consideration of evidence before it as 
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conclusions. 
See also: Revenig, supra note 289; Geer v Susman, 134 Colo 6 at 8-9 (1956); Van De Vegt v Board of 
Comm'rs, 98 Colo 161 at 166-67 (1936);  People v Hoover, 165 P (3d) 784 at 802 (Colo App 2006); State v 
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a DA‘s refusal to press a charge cannot be ―motivated by bad faith, malice, or personal 
vindictiveness‖.292 
Supposedly, non-prosecution resulting from impermissibly discriminatory grounds might 
also be used to challenge a decision not to prosecute. However, this remains inconclusive 
in the absence of an actual case. Non-prosecution based on impermissibly discriminatory 
grounds, such as race, religion, or any other arbitrary classification, could constitute abuse 
of discretion. Arbitrarily selective prosecution is impermissible in the US. This has been 
pointed out in Wayte v. United States: 
[A]lthough prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not ―‗unfettered‘. 
Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is... subject to 
constitutional constraints.‖ ... In particular, the decision to prosecute may 
not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification…293 
In Wayte, the court went on to explain that, because ―even if the passive policy had a 
discriminatory effect, petitioner has not shown that the Government intended such a 
result‖, a prosecution that caused the discriminatory effect but was made out of a non-
discriminatory policy did not violate equality protection. 294  The reason seems 
questionable. The Constitution does not only regulate the laws of a country, but is also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Heywood, 783 P (2d) 890 at 894 (Kan 1989) ([D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable person 
would take the view adopted); Freedom Colo Info, Inc v El Paso County Sheriff's Dep't, 196 P (3d) 892 at 
899-900 (Colo 2008) (Agency abuses its discretion if "decision under review is not reasonably supported by 
competent evidence in the record). 
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 Sandoval, supra note 288 at 302; Genesee County Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115 at 
121 (1974):  
Judge "may not properly substitute his judgment for that of the . . . prosecuting attorney. 
He may reverse or revise [the prosecutor's] decision only if it appears on the record that 
[he] ha[s] abused the power confided to [him]." (footnote omitted)), appeal after 
remand sub nom. People v. Hoskins, 403 Mich. 95, 267 N.W.2d 417 (1978). 
293
 Wayte, supra note 273 at 608. 
294
 Ibid 610. 
110 
 
 
supposed to protect individuals from unconstitutional violations. Of course, if the law or a 
policy is discriminatory, the resulting decision is inherently unlawful. However, if a 
legitimate law is implemented in a way that causes discriminatory effects on an 
individual, the relevant decision should be equally unjust and unfair to the individual who 
is aggrieved or affected. Unfortunately, the decision in Wayte was followed in subsequent 
cases295.  
The burden of proof lies on the complainant. In order to understand reasons behind the 
DA dropping a case, a judge might order the DA to provide a justification for his or her 
decision. Nevertheless, this does not mean the DA has to provide clear and convincing 
evidence to support his reasoning.296 The aforementioned does not shift the burden of 
proof to the DA. 297 Furthermore, the standard of proof is very high. In DiLeo v Koltnow 
and Metro Moving & Storage, the judge emphasized that ―[c]lear and convincing 
evidence is that evidence which is stronger than a preponderance of the evidence and 
which is unmistakable and free from serious or substantial doubt.‖298 This is because, in 
general, even though the DA‘s decisions not to prosecute can be examined by the court 
upon the victims‘ request, before the abuse of discretion is proven by solid evidence, the 
DA should be presumed to be performing their duty correctly and in good faith.299 As a 
result, in situations where a combination of factors, some favoring prosecution and others 
favoring the DA‘s decision to drop a charge, are presented, evidence that supports the 
                                                          
295
 Armstrong, supra note 281; US v Hasting, 126 F (3d) 310 (4th Cir 1997); US v Turner, 104 F (3d) 1180 
(9th Cir 1997). 
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 Sandoval, supra note 288 at 303. 
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 Ibid. 
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 DiLeo v Koltnow, 200 Colo 119 at 125-126 (1980). See also: Metro Moving & Storage Co v Gussert, 914 P 
(2d) 411 at 414 (Colo App 1995). 
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 Ibid. See also Commonwealth v Heckman, 928 A (2d) 1077 at 1079 (Pa Super 2007) [Heckman]; In re 
Private Criminal Complaint of Wilson, 879 A (2d) 199 at 215 (Pa Super 2005) [In re Wilson]. 
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DA‘s decision to terminate prosecution usually proves to be enough to justify non-
prosecutions. 300  Only in the case where evidence supporting prosecution clearly 
outweighs evidence against does the court side with the victims. 
4.4.2 Disapproval of private prosecution 
4.4.2.1 Legal Considerations 
Unlike a request for a mandamus, the standard to allow a de novo review of a district 
attorney‘s disapproval of private prosecution is comparatively lower. 301  In the US, a 
private prosecution might be conditional on the consent of the DA. The DA can exercise 
its discretion to refuse or to approve a private prosecution on the grounds of evidentiary 
insufficiency, public policy or both. However, in some states‘ practice, if a DA rejects a 
private prosecution based on solely legal considerations, which falls in legal 
interpretation, a de novo review is permissible.302  
4.4.2.1.1 Evidential Insufficiency 
It is established that the evidential sufficiency to sustain a criminal charge is a legal issue, 
which makes a decision based on that a legal conclusion.303 Therefore, the court has 
jurisdiction to review the decision to prosecute that has been disapproved by the public 
                                                          
300
 JS v Carol Chambers, 226 P (3d) 1193 (Colo 2009) affirmed in Stene v Chambers, 2010 Colo LEXIS 220 
(Colo 2010). 
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 When requesting for an order in the nature of mandamus, victims expect a court to force a public 
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prosecutor and does not need to give special deference to the public prosecutor.304 If the 
court found that the evidence submitted by the private complainant could sustain a prima 
facie case, it can undo the disapproval. In Commonwealth ex rel Guarrasi v Carroll, the 
court clearly stated: 
If a prosecutor's decision to disapprove a private criminal complaint was 
based on a legal evaluation of the sufficiency of the complaint, then the 
trial court must undertake a de novo review of the complaint to ascertain 
whether it establishes a prima facie cause of action. 305 
In the context of American law, a prima facie case means a case in which ―the amount of 
evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of 
innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by evidence 
tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove facts inconsistent with it; 
that which is received or continues until the contrary is shown.‖306 This is a primary 
requirement for a case to go to a jury.307 In spite of disregarding possible contradictory 
evidence and arguments against the accusation or existing evidence, judges still somehow 
exercise some personal thoughts concerning the value, admissibility, reliability, and 
relevance of the evidence submitted by the private complainant in order to determine 
whether the evidence has made a prima facie case. It is a judgmental call on the judges‘ 
part on how to weigh the evidence. It is possible that, in some less obvious cases, the 
same set of evidence leads to a different conclusion if put in front of a different judge. 
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This standard of de novo review seems appropriate in the case where a disapproval of 
private prosecution occurs. In a private prosecution, it is the private prosecutor‘s power to 
exercise the prosecutorial discretion as a prosecutor in deciding whether to prosecute after 
assessing the possibility of conviction. When considering whether or not to disapprove a 
private prosecution based on the minimum evidentiary threshold, a DA is to assess 
whether a case should be put forward according to the existing evidence at his or her 
discretion as if he or she were the prosecutor who would conduct the private prosecution. 
This means that they will probably disapprove a case because they would have never 
initiated such a prosecution if they were the prosecutor in the case. However, the private 
prosecutor and the DA could have reached two opposite but equally reasonable 
conclusions concerning the establishment of a prima facie case based on the same set of 
evidence. Holding an opposite opinion about whether or not to prosecute than the DA 
does not necessarily mean that the decision made by the private prosecutor is incorrect. If 
the private prosecution does not err in filing a charge against a lawbreaker, a district 
attorney‘s intervention based on his own judgment of no prima facie case will amount to 
unjustifiably disrupting the individual‘s exercise of his right to file a private complaint 
granted by the law.  
However, another issue I am concerned about is whether a judge should give certain 
deference to private prosecutors. In fact, American jurisprudence seems to hold that a 
judge is the best person to have the final say on whether a prima facie case has been made 
because such determination falls within a judge‘s expertise. In an application of judicial 
review of the disapproval of a private prosecution based on evidentiary insufficiency, 
judges do not review the decision of disapproval made by the DA, but rather determine 
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whether or not the private prosecutor has provided enough evidence to sustain a prima 
facie case. However, I believe a private prosecutor could reach an equally reasonable 
counter-conclusion on the matter. It would be unfair to deny a particular conclusion 
because one judge does not agree with it. Therefore, it would be better if the reviewing 
judge assesses only the possibility of whether a prima facie case can be sustained based 
on the existing evidence. 
4.4.2.1.2 Decision made based on error of law 
If the exercise of discretion is based on error of law, is a decision made from such 
discretion reviewable by American courts? If the disapproval of a private prosecution is 
based on the DA‘s misinterpretation of law, a reviewing court can undo the disapproval 
because such an issue is a legal consideration rather than the exercise of discretion. In 
contrast, a court cannot compel a DA to prosecute if her or his refusal to prosecute is 
caused by that reason because the issue has not reached the level of abuse of discretion. A 
court can only issue a mandamus when a DA abuses charging discretion. This limitation 
reflects one of the main differences between a mandamus and a certiorari proceeding. In 
Seeton v Adams,308 the appellant sought a mandamus to compel the DA to prosecute an 
association accused of needless and cruel treatment of pigeons after several private 
complaints filed by two individuals against the potential suspects were struck down by 
the DA. The DA disapproved the private prosecution because she believed that the ―live 
pigeon shoots‖ activity did not break the law. The court found that ―live pigeon shoots‖ 
was prohibited based on the criminal code and the DA indeed misinterpreted the law. 
However, the court still refused to issue a mandamus to compel a prosecution because no 
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abuse of discretion was found, and the court emphasized that the mistaken use of 
discretion was not enough to compel a DA to act.  
However, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Bernard L McGinley considered that legal 
considerations include whether the DA had applied the correct law when making a 
decision not to prosecute, which would make the decision in the current case reviewable. 
He relied on Commonwealth v Jury,309 in which the DA disapproved a private prosecution 
because he considered that the allegations against the alleged offender could not be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt based on the existing evidence. The judge in that case 
allowed a de novo review because the district attorney applied an incorrect standard when 
assessing the prospect of conviction. Even though the majority did not agree with that, in 
my opinion, Judge Bernard L McGinley did not err in his categorization of the DA‘s 
misinterpretation of law as legal considerations, which allows a court to review. However, 
the main difference in Jury and the Seeton case is that, in the latter, the complainant 
wanted the court to order the DA to prosecute the case, not to quash the disapproval of a 
prosecution, which would allow the appellant to re-file a private complaint. Because a 
mandamus imposes a higher burden on the DA, the standard of review should be 
comparatively higher. The superior court was correct to employ a higher standard to 
assess the merit of the application and finally decline to issue a mandamus. 
4.4.2.2 Public policy 
In contrast, if the refusal to prosecute is on the grounds of public policy over which the 
DA has exclusive prosecutorial discretionary power, courts are generally reluctant to 
become involved unless a clear abuse of discretion is proven. The standard and burden of 
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proof are the same as to seek a mandamus. This tendency has been upheld in many 
cases. 310  In comparison to legal-consideration-based refusal, policy-based refusal is 
subject to a higher standard of review. It is vital for the judge to carefully examine the 
rationale behind the decision to disapprove a private prosecution.  
In the case where the DA submits that the decision to stop a private prosecution is based 
on public policy, a court can require the district attorney to present evidence to show the 
existence of ―an established policy‖ in order to determine whether they are following an 
actual public policy.311 It has been pointed out that the ―lack of sufficient evidence‖ 
cannot be categorized as a part of public policy, which the district attorney might use to 
object the court‘s de novo review. In Commonwealth ex rel Guarrasi v Carroll, the court 
explained:  
…the D.A. in this case has a policy of not accepting private criminal 
complaints that lack legal merit does not transform the law-based rejection 
of such a complaint into a public policy decision or a hybrid of legal and 
public policy reasons. The significance of this point is simply this: If the 
D.A. were permitted to characterize all law-based rejections of criminal 
complaints as policy decisions, then every rejection would be subject to the 
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard upon review by the Common 
Pleas Court. Thus, the D.A.'s decisions to reject private complaints would 
never be subject to de novo review even though the law requires that 
standard of review for rejections based on lack of legal merit.312 
                                                          
310
 Commonwealth v Brown, 669 A (2d) 984 at 990 (Pa Super 1995) [Brown]; Commonwealth v McGinley, 
673 A (2d) 343 at 345-46 (Pa Super 1996); Michaels v Barrasse, 452 Pa Super 325 at 330-31 (1996); In re 
Wilson, supra note 299 at 215, 218; Carroll, supra note 303 at 385 (District Attorney's disapproval of the 
private criminal complaint due to lack of evidence to prove elements of crimes charged constitutes legal 
conclusion, which is subject to de novo review). 
311
 Brown, supra note 310 at 990 (1995). 
312
 Carroll, supra note 303 at 386 [emphasis added]. 
117 
 
 
Another issue is whether the ―existence of adequate civil remedies‖ constitutes a policy-
based reason. In Commonwealth v Michaliga,313 the complainant requested a nullification 
of the DA‘s decision not to prosecute, which was made based on an assumption that the 
complaint would be better addressed in a civil suit. The appellate court overturned the 
trial court‘s decision to review and emphasized that adequate civil remedies was a policy-
based reason for the disapproval of charges, which was unreviewable in the absence of 
abuse of discretion.314 However, I find the conclusion of the trial court concerning the 
issues about available civil remedies more convincing: 
…this court cannot agree with the definition provided by the learned 
Justice Cappy [in Commonwealth v. Brown, 550 Pa 580 (1998)]: "bad 
faith is shown where the action under review was undertaken with a 
dishonest or corrupt purpose.‖ …However, his definition would provide a 
judge no opportunity to check a District Attorney's exercise of power 
under the present facts; namely, a decision not to prosecute because of 
available civil remedies. There are civil remedies available in this and like 
cases, there are always civil remedies available, but Justice Cappy would 
deny this court the needed latitude to determine their adequacy.  
Take for example an aggravated assault. The District Attorney could deny 
prosecution claiming a civil action for battery would be an "adequate" civil 
remedy. Then on appeal, how could a Petitioner prove that the District 
Attorney denied [the complaint] out of "a dishonest or corrupt purpose"? 
Under Justice Cappy's definition, how could a court possibly find an abuse 
of discretion when it must first find corruption and dishonesty? Under 
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facts similar to this case, he would provide the judiciary no checks or 
balances on the District Attorney's use of discretion.315 
In my opinion, the trial court was correct to reverse the DA‘s decision not to prosecute, 
but it was wrong to conclude that the court should have the power to determine the 
adequacy of civil remedy. Its argument is partially problematic. First, the reasoning is 
illogical. When the court made this conclusion, it agreed with the fact that the 
discontinuance of a prosecution based on the existence of civil remedies was a non-
prosecution policy. If such a policy was lawful, whether the civil remedy was adequate 
was supposed to be a part of the DA‘s exercise of his or her discretion in determining 
whether a case should be dropped based on the availability of civil remedy. The court 
reiterated that it should give high deference to the DA‘s exercise of discretion in charging 
decision-making, so how can it determine ―adequacy of civil remedy‖ for the DA? 
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that a court, which has limited judicial power over 
prosecutorial discretion, should have the power to determine the ―adequacy‖ of the 
existence of civil remedy without proving the DA abused discretion when making 
decisions based on this ground. For another reason, no one should have the right to 
determine whether a remedy is sufficient other than the one who is suffering and needs 
the remedy. Using ―existence of civil remedy‖ as a non-prosecution policy deprives 
victims of liberty and the opportunity to choose the suitable remedy they desire.  
In my opinion, the discontinuance of a prosecution based on the existence of civil remedy 
should not be considered as a valid policy. As the trial court pointed out, there is always a 
civil remedy present. The DA can therefore frequently use ―existence of civil remedy‖ as 
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an excuse to stop a private prosecution and effectively block the court from reviewing the 
decision because the standards of judicial review for policy-based non-prosecution are 
extremely high. Furthermore, the policy is unconstitutional. If a victim fails in his 
criminal complaint, he can always apply a civil suit or other civil remedies. If one case 
were dropped because the complainant had sufficient civil channels to recover his 
damages, other cases that involve the same or similar alleged criminal acts would also be 
eligible for exemption from prosecution based on the same policy. For example, A loses 
$2,000 from an insurance fraud, and the DA determines not to prosecute claiming that A 
can file a civil suit to recover that damage. Then, if B also loses $ 2,000 from similar 
insurance fraud when the policy is still in effect, the DA should drop that case as well if 
other factors are similar, for otherwise, his actions will lack consistency. It can be inferred 
that, if the DA keeps consistency in his decision-making, the other subsequent similar 
insurance fraud should not be prosecuted due to the existence of adequate civil remedy, 
unless there are other distinctive factors that come into play. However, such insurance 
fraud is still an indictable offence listed in criminal law, but in practice the DA‘s policy 
and practice instead takes it off the list of indictable offences. Therefore, by posting this 
policy, the DA‘s actions have the same effect as assuming the legislative function to 
amend the criminal statute, which is unconstitutional based on the separation of power. 
The court is allowed to interfere with a policy-based decision not to prosecute in the 
presence of unconstitutionality.316 In sum, the ―existence of adequate civil remedies‖ as 
policy per se is not valid. 
                                                          
316
 Heckman, supra note 299 at 1079; In re Wilson, supra note 299 at 215; Michaliga, supra note 313 (If 
the DA based the disapproval on policy reasons, the court applies an abuse of discretion standard, 
deferring to the D.A.'s decision , Unless the DA was proved to acts in bad faith, fraudulently or 
unconstitutionally). 
120 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in the EU, there is an increasing emphasis on victims‘ interests at the 
charging stage of a criminal proceeding in recent decades. Most EU countries have 
granted victims either the right to review decisions not to prosecute or the strong right to 
private prosecution to respond to public prosecutors‘ inaction. The adoption of the 
Victims‘ Rights Directive,317 which grants victims the right to review decisions not to 
prosecute, further strengthens victims‘ power to confront public prosecutors‘ improper 
refusal to commence a prosecution throughout the EU. Influenced by the EU practices 
and legislation, the UK has made progress on the reform of its review system for 
decisions not to prosecute. The UK has lowered standards of review of decisions not to 
prosecute, and it recently set up a formal internal review scheme in its prosecution office 
in 2013. In addition, English courts restrict public prosecutors to discontinue a case based 
on ―evidentiary sufficiency‖ grounds. In the US, even though courts still apply 
comparatively high standards of review of public prosecutors withdrawing or staying 
public prosecution, they have absolute power to review the disapproval of the private 
prosecution based on legal considerations such as the lack of sufficient evidence. The 
practice in these areas demonstrates that victims‘ interests at the charging stage of a 
criminal proceeding have gained increasing attention worldwide. 
With the combination between the information about Canadian system given in section 
2.3.4 in Chapter 2 and the information set out above in this chapter, a brief comparison is 
made in the following chart. 
 
                                                          
317
 Victims’ Rights Directive, supra note 14. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of practice in the EU, US, UK and Canada concerning 
victims’ possibility to review a decision not to prosecute  
 Right to review Formal Internal 
Review System 
Judicial Review System 
European 
Union 
Yes 
(Victims‘ Rights 
Directive 2012/29/EU) 
In practice, some EU 
countries substitute a 
right to review a 
decision not to 
prosecute with a strong 
right to a private 
prosecution. In a few 
jurisdictions, such as 
Finland and Austria, a 
private prosecution is 
out of public 
prosecutors‘ control. 
Some countries 
After the adoption of 
Victims‘ Rights Directive 
2012/29/EU, EU 
countries have an 
obligation to adapt their 
corresponding national 
legislation in order to 
comply with the Directive 
within a period of time, 
which means all EU 
countries will have at 
least an internal review 
system eventually.) 
Some countries  
United 
Kingdom 
Yes Yes  
Newly established in 
2013 
Yes. 
Termination of Public 
Prosecution:  
 Reasonableness 
standard of review 
Termination of Private 
Prosecution: 
 Evidentiary 
Sufficiency: ―clearly 
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no case to answer‖ 
 Public Policy: 
Reasonableness 
standard of review 
Available Relief:  
 Direct 
Reconsideration 
 Nullify a Decision 
not to Prosecute  
United 
States 
No No Yes 
Termination of Public 
Prosecution: 
 ―Abuse of 
Discretion‖ 
Standard of Review 
Disapproval of Private 
Prosecution: 
 Legal 
Considerations: 
Automatic de novo 
review 
 Public Policy: 
―Abuse of 
discretion‖ standard 
of review 
Available Relief:  
 Compelling a 
Prosecution 
123 
 
 
 Nullify a Decision 
to Disapprove the 
Private Prosecution 
Canada No No Yes 
Termination of Public 
Prosecution: 
 ―Flagrant 
impropriety‖ 
standard of review 
Termination of Private 
Prosecution: 
 ―Flagrant 
impropriety‖ 
standard of review 
Available Relief:  
 Compelling a 
Prosecution 
 Nullify a Decision 
not to Prosecute 
 Direct a 
Reconsideration 
(Possible) 
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CHAPTER V 
5 Proposed Reforms 
5.1 General Overview 
Drawing on the experiences of the practice in the EU, UK and US, this chapter proposes a 
series of reforms to ensure that victims in Canada have effective opportunities to 
challenge unreasonable and incorrect decisions not to prosecute made by Crown 
prosecutors. The recommended reform includes a two-level process, Internal Review and 
Judicial Review. In section 6.1, I will provide an introduction regarding the application 
and limitations of the Internal Review and Judicial Review respectively, including their 
process, scope of application, eligible and potential participants, and statutory limitations. 
5.1.1 Definition of Victims: “who may seek review” 
The definition of ―victim‖ commonly used in the Canadian legal system is also applicable 
in this review system. A direct victim is the person to whom harm was done, or who 
suffered personal physical, emotional, or economic loss as a direct result of the 
commission of the alleged offence. A person can claim to be a victim eligible for this 
review system based only on emotional loss only when such mental suffering caused by 
the alleged offence is so severe that this person is not able to have a normal life. The 
reason behind this narrow definition of ―mental suffering‖ is to prevent a huge number of 
applications for review merely based on their trivial emotional distress. A person who 
finds himself or herself falling into this definition is eligible to seek review of decisions 
not to prosecute through this review system. Meanwhile, an eligible victim can give up 
his or her opportunity to use this system. Therefore, it is not the system that should 
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automatically identify victims in alleged crimes, but the ―victims‖ who should claim and 
prove that they are victims who are eligible for the system.   
―Indirect victims‖ are the spouse, common-law partner, dependent, or any relative of the 
direct victim, or anyone who has, in law or fact, the custody of the direct victim or is 
responsible for the care or support of the direct victim who suffers emotional or economic 
loss as a result of the alleged offence against the direct victim. In most situations, indirect 
victims alone should have no legal standing to complain about a decision not to prosecute 
because their harm is not directly caused by the alleged offender. However, in cases 
where the direct victim is dead or otherwise incapable of filing a complaint, an indirect 
victim should be able to file a complaint on his or her behalf. In John Doe murder cases 
where the identity of direct victims cannot be confirmed, anyone can file a complaint 
anonymously on behalf of the victims. I consider this situation to be rare and the case is 
likely to be high-profile. At the internal review level, even though it is possible multiple 
complaints are filed given that anyone can act on behalf of the victims in these cases, a 
prosecutor would only conduct one internal review for all complaints, and issue a public 
explanation for his or her decision not to prosecute. At the judicial review level, I assume 
that few people will want to bear the cost of the judicial review process for strangers. 
Therefore, to allow citizens to file review applications for John Does in murder cases will 
not improperly increase the burden on Crown prosecutors because of the increasing, 
sometimes frivolous, complaints.  
Under my proposed reform, a direct victim can block an indirect victim from filing a 
complaint. If the direct victim is a minor or a person who is intellectually disabled, his or 
her express refusal to pursue a case can block an indirect victim from filing a complaint 
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on his or her behalf. This system is a method by which direct victims can assert their 
wishes to have a criminal trial for alleged crimes. If direct victims do not have such 
wishes, indirect victims have no right to force them to go through a trial (if the decision is 
reversed), which can re-victimize the direct victims. As well, it is possible that the 
indirect victims explore the direct victims‘ grievance for their own benefits, for example, 
using potential criminal prosecution or the review of decisions not to prosecute to reach a 
settlement with the accused. However, the effect of this refusal will not expand to barring 
the Crown prosecutor from conducting a prosecution if he or she deems it necessary 
because the Crown prosecutor‘s job is to protect public interests and security by 
instituting a prosecution, and this should not be compromised by the victims‘ wishes. 
I recognize that it is possible that conflicting ideas concerning whether or not to pursue a 
criminal proceeding appear in cases where multiple victims are involved. However, the 
opportunity to review is given to any eligible individual victim, not victims of an alleged 
offense as a group, so the refusal of others should not hinder one particular eligible victim 
from accessing the system. Once the decision is found flawed and the prosecution is re-
commenced following the review, the willingness of the victims of the alleged offense is 
not relevant to whether or not a Crown prosecutor should commence a prosecution 
against the will of the majority of the victims. This is because the Crown prosecutor is 
acting on behalf of the state, not victims, to prosecute the accused. 
In cases where a large number of victims are involved the court can join the applications 
pertinent to the same prosecution and direct the applicants to integrate all arguments and 
elect one representative to present the common interests of the applicants in the judicial 
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review process. For internal review, the Crown prosecutor can conduct only one review 
and send the result and full explanation to all complainants. 
5.1.2 Internal Review System 
In reference to the practice in the UK and the reasoning in the English court in Killick, it 
is necessary that Canada should have an internal review system to protect victims‘ 
potential interests in criminal proceedings. The English court in Killick correctly pointed 
out that the implementation of the victims‘318 right to review should not rest merely with 
his or her seeking judicial review in court.
319
 Victims could not effectively exercise their 
rights to review in the Killick case partially because of the lack of a formal internal review 
system in the Crown Prosecutor‘s Office.320 If victims had a right to review in the UK, the 
Crown Prosecutor‘ Office should have had a systematic, efficient review mechanism to 
receive and re-examine the complaint about its service. Otherwise, the affected victims in 
                                                          
318
 Ministry of Justice, “The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime” (1 October 2005), online: The Crown 
Prosecution Service <http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_code.pdf>. People who are 
eligible for Review Scheme in the UK are defined as follows: 
3.2 The person who has made the allegation (or on whose behalf the allegation has been 
made) must be the direct victim of the criminal conduct. This Code does not require 
services to be provided to third parties or indirect victims such as witnesses of violent 
crime. 
…… 
3.4 Where a person has died as a result of criminal conduct, or is unable to receive 
services as a result of a disability, the victim’s family spokesperson is entitled to receive 
services under this Code. 
3.5 A family spokesperson should be nominated by the close relatives of the person who 
has died. If the close relatives cannot nominate a family spokesperson, the Senior 
Investigating Officer (SIO) working on the criminal investigation must nominate a family 
spokesperson. If the person who has died has no identified close relatives, the SIO may 
nominate someone who appears suitable to receive assistance under the Code in 
respect of the death. 
3.5 Where a person entitled to receive services under this Code is under the age of 17, 
then that person’s parent or guardian is entitled to receive services under this Code as 
well as the young person. 
319
 Killick, supra note 237 at para 48. 
320
 Ibid. 
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the country exercising their rights to review will be undermined.
321
 As a result, the UK 
government recently implemented an internal review system to promote the victims‘ right 
to review a decision not to prosecute. Even though the situation in Canada is different 
given that, in this country, victims have not been formally granted the right to review, 
they have sufficient interests to request the Crown prosecutor to review decisions not to 
prosecute. In this case, it will be more efficient or convenient for victims to protect their 
interests if the Canadian Crown Prosecutor‘s Office provides internal review for them. 
The Internal Review System is necessary. First, it can reduce the incidents wherein 
victims seek judicial review in court because most complaints can be addressed internally 
faster and with less expense for both victims and the justice system. Second, it can 
promote prosecutor-victim interaction in charging decision-making and encourage the 
Crown prosecutor to consider victims‘ interests while following the requirements laid 
down in charging guidelines. In most situations, sufficient communication might 
effectively reduce the immediate tension between the Crown prosecutor and victims 
caused by the decision not to prosecute. By operating the internal review system, the 
Crown prosecutor may realize most complaints can be addressed with sufficient 
communication during the decision-making process. Third, the possibility of heightened 
scrutiny through a review process might promote Crown diligence and caution, and 
reduce prosecutorial misconduct. A Crown prosecutors‘ integrity and ability might be 
questioned by the public and people working in the field if his or her decisions are 
constantly complained and reviewed. Realizing the possibility of review and its 
consequences, Crown prosecutors are likely to be more diligent and careful when making 
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decisions to discontinue a case.  
5.1.2.1 Process 
The proposed internal review system should work in the following way. In general, after a 
Crown prosecutor withdraws charges or stays a proceeding, victims should be informed in 
person on the same day about the decision not to prosecute and about the opportunity to 
request a review for such a decision. The notification and basic information about the 
decision not to prosecute should be put into writing and given to the victim. In the case of 
a stay of a proceeding, unless the Crown prosecutor clearly declares the stay permanent, 
victims are only allowed to challenge the corresponding decision not to prosecute 
beginning one year from the stay of the proceeding. This is because it is unclear whether a 
stay of a proceeding is permanent or temporary. However, after a year, a proceeding that 
was stayed will be deemed never commenced.322 In this case, victims can be sure that no 
prosecution is ongoing for their cases, unless the police re-lay the same charges again.  
It is incorrect to think that this one-year period further prolongs the review process, which 
might have a negative impact on the accused. The accused and his or her representative 
should have known of the Crown prosecutor‘s power to re-commence a prosecution 
within one year even without a review system. Therefore, this one-year period should not 
be counted into the period that the review system would use. This means the negative 
effect on the accused caused by the review system concerning time limitation in the 
situation of staying a prosecution would be no different than in the situation of 
withdrawing charges. 
                                                          
322
 Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 579 (2). 
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If victims decide to make a complaint, they should file an application within fourteen 
days either of receiving notification of non-prosecution or the day the proceeding is 
deemed never commenced. During those fourteen days, the victims can approach the 
local Crown prosecutor‘s office through informal channels to address the issues 
concerning the decision not to prosecute. For an internal review, a victim does not need to 
show any flaws in the Crown prosecutor‘s decision not to prosecute. Instead, they should 
prove that he or she is the ―victim‖ eligible to ask for a review for a decision not to 
prosecute for a particular alleged offense. The Crown prosecutor is obliged to conduct an 
internal review once the application is filed and the eligibility of the applicant is 
confirmed. 
Once victims file an application for reviewing the decision not to prosecute, an internal 
review will take place. Just as many courts have maintained, an administrative decision is 
best handled by people with expertise in the relevant area.323 A special review unit should 
be set up in the Crown Prosecutor‘s Office in every city to review victims‘ complaints in 
that city. In addition, the review unit should provide full explanations of the decision not 
to prosecute if the Crown prosecutor did not do so previously. The unit should be made up 
of two to three experienced prosecutors who can identify potential flaws in the reasoning, 
criteria, standards, etc. behind the decision not to prosecute and decide whether to reverse 
the decision. The unit should only accept complaints pertinent to the Crown prosecutor‘s 
decision to terminate a prosecution permanently after charges have been laid. Meanwhile, 
the Crown prosecutor should inform the accused of the status of the review process and 
the possibility of reversal of the decision not to prosecute. In most situations, the whole 
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 New Brunswick (Board of Management) v Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 at para 27, [2008] 1 SCR 
190[Dunsmuir]. 
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process should be completed in no more than two months from the day the complaint is 
filed. An extra month could be given to the unit to reassess the decision not to prosecute if 
the case is exceptionally complicated. 
5.1.2.2 Scope 
Victims can only apply to the internal review system when a case is discontinued 
permanently and completely. Victims cannot apply in the following situations: (1) the 
Crown prosecutor withdraws one or several charges or alters the charges substantially, 
but the prosecution continues; (2) the Crown prosecutor clearly indicates, when staying a 
prosecution, that the stay will last for only a short period; and (3) the Crown prosecutor 
withdraws charges or stays a private prosecution as a result of a deal with the accused.
324
 
In the first situation, victims do not have a right to a specific prosecution and cannot 
decide how the Crown prosecutor should conduct a prosecution. Even though victims‘ 
satisfaction with the prosecution might be comparatively reduced, if the prosecution 
continues, victims still have opportunities to uphold their interests and exercise their 
rights in the trial and post-trial stages at the least. Furthermore, if the prosecution is 
commenced, the Crown prosecutor is in a better position than victims to know how to 
conduct a prosecution effectively and how to get a conviction. In the second situation, 
victims can file a complaint for internal review a year from the day the proceeding was 
stayed because the prosecution is deemed never commenced if a stay is more than a year 
old. 
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The type of non-prosecution in the third situation, in which the Crown prosecutor stops 
prosecution as quid pro quo for receiving something from the accused, comes from the 
Crown prosecutor‘s power to make a deal with the accused and is not discussed in this 
thesis. Allowing victims to review this type of decision will open a Pandora's Box of 
victims‘ power to interfere with the Crown prosecutor‘s power to make deals. 
Furthermore, it has been held in R v S (N) that a just and proportionate balance should 
always be maintained between the victims‘ rights in criminal proceedings and the 
accused‘s right to a fair trial.325 A review in this type of situation, more than others, risks 
the possibility of significant damage to the right of the accused.  
In some cases, the Crown prosecutor‘s need for the accused‘s information is urgent, and 
making a deal for such information cannot wait for the victim to exhaust appeals for 
review of the deal. The accused feels secure in disclosing possibly damaging information 
because of the belief that the Crown prosecutor will not renege on their deal. Just as 
Berger J stated in R v Smith, ―the ordinary man is entitled to expect that the Crown will 
keep its word‖.326 A review and subsequent reinstitution of the prosecution would be 
unfair to the accused given that the incriminatory information may have been disclosed in 
the deal, which could be used against the accused in court. This risks the possibility that 
the Crown prosecutor uses the internal review and victims to trap the accused into self-
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 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 SCR 726; Department of Justice Canada, “Victims Rights: Enhancing Criminal Law 
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incrimination: a blatant violation of the accused‘s right to be silent and avoid self-
incrimination.
327
  
For example, in the case of R v Talon,
328
 Talon entered into an immunity agreement with 
the Crown prosecutor in exchange for the former‘s testimony against two accomplices in 
a double murder. Two years later, while promoting his book about his criminal career, he 
admitted, to third parties, to having committed the murders. As a result, he was charged 
with murder, but the prosecution was stayed because it was prejudicial and unfair to 
Talon, who would never have admitted committing the crime without the immunity 
agreement.  
This example also reveals another issue. Incriminatory evidence obtained in an 
unconstitutional way might be ruled inadmissible in court, which would be detrimental to 
the prosecution. As well, the court might stop prosecution if the repudiation of a non-
prosecution agreement is deemed to cause irreparable damage to a fair trial. Repudiation 
of non-prosecution amounts to the abuse of power by the Crown prosecutor if he unfairly 
reneges on expectations he has generated in the accused.
329
 This would make a victim‘s 
application for review of a deal meaningless, because the prosecution ends up stopped 
anyway.  
If internal review happens, and is successful, a Crown prosecutor will re-commence the 
prosecution. If internal review upholds the original decision not to prosecute, victims 
have an option to bring their complaints to a competent court for judicial review. 
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 Charter, supra note 20, ss 11, 13. 
328
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5.1.3 Judicial Review in Competent Court 
In general, I do not recommend victims be overly dependent on the court‘s adjudication. 
The superior court is supposed to be the last resort for victims to seek a remedy. The court 
considers itself the least viable option to challenge decisions not to prosecute because 
judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion does not prevail in most circumstances. 
In such a situation, the court takes action only when victims have run out of options and a 
court feels a need to uphold the rule of law and the integrity of the criminal justice 
system. For this reason, the application for judicial review can be easily rejected if there 
are other available remedies. 
5.1.3.1 Process 
If victims are still dissatisfied with a decision not to prosecute after an internal review, 
they should be able to apply for a judicial review to the superior court in the 
corresponding province within fourteen days after receiving the internal review process 
result. The superior court has ―inherent jurisdiction‖ which, in principle, makes no matter 
beyond its jurisdiction.330 It should have jurisdiction over an application for reviewing a 
decision not to prosecute.331 Therefore, the superior court is the best place for victims to 
apply for judicial review of decisions not to prosecute. In fact, many previous 
applications of this type were brought before the superior court. In cases where the 
subject matter is authorized to be heard before the Federal Court in accordance with the 
Federal Courts Act332 or other federal statutes,333 the judicial review of decisions not to 
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prosecute can be brought before the Federal Courts. A court‘s proceeding should start no 
more than twenty-eight days after victims file an application. The length of time it takes 
to complete a judicial review should not be longer than nine months. 
Victims can challenge decisions not to prosecute on the ground of ―flagrant impropriety‖ 
of the Crown prosecutors‘ behavior and ―reasonableness‖ and ―correctness‖ of the 
decisions. These standards of review will be further elaborated in later sections. Before 
accepting the application, a court needs to be satisfied that the victim has established a 
prima facie case of those grounds.334 Although, in this proposed judicial review system, 
the standard of review is lowered from the existing one,335  the burden of proof and 
persuasion still lies with the victims. In most situations, the Crown prosecutor performs 
his or her role as a minister of justice independently and effectively and should not be 
influenced by external duress or be unduly called into question. Therefore, during the 
judicial review, he or she should be presumed to be acting in good faith and in a correct 
manner unless someone can prove otherwise.336  
In the application, victims should specify a particular remedy they are seeking. However, 
in the end, deciding when and how to use a prerogative remedy is at the court‘s 
discretion.
337
 The court should be able to compel a prosecution, direct reconsideration, 
quash a stay of private prosecution, or combine any two of them on a case-by-case basis. 
For example, in cases where the applicant originally seeks to compel a prosecution but 
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fails to establish ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of Crown prosecutors, the court can 
refuse to grant such a remedy. However, if after the judicial review of the original claim, 
a court instead finds the decision is irrational based on the ―reasonableness‖ standard, it 
has the power to quash the decision not to prosecute and direct the Crown prosecutor to 
reconsider his or her decision. The applicant does not need to file a new application. 
5.1.3.2 Statutory Power of the Crown Prosecutor to Discontinue a 
Prosecution 
Crown prosecutor‘s prerogative power to decide not to prosecute a case should be 
replaced by a statutory power. The scope of a Crown prosecutor exercising discretionary 
power to stop a prosecution should be laid down in the relevant legislation. Unlike the 
existing Crown charging guideline or manuals, the statute is binding, which can impose 
upon Crown prosecutors legal obligations to comply with it. As well, the statute can 
provide courts with legal guidance when examining whether the Crown prosecutors‘ 
decisions not to prosecute are legitimate and valid. This point will be further discussed in 
the later section 6.3.1. 
5.1.3.3 Participation of the accused 
In the judicial review process, the only parties are victims and the Crown prosecutor. The 
prospective accused should not be a party to the judicial review process, but he or she 
should be allowed to have limited participatory role in such a process provided the 
prospective accused would be significantly harmed by some particular outcomes from the 
judicial review, such as compelling a prosecution or nullifying a stay of private 
prosecution.  
The prospective accused should only be allowed to raise arguments concerning 
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procedural issues of the judicial review process. Conducting a judicial review in a 
particular way might have caused significant or irreversible damage to the prospective 
accused‘s possibility of receiving a fair trial if the judicial review resulted in a 
prosecution. The accused is in a better position than the Crown prosecutor to demonstrate 
how the procedure would affect him. For example, if a victim demands an adjournment in 
order to collect more evidence, arguments of the accused should be relevant and 
important for the court to determine whether or not to grant an adjournment and the 
proper length of the adjournment if granted. The adjournment might further extend the 
judicial review process, which can harm the accused if important evidence goes missing, 
mental suffering prolongs or other unexpected and detrimental incidents happen in the 
period of the adjournment.   
However, the prospective accused should not be allowed to make a submission 
concerning the merits of the judicial review. To allow the prospective accused to make an 
argument for the merits of the judicial review will improperly delay the judicial review 
process, which would have negative impact on both the prospective accused and the 
efficiency of the judicial review system. First, because the Crown prosecutor is the one 
who is actually accused by the victims, he or she might have raised all possible arguments 
for his or her position. The accused would probably raise the same arguments as the 
Crown prosecutor did, which would be useless.  
Second, the reviewing court is not a trial court. The reviewing court‘s job is to determine 
whether or not a reason behind a decision not to prosecute is reasonable or whether or not 
the decision is correct. I do not believe that the accused would have better knowledge of 
the charging decision-making process and reasons behind such a decision than the Crown 
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prosecutor would have, which makes the accused not in a better position to justify the 
decision not to prosecute. This is especially the case when the issues in dispute are about 
how the Crown prosecutor weighs the evidence, considers possible defense of the accused 
at trial, or determines a policy concerning non-prosecutions.  
In addition, the participation of the prospective accused might have a negative impact, as 
the prospective accused may try to inappropriately influence the judges to deliver a 
favorable outcome by providing arguments that are supposed to be addressed in a trial 
court and are irrelevant to determination for a judicial review. If a reviewing judge does 
not take the irrelevant factors into account when deciding whether or not a decision is 
flawed and what remedy is going to be issued, then introducing such irrelevant factors 
would be merely a waste of time. If a reviewing judge might be influenced by such 
irrelevant factors and unconsciously consider those factors in his or her judgement, it is 
improper and unfair to the participants to bring them up.  
Third, the prospective accused has limited interests in the result of a judicial review in 
most situations. The accused will be significantly affected by the judicial review only 
when the review results in the reinstitution of the criminal proceeding. However, only on 
limited grounds will the court compel a prosecution or quash a stay of private 
prosecution.338 In most situations, the court will only re-direct a reconsideration. An order 
to re-consider a decision is not an order to reinstitute a prosecution, nor will it definitely 
result in a reinstitution of a prosecution. This means, in such situations, the reinstitution 
of the criminal proceeding, if any, does not directly result from the judicial review. In 
addition, the limited grounds that might finally lead to the reinstitution of the prosecution 
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directly from the judicial review are related to the integrity of the Crown prosecutor, 
which makes the Crown prosecutor be more motivated to argue with due diligence. In 
conclusion, in order to promote the efficiency and fairness of the judicial review, the 
participation of the accused should be limited.  
5.1.4 Issue on limitation periods for summary conviction offences 
There is a limitation period of six months for summary conviction offences to be 
pursued.
339
 It makes no sense for the reviewing court to reverse a decision not to 
prosecute if the limitation periods of the alleged offence have expired. For some hybrid 
cases, even if the time limitation for a summary conviction proceeding has passed, the 
Crown prosecutor can still proceed with the case by indictment. It is possible that a 
judicial review could turn a summary conviction case into a case that proceeds by 
indictment. The latter affords the accused all sorts of expensive procedural rights and is 
comparatively lengthy, which could be detrimental to the victim. For example, in sexual 
assault cases, the accused can require a jury trial. In this case, attacking the character of 
the victim and his or her sexual history might be a strategy to discredit the victim before 
the jury.  
To prevent the time limitation from running out, an amendment to section 786 of the 
Criminal Code
340
 is necessary. The clock should stop running the day the charges are 
filed against a suspect. The limitation period was created to urge the investigating and 
prosecuting authorities to perform their duties with reasonable diligence and to reduce the 
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possibility that the accused loses evidence for his or her effective defense. In order to 
balance these interests, the statute of limitations should continue running fourteen days 
after the day the judgement is delivered by the court of last appeal. A fourteen-day period 
is also given to the Crown prosecutor for reconsideration of the original decision not to 
prosecute. In cases where victims do not apply for judicial review or miss the deadline for 
the application, the statute of limitations starts running fourteen days after the day the 
outcome of the internal review is delivered. 
5.2 Internal Review Scheme 
5.2.1 The victims should receive full explanation through an Internal 
Review Scheme 
Victims should only receive a full explanation of the decision not to prosecute after they 
file a request for an internal review. Before that, victims should receive only the 
notification of the decision and brief reasons at the Crown prosecutor‘s discretion. In my 
opinion, it is not necessary for the Crown prosecutor to provide detailed reasons for every 
decision not to prosecute. For one reason, as explained by Robert J Frater, the prosecution 
system would be unworkable if the Crown prosecutor had to give a full explanation for 
every decision because countless cases need to be dropped every year.
341
  
For another reason, not all victims are obsessed with a criminal prosecution and are 
anxious to receive a full explanation of the termination of a prosecution. For various 
reasons, some victims might be satisfied with brief reasons behind decisions not to 
prosecute. Perhaps they do not want to spend more time questioning the decision, or the 
Crown prosecutor has successfully explained the reason behind the termination of the 
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prosecution. Alternatively, civil recourse might be more tempting for some victims, and 
therefore they do not care about criminal prosecution at all. In some cases, such as sexual 
assault or domestic violence cases, some victims do not want to go through a complete 
criminal proceeding.
342
 For them, a notification of the termination of a case is, instead, 
good news. Therefore, in the aforementioned cases, it would be a waste of time for the 
Crown prosecutor to prepare a lengthy and detailed explanation because victims do not 
need one. 
For some victims, a basic reason is enough. In most situations, in Canada, brief 
explanations of the termination of a prosecution will be provided to victims. In many 
provinces, it is recommended in the Crown prosecutor manuals that the Crown prosecutor 
provide some explanations of stopping a prosecution. At federal level, according to the 
Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, the federal government attempts to balance 
transparency, in the interests of victims and the public, and privacy, in the interests of 
suspects and justice: 
Where a decision is made not to institute proceedings, it is recommended 
that a record be kept of the reasons for that decision. Furthermore, counsel 
should be conscious of the need in appropriate cases to explain a decision 
not to prosecute to, for example, the investigative agency. Ensuring that 
affected parties understand the reason for the decision not to prosecute, 
and that those reasons reflect sensitivity to the investigative agency‘s 
mandate will foster better working relationships.343 
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It is true that this paragraph actually emphasizes providing reasons to the police, not so 
much to victims. However, it somehow implies that victims should be given some 
explanations of the non-prosecution given that they are affected parties as well. This rule 
is applied in several provinces. For example, similar text is put into the guidebook of 
policies and procedures for the Conduct of Criminal Prosecutions in Prince Edward Island 
and Newfoundland.
344
 In Nova Scotia, Crown prosecutors have the duty to release 
reasons behind decisions not to prosecute to both victims and the public.
345
 The Crown 
prosecutors in this province are encouraged to ensure victims understand the reason 
behind a non-prosecution decision in order to maintain confidence in the administration 
of justice. In other provinces, such as British Colombia and Ontario, victims have the 
right to receive reasons behind decisions not to prosecute according to relevant victims‘ 
bill of rights.
346
 Therefore, at this stage, I believe that, in general, victims are more or less 
expected to receive the basic information about decisions not to prosecute. 
 
5.2.1.1 After the application for internal review 
In my opinion, if a victim applies for an internal review, this means that this victim is firm 
about instituting a criminal prosecution and that the basic information on the decision not 
to prosecute is not acceptable to him or her. In this case, the Crown prosecutor should 
provide a full explanation to this victim if the decision not to prosecute is maintained after 
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an internal review. The full explanation must be given to victims after the internal review. 
The explanation can help the victim understand the reasons behind the termination of the 
case, possibly agree with the Crown prosecutor‘s judgement, and forgo pursuit of the case 
in the criminal dimension.  
If the victim is not satisfied with the Crown prosecutor‘s reasons, he or she can use those 
reasons to challenge in court the decision not to prosecute. Apart from judges‘ reluctance 
to intervene in prosecutorial discretionary decisions, the low success rate in judicial 
review for a decision not to prosecute is attributable to the lack of conclusive evidence for 
the victim to make a strong claim. This is partially because, in most situations, victims do 
not receive full explanations of the decision not to prosecute. In most provinces, the law 
allows the Crown prosecutor to withhold information for security reasons. In Canada, the 
Crown prosecutor is not obligated to give reasons for decisions not to prosecute.
347
  
For example, in Nova Scotia, while the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act requires the public body to disclose reasons behind decisions not to prosecute if a 
person demanding the information is aware of the investigation, it also includes a list of 
information that a Crown prosecutor is allowed to withhold.348  Empirical research is 
lacking on Crown prosecutors‘ practice of giving victims reasons for decisions not to 
prosecute. However, in the case of decisions to institute a prosecution, the Crown 
prosecutor either refuses to give any reasons or merely gives a perfunctory response.349 It 
is not a bad prediction that victims can hardly receive a full explanation of decisions not 
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to prosecute given that they do not even have a solid ―right‖ to disclosure as do the 
accused. Without the full explanation of the termination of a prosecution, victims would 
have difficulties in finding flaws in the decision not to prosecute. This makes it difficult 
for victims to convince a judge to review a decision not to prosecute without strong 
arguments and sufficient evidentiary support. In most cases of judicial review of charging 
decisions, both decisions to prosecute and decisions not to prosecute, the applicants can 
only contest from the decision itself, and there is seldom any ―smoking gun‖ evidence.350 
In an administrative law context, the duty of an administrative decision maker to give 
reasons for a decision is generally recommended to ensure a rational and transparent 
decision-making process.351 For example, in Canada v Baker, the Court recognized that: 
Reasons, it has been argued, foster better decision making by ensuring that 
issues and reasoning are well articulated and, therefore, more carefully 
thought out. The process of writing reasons for decision by itself may be a 
guarantee of a better decision.352 
Written reasons for decisions can promote transparency. Once the decision is questioned 
by citizens, written records can clearly show what happened in the decision-making 
process, which can prevent secrecy. Transparency in decision-making is necessary to 
promote the accountability of the decision-maker to the person affected and to the 
public.353 Even though giving reasons for a decision is not necessary in common law 
tradition, under some circumstances, the Supreme Court has recognized that the duty to 
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provide reasons is appropriate and necessary:  
In certain circumstances, the duty of procedural fairness will require the 
provision of a written explanation for a decision. The strong arguments 
demonstrating the advantages of written reasons suggest that, in cases such 
as this, where the decision has important significance for the individual, 
where there is a statutory right of appeal, or in other circumstances, some 
form of reasons should be required.354 
In Baker, the court also affirmed that ―reasons are invaluable if a decision is to be 
appealed, questioned, or considered on judicial review‖. 355  Victims have significant 
interest affected by the decision not to prosecute. In this proposal, I recommend that 
victims‘ ability to access judicial review should be further strengthened. With this change, 
victims should receive a full explanation of the decision not to prosecute when they deem 
judicial review is necessary. Normally, reasons behind a decision are important for the 
reviewing authority to determine whether the decision is correct or rational. Not knowing 
the reasons behind a decision not to prosecute would put victims at a disadvantage in 
exercising their power to protect their interests through applying for judicial review. Even 
if victims‘ suspicions about the decision not to prosecute are correct, they will not have 
enough ammunition to make a successful claim. In this case, the operation of the review 
system will be extremely unfair to victims. Victims are not given a reasonable opportunity 
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to present their claims because the system puts them at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-
vis the Crown prosecutor. This significantly reduces procedural fairness in the legal 
system.  
5.2.2 The Crown prosecutor should be allowed to overturn his original 
decision not to prosecute without introducing new evidence 
In order to ensure the effective operation of an internal review system when victims 
request a review, the Crown prosecutor should be allowed to reverse his or her original 
decision not to prosecute without referring to new evidence. The accused should not be 
able to claim that the Crown prosecutor abuses the court‘s process merely based on the 
fact that the latter reverses a decision not to prosecute after an internal review process. 
First, from a practical perspective, for an internal review, victims will often complain that 
the judgement of the Crown prosecutor is incorrect or irrational. In such a situation, 
victims will not bring in new evidence, but merely request a reassessment of the existing 
evidence or reconsideration of public interest policy. The system will be unworkable if 
the Crown prosecutor is not allowed to reverse the original decision without introducing 
new evidence. 
Secondly, the power to reverse a decision not to prosecute is fundamentally connected to 
the Crown prosecutor‘s discretionary power to determine whether to continue a criminal 
prosecution. A Crown prosecutor can decide to drop a case at this moment, but find it 
wrong or improper in the next moment. When people make complex decisions, there 
might be conflicting ideas in their mind, and they might want to change their decisions 
through thinking and evaluating the relevant elements. All these constitute a basic part of 
discretion. If a Crown prosecutor cannot effectively reverse his or her own decision, the 
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exercise of discretion to decide whether to continue a case is subject to improper 
limitation. This is also to maintain a good quality of the outcome resulting from the 
discretionary decision-making. In R v Papaioannou, the court found that re-laying 
charges is appropriate and permissible if flaws were found in dropping charges.
356
 The 
reversal is forbidden only when such a reversal is motivated by bad faith or influenced by 
improper motive or policy.
357
  
5.2.2.1 Limitations and Notification 
One important issue is how much negative impact will be imposed on the accused if the 
Crown prosecutor has unlimited power to reinstitute a prosecution without referring to 
fresh evidence after a charge is withdrawn or permanently stayed. The jurisprudence in 
Ireland and the UK can assist in analyzing the use of the reversal by public prosecutors in 
the absence of fresh evidence. 
5.2.2.1.1 Ireland 
In Ireland, as an informal procedure, victims can write a letter to the Director of Public 
Prosecutor (DPP) and request a review for the original decision not to prosecute. If the 
DPP considers it is appropriate, an internal review will be conducted by an official who is 
not the one who made the original decision.358 The DPP can stop a case in both pre-
charge and post-charge stage, but it is his or her general right to re-commence the case at 
both stages.359 
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In general, the DPP is allowed to have second thoughts on the decision not to prosecute 
without introducing new materials. This does not amount to arbitrariness or perversion if 
the DPP‘s exercise of this function does not impair the accused‘s fair procedure right. The 
most famous case dealing with this issue is Eviston v DPP360 in 2002. Mrs. Eviston was 
involved in a car accident that resulted in the death of the victim, and later her lawyers 
were informed that the DPP had decided not to file a charge against her based on the lack 
of necessary mens rea for the crime. Six days later, the father of the victim wrote to the 
DPP and requested reconsideration of the decision not to prosecute. Even though he had 
not received any new evidence, the DPP still decided to review the decision, and because 
of that, the original decision not to prosecute was reversed. Mrs. Eviston filed a complaint 
to the High Court in order to seek an injunction against the prosecution. The High Court 
granted the motion by finding that the reversal was not consistent with the DPP‘s official 
charging guideline, which amounted to the DPP acting ―arbitrarily‖ and ―perversely‖. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the injunctive relief granted by the High Court but rejected its 
reasoning. It emphasized that the DPP‘s change of mind in the charging decision is a part 
of his discretion, and the mere disobedience of the guideline did not constitute valid 
grounds to review a decision to prosecute. It continued pointing out that the essential 
issue in this case was whether the fair procedure right was infringed, concluding as 
follows: 
In thus holding, I am bearing in mind all the facts of the case as they have 
emerged during the course of the proceedings. I also bear in mind the level 
of stress and anxiety which has been borne over a considerable period by 
the Applicant. On these particular facts it seems to me that once the DPP 
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had unequivocally and without any caveat informed the Applicant that no 
prosecution would issue against her in connection with this road traffic 
accident, it was a breach of her right to fair procedures for him to reverse 
his decision and to initiate a prosecution by the issuing of the summons on 
the 23rd December 1998.361 
Eviston did not define what level of stress and anxiety generated by the reversal would 
make it a violation of procedural fairness. Later in the same type of case, Carlin v 
DPP,362 the Supreme Court partly followed Eviston‘s reasoning. It agreed that a sort of 
exacerbating anxiety and stress caused by the reversal of a decision not to prosecute 
without the proper warning of the possible future review could amount to the denial of a 
fair procedure. However, it stressed that ―[t]he appellant would have to have shown that 
the level of anxiety or stress suffered was raised beyond that normal level by reason of the 
failure of the Director to observe fair procedures.‖363  
In Carlin, the Chief Justice only emphasized the degree of the anxiety and stress Mr. 
Carlin suffered at the moment when he received the notification of prosecution against 
him a year after the original decision not to prosecute was delivered. In Eviston, by 
contrast, the Chief Justice based the denial of fair procedure on the hypothesis that if a 
notification of the decision not to prosecute was not a final one, Mrs. Eviston might have 
lived in the fear of not knowing when she would be prosecuted on the same grounds 
again. In his dissenting judgement in Eviston, Justice Francis D. Murphy expressed his 
disagreement on the point that the exercise of discretion by the DPP is reviewable for 
Eviston types of violation of fair procedure. In Eviston, the violation of fair procedure 
                                                          
361
 Ibid. 
362
 Carlin v DPP, [2010] IESC 14. 
363
 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
150 
 
 
means the violation of ―a right to peace of mind‖, which means that a person is entitled to 
be free from a sense of stress and anxiety caused by the uncertainty of being prosecuted. 
Justice Murphy stressed the point that ―there is no suggestion that she altered her position 
for the worse as a result of being informed in the first instance that she would not be 
prosecuted‖364. Furthermore, he also considered that, even if the DPP had warned Mrs. 
Eviston of the possible reversal of the decision not to prosecute, she would not have 
received peace. Rather, she would have been more disrupted by knowing the decision was 
not final.  
In this case, should we suggest that in no circumstances could the DPP change his or her 
decision after informing the suspect? Justice Murphy clearly has a point on this issue. 
However, he, as well as the majority in Eviston, failed to consider the stress that might be 
imposed on an accused at the moment when he or she is informed about the reinstitution 
of the proceedings. The accused might recently have located a new job after 
unemployment caused by the previous investigation and prosecution and might be 
stressed and scared about losing a job again for the same reason. He or she might have 
disposed of materials valuable to the defence prepared for the dropped prosecution. 
Important witnesses may not available anymore for various reasons. He or she may also 
have ceased investigations for the defence, and a new investigation may turn negative 
because exculpatory physical evidence could be long gone after a period of time since the 
alleged crime was committed. This could be detrimental to the accused‘s defense. All of 
these could cause stress to the accused. 
The length of delay for the reversal is also an important factor influencing the 
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determination of whether the accused is denied fair procedure. In LON v DPP,365 the 
interval of time between the two decisions was thirteen years. In MQ v Judges,366 the 
interval was four and a half years. In both cases, the court found that the accused‘s fair 
procedure right was impaired due to the great time gap between the original decision not 
to prosecute and the reinstitution of the proceeding.367   
Justice J Pearts suggested, from another perspective, that official notification is not 
necessary because everyone should know the decision not to prosecute might be reversed 
after Eviston case has been made public: 
…since the Eviston case it has become public knowledge that the 
respondent may review decisions made by him, and that the applicant 
cannot successfully complain that the respondent failed to indicate when 
he made his first decision that he was entitled to review and alter that 
decision.368 
It is true that a suspect or an accused is normally accompanied by a lawyer who should 
know this case. However, if he or she chooses self-representation and refuses legal 
representation, should the suspect or accused still be expected to know the case? Should 
the accused blame himself or herself for the failure of warning after rejecting legal 
representation to which he or she is entitled? 
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5.2.2.1.2 United Kingdom 
The courts in Wales and England affirm the DPP‘s discretionary power to reverse a 
decision not to prosecute as the Irish courts do. However, they do not consider that the 
failure to inform the accused about this possibility will invalidate such a reversal. In the 
case of R v DPP, ex parte Burke,369 the victim claimed to be sexually assaulted by the 
applicant B when she was thirteen years old, but the case was originally dropped due to 
evidential insufficiency at that time. The decision was sent by mail to notify the applicant. 
The mother of the victim was dissatisfied with the decision and made an informal 
complaint to the DPP, which resulted in the reinstitution of the case. The DPP concluded 
that the original decision not to prosecute was wrong. The applicant objected to the 
reversal of the decision, claiming that the notification of the decision not to prosecute had 
given him a legitimate expectation of non-prosecution. The court refused to review the 
decision to prosecute:  
 [D]ismissing the application, that (1) the DPP had discretion to form her 
own view on the facts before her, for which it was necessary to consider 
what was in the public interest…It was not necessary for there to be 
special circumstances in addition to the fact that the decision was clearly 
wrong before the DPP could exercise her discretion to reinstate and (2) … 
It could not be said that the standard letter sent to B that the prosecution 
was to be discontinued would justifiably have led B to believe he was free 
of jeopardy…370 
The reasoning was affirmed and put forward in the recent Killick case. In June 2007, the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) decided not to prosecute Mr. Killick and sent an e-mail 
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to his counsel to notify him of the decision. A prosecution re-commenced two years later, 
after the decision not to prosecute was reversed through the internal review process. Mr. 
Killick and his counsel contended that the reversal of the CPS‘s decision not to prosecute 
was an abuse of process. The court re-affirmed that the CPS had a general right to review 
its original decision not to prosecute and recommence the case. In addition, it held that a 
notification of such decision sent to the counsel of a suspect or a defendant could not be 
deemed as legally binding promises and reasoned that counsel would have known such a 
decision would be subject to review. However, it also considered that the repercussions of 
such reversal to the accused should not be completely ignored and should be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis.371  
5.2.2.1.3 Solutions 
Considering the jurisprudence in Ireland and the UK, I think that the negative impact of 
the reversal of a decision not to prosecute should be taken into account and reduced as 
much as possible. After a charge has been withdrawn or permanently stayed, the power of 
the Crown prosecutor to reverse a decision not to prosecute without introducing new 
evidence should be limited. This power can only be used through victims‘ application for 
an internal review process. If the Crown prosecutor is allowed to reverse his or her 
decision not to prosecute without introducing fresh evidence, it might risk the possibility 
that the Crown prosecutor keeps bothering the accused with the same case. This can 
prevent the Crown prosecutor from prosecuting the accused suddenly or threatening the 
accused with the possible prosecution in order to obtain some information years later 
without having any new evidence about that prosecution.  
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As well, when a decision not to prosecute is made, the Crown prosecutor should inform 
the accused that the decision might be reversed within a maximum of three months 
through an internal review process and that there is a possibility that the victims will 
apply for judicial review afterwards. Although the failure to notify the accused of the 
possibility of the reversal of the decision not to prosecute is not always detrimental to the 
reinstitution of the prosecution, a proper notification can be helpful to promote procedural 
fairness. With a proper notification, the accused can be well prepared, both physically and 
psychologically, for a future reversal of the decision not to prosecute. It does no 
significant harm to the Crown prosecutor or victims to provide such information to the 
accused and to impose time limits on the internal review process to maintain procedural 
fairness.  
5.3 Judicial Review 
As previously mentioned, limited grounds to challenge, rigorous standards of proof, and 
the judicial reluctance to intervene into the prerogative power have all caused difficulties 
for victims in seeking judicial review of decisions not to prosecute. However, judicial 
review is the last and sole recourse for victims when they find their interests and 
individual rights jeopardised due to such decisions. In my opinion, the following reforms 
should be carried out: 
1. The prerogative power of the Crown prosecutor to decide whether to prosecute should 
be replaced by a statutory one. 
2. Broader standards of review for administrative discretionary decisions should be 
employed in judicial review of decisions not to prosecute. 
155 
 
 
3. Various standards of review should be employed in judicial review for the decision not 
to prosecute based on the nature of available remedies and the nature of the issues at 
dispute. 
5.3.1 Prerogative power of the Crown prosecutor to decide whether to 
prosecute should be replaced by statutory power 
The scope and exercise of the Crown prosecutor‘s prerogative power is derived from the 
long-term common law practice, which is not yet codified. This makes the power 
different from those statutory powers that have clear regulation and limitations put down 
in the corresponding statutes. The statutes assist the court in determining whether an 
administrative power is exercised within the statute‘s limitations. The court‘s role in 
administrative law is to ensure that the governmental decision-maker‘s action is not 
contrary to what is expressly put down in legislation and to protect individuals‘ legal 
rights from invalid administrative decisions.
372
 If duties and powers are not clearly laid 
out in legal instruments, it is difficult for the court to determine whether a prerogative 
power is properly exercised. This is the case for judicial review of decisions not to 
prosecute.  
The common law tradition and the Crown empower the Attorney General and his counsel 
to discontinue a case based on their discretion, which leaves unlimited room to Crown 
prosecutors to determine and interpret when, where and how to exercise such power. 
Even though in recent decades Crown prosecutors in most provinces have made public 
the detailed charging guidelines or manuals to average citizens, they are not legally bound 
to these guidelines or manuals. Even if the judiciary applies a ―reasonableness‖ standard 
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of review, it is not clear that the noncompliance with the guidelines or manuals could 
render the decision not to prosecute unreasonable given that the Crown prosecutors might 
not intend to be bound by them in all circumstances.  
Even though the prerogative power is ultimately subject to judicial review on the grounds 
of ―flagrant impropriety‖, after years of debate, the judiciary is still extremely reluctant to 
touch upon this type of power, partially because of the abovementioned nature of the 
prerogative power. It is true that the Crown prosecutor‘s discretion in making charging 
decisions is a necessary evil.
373
 While realizing the undue disposal of cases at the Crown 
prosecutor‘s discretion has a negative impact on the system - such as creating secrecy in 
administration - legislators still preserve the discretionary power because it also plays an 
indispensable role in enforcing criminal law effectively. However, the exercise of such 
discretion ought to be confined to limited situations. These situations should be clearly 
specified to guide not only the Crown prosecutors but also the judiciary when they are 
called upon to determine whether a decision is valid.  
A statute providing the Crown prosecutor power to prosecute and not to prosecute should 
codify the standards for whether to institute a prosecution used in the existing charging 
guidelines, commentaries on charging standards, and Crown manuals. The statute should 
not use unduly vague language, which would undermine the courts‘ ability to review the 
decisions not to prosecute. 
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5.3.2 The broader standard of review for other discretionary decisions 
should be used in judicial review for the decision not to 
prosecute 
After exhausting all available remedies, victims may consider applying for judicial review 
of the decision not to prosecute. However, as mentioned in section 3.2.4.2, the only 
existing standard of review is ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the Crown prosecutor 
in charging decision-making, which is very difficult for victims to prove with conclusive 
evidence and therefore limits victims‘ effective access to the judicial review system. For 
this reason, I recommend loosening the standard of review for the decision not to 
prosecute.  
In the context of administrative law, a court‘s power to review administrative action or 
decisions in order to uphold and preserve the rule of law in the country is considered 
essential and is provided in the Constitution.
374
 As well, it is a court‘s inherent power to 
ensure the legality, reasonableness, and fairness of the administrative process and its 
outcomes through judicial review so that public authorities will not abuse their power.
375
 
Therefore, the Canadian system has developed comparatively flexible and low standards 
to review the public authorities‘ exercise of discretion in making decisions, and those 
standards are still evolving.  
In my opinion, the use of those standards should be extended to the judicial review of the 
decision not to prosecute. Peter Finkle and Duncan Cameron considered that problems 
and outcomes resulting from uncontrolled prosecutorial discretion are similar to those 
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caused by uncontrolled administrative discretion to pass and enforce regulations or 
legislation.
376
 Uncontrolled discretion may lead to the abuse of discretion, which will 
cause unequal and unfair treatment to those subject to the law,
377
 including victims. They 
also considered that a judicial standard of review should be consistent with the need to 
prevent the authorities‘ abuse of such power.378  
Traditionally, the court is not allowed to second-guess discretionary decisions through 
judicial review by weighing contextual elements differently, making a decision for public 
authorities at its own discretion, or coming up with a more reasonable decision than the 
original one.
379
 Historically, the traditional grounds to challenge a discretionary decision 
were limited to bad faith, consideration of irrelevant grounds or improper purpose, failure 
to consider a relevant ground, patent unreasonableness, fettering discretion,
380
 and 
discrimination.
381
 
Currently, only two standards of review existed: correctness and reasonableness. A 
review for correctness is similar to examining the jurisdiction of the public officials to 
exercise discretionary power in making corresponding decisions, including whether such 
exercise of discretion is ultra vires and whether it is consistent with the objective and 
purpose of the governing law. When a court reviews a discretionary decision for 
correctness, it does not need to give deference to the decision makers and the way they 
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make such decisions, which allows the court to make a judicial review decision based 
totally on its own analysis.  
The court in Dunsmuir defined the ―reasonableness‖ standard as follows: 
A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities 
that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of 
articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, 
reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, 
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it 
is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, 
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and 
law.
382
 
The court agreed that, when applying the ―reasonableness‖ standard of review, due 
deference should be given to judgments and choices made by the decision-maker because 
of his or her expertise on making such decisions. Therefore, the court should not object to 
a decision that falls with a range of possible, acceptable outcomes merely because it 
believes a better decision is available. However, the court emphasized that to give 
deference does not mean that ―the courts are subservient to the determinations of 
decision-makers, or that courts must show blind reverence to their interpretations‖.383 
This requires the court to draw a conclusion independently, without being unduly 
influenced by the judgement of the decision-maker.  
A ―pragmatic and functional approach‖ was introduced to determine what level of 
deference should be given to discretionary decisions in Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister 
                                                          
382
 Dunsmuir, supra note 323 at para 47 [emphasis added]. 
383
 Ibid at para 48. 
160 
 
 
of Citizenship and Immigration).
384
 The court in this case pointed out that the judiciary 
should carefully determine whether the question at issue is about the law or the fact. If it 
is a matter of the law, low deference will be given when the court is reviewing the 
decision that is questioned.  
5.3.3 Application of Various Standards of Review for Decisions not to 
Prosecute   
The standards of review used to examine administrative discretionary decisions, together 
with the existing standard of review for the decision not to prosecute, should be used in 
this proposed judicial review system. Different prerogative remedies impose different 
levels of burden on the Crown prosecutor to act. The use of different standards of review 
should match this level of burden. An order in the nature of a mandamus (a mandamus) to 
compel a prosecution forces the Crown prosecutor to act in a particular way, which is 
more intrusive to the prosecutorial discretion. The ―flagrant impropriety‖ standard of 
review for this remedy should be applied. A mandamus to direct the Crown prosecutor to 
reconsider its decision not to prosecute requests a Crown prosecutor to take, or to not take, 
additional factors into account when making charging decisions. It gives the Crown 
prosecutor leeway to re-exercise his discretionary power in making charging decisions, 
which makes the remedy less intrusive. In this case, the ―correctness‖ and 
―reasonableness‖ standards of review should be applied.  
Similarly, an order in the nature of a certiorari (a certiorari) to quash a decision to stop a 
private prosecution is used simply to stop the Crown prosecutor from interfering in a case. 
In order to promote the effectiveness of individual exercising his or her right to a private 
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prosecution, the Crown prosecutor cannot intervene into the private prosecution based on 
the grounds of ―evidentiary sufficiency‖. When the intervention is based on the public 
interest test, it should be subject to ―correctness‖ and ―reasonableness‖ standards of 
review. The level of deference to the judgement of the Crown prosecution will be 
determined by the nature of the issues in dispute.  
5.3.3.1 Definition of different standards of review 
The standards of review used in this proposed judicial review system should be defined as 
follows: 
Flagrant Impropriety: I adopt the definition of ―flagrant impropriety‖ used in Kostuch v 
Alberta (Attorney General). ―Flagrant impropriety‖ here refers to ―misconduct bordering 
on corruption, violation of the law, bias against or for a particular individual or offence‖ 
on the part of Crown prosecutor.
385
 In addition, the grounds must be directly linked to the 
Crown prosecutors‘ state of mind or actions when dropping cases instead of the 
consequences of such a decision. Under the ―flagrant impropriety‖ standard of review, the 
court can only review and reverse decisions not to prosecute when one or more of the 
grounds has clearly been proven. In fact, what a court reviews under this standard is not 
the reasonableness and correctness of the decision not to prosecute per se, but the 
behavior of the Crown prosecutor during the decision-making process. This standard of 
review will be used only in cases where compelling a prosecution is sought. 
Reasonableness: A court can review and reverse a decision not to prosecute when the 
decision only appears to be unreasonable. Under this standard of review, the court focuses 
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on the reasons and rationality behind the decision per se. The ―patent unreasonableness‖ 
standard of review should be subsumed under this standard of review. A decision is 
unreasonable no matter whether it is patently unreasonable or simply unreasonable, and 
unreasonable decisions should be reversed. ―Flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the 
Crown prosecutor can be one of factors that make a decision unreasonable, but the 
unreasonableness of the decision can be attributable to other factors, such as 
misinterpretation of law, failure to consider some essential elements, application of an 
unlawful policy, and so on. Those flaws might not amount to illegal planning or 
manipulation by the Crown prosecutor. The level of deference to the original decision 
should depend on the nature of the issue in dispute. If the issue is a matter of fact, such as 
re-evaluating existing evidence or re-identifying public interests in the case, the court 
should not consider whether the institution of the prosecution could be more reasonable, 
but whether the non-prosecution falls into the acceptable range of reasonableness. If the 
issue is about legal considerations, such as interpretation of applicable law or legality of a 
policy concerning public interests, the court can make a conclusion based on its own 
judgement and analysis without deferring to the original decision. This type of review 
will be used when directing reconsideration or quashing a decision to stop a private 
prosecution is sought. 
Correctness: This type of judicial review is limited to the Crown prosecutors‘ 
jurisdiction over a case. For example, a Crown prosecutor could stop a prosecution 
claiming he or she has no jurisdiction to prosecute certain types of crime, such as a crime 
taking place abroad, or over certain groups of people, such as foreign diplomats. Under 
this standard of review, a court does not need to give deference to the judgement of the 
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Crown prosecutor. This type of review will be used in such cases where directing a 
reconsideration or quashing a decision to stop a private prosecution is sought. 
5.3.3.2 Compelling a prosecution 
Victims may specifically ask for the extraordinary remedy of compelling a prosecution 
when a Crown prosecutor stops a prosecution, either public or private. If a Crown 
prosecutor withdraws or stays a charge, a mandamus to compel a prosecution should 
remain available for victims to challenge the decision. The court should decide whether to 
issue such remedy or whether other remedies are more appropriate, after conducting 
judicial review of the decision not to prosecute. In the application for compelling a 
prosecution, a comparatively stricter standard of review is necessary, and therefore 
―flagrant impropriety‖ should be the sole ground for victims to seek compelling a 
prosecution. As an extraordinary remedy, the compelling of a prosecution will not be 
granted if directing a reconsideration is workable. 
Compelling a prosecution can force a Crown prosecutor to perform his legal duty to the 
public, including victims, to institute a prosecution against an alleged lawbreaker. 
However, in theory, in the current Canadian system, even though the issuance of a 
mandamus relies on the discretion of the reviewing judge, a mandamus is not used to 
compel an exercise of discretionary power or to force a governmental official to act in a 
particular way,
386
 such as compelling a prosecution. This is because compelling the 
performance of public officials by a court in a particular way is equivalent to depriving 
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these officials of discretionary power to decide how an act should be performed, which is 
too intrusive to the executive power, as well as to prerogative power.  
However, in practice, it seems that Canadian courts are capable of compelling a 
prosecution if the Crown prosecutor is proven to act flagrantly improperly. In most recent 
cases where the decision not to prosecute was in dispute and the applicant sought a 
compelling of prosecution, the court refused to issue an order of mandamus on the ground 
of no finding of ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of Crown prosecutors.387 The courts 
did not address the issue concerning the availability of a mandamus to compel a 
prosecution or reject the application because of the unavailability of such a remedy. 
In my opinion, compelling a prosecution is necessary in certain exceptional cases. For 
example, in the US, a mandamus to compel a prosecution will be issued when the 
termination of a public prosecution is so arbitrary or abusive that it cannot amount to the 
actual exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
388
 The reason behind this, as explained in 
Tanenbaum v D'Ascenzo, is that compelling a prosecution under the abovementioned 
conditions cannot be considered an unreasonable intervention into the public prosecutor‘s 
exercise of discretion.
389
 Indeed, in the situation described above, the Crown prosecutors 
are considered unable, or they just did not in the case at bar, to make just, fair, and 
reasoned charging decisions at their discretion because their minds are contaminated.  
Meanwhile, if the Crown prosecutors‘ decisions not to prosecute are motived by bad faith, 
bias, or arbitrariness or result from a violation of law, which amounts to a breach of rule 
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of law, the court has the responsibility to uphold the rule of law by granting effective 
remedies.
390
 In that case, if the court finds flagrant impropriety and determines that the 
ultimate decision was wrong, the court can make a decision for the Crown prosecutor. 
Crown prosecutors exercising discretion in the abovementioned ways is equivalent to 
acting ultra vires because exercising such power is not consistent with the duties of the 
Crown prosecutor. In the Canadian administrative law context, no deference from the 
judiciaries will be given to reviewing this type of decision not to prosecute because the 
Crown prosecutor is not considered exercising discretion in determining the disputed 
decision. 
If a Crown prosecutor acts flagrantly improperly under the definition in section 6.3.3.1, 
his or her state of mind or actions during the decision-making process is questionable. If 
the Crown prosecutor‘s state of mind or the decision-making process is corrupt, malicious, 
or biased, there is no expectation for the court to believe that the Crown prosecutor can 
make a just and fair decision, even if the court directs reconsideration. In this case, the 
court must force the Crown prosecutor to prosecute if it deems a prosecution necessary to 
maintain the integrity of criminal justice system and uphold the rule of law. 
A case where violation of the law and bias appear only as a result of non-prosecution has 
not reached a level where a court has to compel a prosecution. The court in Wayte v 
United States pointed out that a decision with discriminatory effect could come from a 
non-discriminatory policy or decision-making process.
391
 The decision not to prosecute, 
with negative impact on individuals‘ legal rights or the application of law, might merely 
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come from one or more simple mistakes or negligence when the Crown prosecutor 
decides to withdraw charges. In this situation, it is more appropriate for a court to point 
out the mistakes or negligence and direct the Crown prosecutor to re-think the original 
decision not to prosecute. For a similar reason, ―patent unreasonableness‖ of the decision 
is not suitable grounds for a court to compel a prosecution. Not all factors that make a 
decision patently unreasonable amount to ―flagrant impropriety‖. In cases other than 
―flagrant impropriety‖ cases, directing reconsideration is more appropriate. The standards 
of review applied in the issuance of directing reconsideration will be further explained in 
the next section. 
5.3.3.3 Quashing a decision not to prosecute and directing 
reconsideration 
In most cases concerning public prosecutions, a court should be allowed to review a 
decision not to prosecute with lower standards than the existing one. However, the 
remedy it can issue based on those lower standards of review should be less powerful 
than the compelling of a prosecution. In those cases, a court should be able to quash a 
decision not to prosecute and direct the Crown prosecutor to reconsider his original 
decision if it finds the original decision was rendered in an incorrect or unreasonable way.  
In the UK, the common method for the court to deal with incorrect or irrational decisions 
not to prosecute is to quash such decisions not to prosecute and at the same time direct the 
DPP or CPS to reconsider the decisions.
392
 A comparatively low standard of review is 
employed. The court in the Manning case reasoned that, compared to decisions to 
prosecute, it was difficult to find that ―a decision not to prosecute is bad in law on which 
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basis alone the court is entitled to interfere‖.393 It continued to point out that a citizen‘s 
access to an effective remedy against a decision not to prosecute is denied if the standard 
is too high, because judicial review is the sole remedy in such a situation.
394
 Such an 
approach is generally accepted in the UK courts. 
The same approach could also be used in Canada because a mandamus to compel a 
prosecution is not always necessary and the corresponding standard of review is too 
exacting. The current standard leaves several types of problematic decisions not to 
prosecute uncovered, which limits victims‘ ability to protect their interests. For example, 
if a decision not to prosecute is unreasonable and caused by factors that are not 
categorized as ―flagrant impropriety‖, victims‘ interests and recognized rights in a 
criminal prosecution are at stake. It is similar if a violation of individual rights and 
discrimination result from exercise of discretion in good faith. However, the court cannot 
remedy such decisions because they do not meet the requirement for compelling a 
prosecution. At the same time, it has no other available remedies, and as a result, such a 
decision becomes non-justiciable.  
Apart from compelling a prosecution, a mandamus can also be used to force the Crown 
prosecutor to have additional factors properly considered.
395
 In Canada, a court should be 
capable of quashing an original decision not to prosecute and directing the Crown 
prosecutor to reconsider his original decision. This way is less intrusive to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion compared to compelling a prosecution, because the court has no 
final say in the outcome of the Crown prosecutor‘s reconsideration. Even though the 
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Crown prosecutor must follow the court‘s order to reconsider a decision not to prosecute, 
he or she could decide to maintain the decision after re-assessing the relevant factors and 
taking into account the court‘s recommendations. This remedy is aimed at reducing the 
mistakes or negligence that might take place in charging decision-making. As well, it is 
appropriate because the flaw in the original decision did not result from a corrupted state 
of mind that would make it unlikely for a prosecutor to engage in an honest and fair 
reconsideration. 
As in the UK, the standard of review in this type of application is comparatively lower, 
and therefore the ―reasonableness‖ standard of review in an administrative law context 
should be made available for this type of review in this proposed system. For one reason, 
the corresponding remedy is comparatively less intrusive into the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, and therefore ―flagrant impropriety‖ imposes an overly high 
burden of proof for this type of remedy. A rigorous standard of review highlights the 
extraordinary nature of compelling a prosecution as a remedy, and reminds victims that 
the court will be extremely cautious in using it.  
Furthermore, using the same standard of review for two different levels of remedies will 
diminish the significance of the separation of this remedy and compelling a prosecution. 
When applying for judicial review of the decision not to prosecute, victims will always 
seek compelling a prosecution if only one standard of review is available. The outcome of 
compelling a prosecution is more secure than directing reconsideration, which may or 
may not end in prosecution. If a same standard of review equally applies to both remedies, 
the court will have difficulty justifying its choice of different remedies. In addition, the 
169 
 
 
overly broad power of the court to compel a prosecution also risks the possibility of the 
court manipulating the institution of prosecution.  
For another reason, a lower standard of review allows more possibility to review, and to 
find mistakes and negligence in making the decision not to prosecute. If the reviewing 
court is not allowed to probe into the deeper cause of the decision not to prosecute, it can 
hardly find any flaw in the decisions that was simply caused by procedural mistakes or 
negligence. At the same time, a lower standard of review makes judicial review easier and 
more effective for victims who wish to file complaints about a questionable decision not 
to prosecute, which better guarantees their interests and individual rights.  
Under the ―reasonableness‖ standard of review in the context of administrative law, the 
court can examine whether the decision itself and reasons behind it are defensible and fall 
into the range of possible outcomes that might result from the proper exercise of 
discretion. More specifically, the court can examine whether the Crown prosecutor has 
complied with the charging decision guidelines, whether a public policy is lawful, and 
whether an international obligation has been fulfilled. Under this lower standard of 
review, the court should first determine whether the issue is about an issue of fact or an 
issue of law based on the approach adopted in Pushpanathan v Canada.
396
 Based on the 
result, the court can decide how much deference should be given to a challenged decision 
not to prosecute. If the issue is an issue of fact, high deference should be given. For 
example, is it reasonable for a Crown prosecutor to weigh one factor over another when 
deciding whether a prosecution should be instituted? Another example could be whether 
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or not a prosecutor is correct in determining the credibility of a critical witness for a case 
to go forward.  
5.3.3.3.1 Deviance from published guideline 
I have recommended in section 6.3.1 that the discretionary power should become a 
statutory power. Standards for the Crown prosecutor to decide whether or not to prosecute 
should be codified in the corresponding statutes and made publicly available. Deviation 
from those statutory provisions will impair the legitimacy and correctness of decisions not 
to prosecute because the exercise of discretionary power by the Crown prosecutors is not 
consistent with the power the statute confers on them. In the UK, charging decisions 
inconsistent with charging guidelines are considered unreasonable.
397
 
In general, the issues are related to public interests and the reasonable prospect of 
conviction. Different levels of deference apply in two different types of situations. In 
cases concerning issues of fact, such as reasonableness of the application of public 
interests by the Crown prosecutor, or evaluation of the existing evidence, a court can 
review the decisions when they appear to be unreasonable. However, the court should 
only interfere with the decision not to prosecute when the decision is so abnormal that no 
reasonable Crown prosecutor would have reached such a conclusion. This allows 
deference to the judgement of the Crown prosecutors. It would be inappropriate for the 
court to second-guess how certain public interests criteria should be applied or whether 
the available evidence creates a reasonable prospect of conviction.  
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Factors that could make a decision patently unreasonable might include the failure to take 
into account one or several critical elements in decision-making or technically applying 
public policy to every case regardless of case diversity. For example, in an English case 
of R v DPP, ex parte Chaudhary,
398
 the policy was deemed flawed because it had either 
confused or conflated two separate and different offences listed in the Criminal Law Act. 
A decision made based on this flawed policy would be unreasonable. In the Manning 
case,
399
 additional critical factors concerning whether to prosecute were identified by the 
court, and the decision would be patently unreasonable if those factors were not taken 
into consideration in decision-making.  
In contrast, when the court considers the issues in dispute are about legal considerations, 
it can review the decision not to prosecute and base its conclusion on its analysis without 
deferring to the judgement of the Crown prosecutor. These issues can be whether a 
claimed policy concerning public interest is legally valid, or whether the standard of 
evidential proof applied by the Crown prosecutor is appropriate according to the 
guidelines. The policy itself, used by the Crown prosecutor, can be unlawful, 
unconstitutional, or a violation of international law. For example, in the case of R v 
Catagas,
400
 an Indian violated the terms of the Migratory Birds Convention Act 1994
401
 
and was thereby charged. The charging decision was subsequently questioned in court 
because it was inconsistent with the established policy not to prosecute Indians.
402
 The 
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court found the policy was unlawful given that the Crown had no authority to exempt a 
particular group from following the law.  
It is also possible that the standard of evidentiary sufficiency the Crown prosecutor relies 
on to withdraw charges could be overly high. In this case, the issue in dispute is whether a 
Crown prosecutor‘s interpretation of the term ―realistic prospect of conviction‖ is 
appropriate rather than whether there are contestable opinions regarding the value of 
pieces of evidence. In the US, this issue has been categorised as a legal issue that allows 
the court to review a DA‘s disapproval of private prosecution.403 Consequently, a decision 
that results from those legal considerations will not be one of the reasonable alternatives 
made by the Crown prosecutor‘s correct exercise of discretion.  
5.3.3.3.2 Misinterpretation of law 
If a Crown prosecutor decides to drop a charge based on his misinterpretation of law, the 
decision not to prosecute is irrational. In the US case of Seeton v Adams,
404
 the DA 
dropped the charge against the accused because it considered that the accused‘s act was 
not a violation of the corresponding laws. The applicant sought to compel prosecution 
claiming that the DA did not interpret the law correctly. The court agreed that the DA‘s 
interpretation of the law was in error but regretted that it could not compel a prosecution 
because the claim did not reach a level that permitted the court to compel a prosecutor to 
press charges against the suspects. As explained in the section concerning compelling a 
prosecution, it is true that if a Crown prosecutor does not deliberately misinterpret the law 
in order to drop a case, a mandamus to compel a prosecution is inappropriate. However, a 
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decision not to prosecute based on misinterpretation of law also causes a miscarriage of 
justice and unjustifiably impairs the interests of the victims who suffered because of the 
accused‘s acts. Furthermore, the court has jurisdiction and is more specialized in 
interpreting the law than the Crown prosecutor. Therefore, it is proper for the court to 
remind the Crown Prosecutor of his or her mistakes in the decision not to prosecute and 
direct reconsideration. 
5.3.3.3.3 Maintaining a decision not to prosecute after 
reconsideration 
In the situation where a prosecutor maintains a decision not to prosecute after 
reconsideration, no second internal review will take place and the court will accept an 
application for a second judicial review only on the grounds of ―flagrant impropriety‖. In 
addition, the court should not be allowed to direct reconsideration in the second judicial 
review process. First, if a decision not to prosecute in a case has been subject to a judicial 
review once and has subsequently been quashed, any reasonable prosecutor will be more 
cautious in reconsidering such a decision in the same case. If the reasonableness and 
correctness of non-prosecution has been called into question once, any issues concerning 
non-prosecution should be put under a microscope by any reasonable and responsible 
Crown prosecutor reviewing the original decision. In addition, the flaws in the original 
decision-making will have been identified and pointed out by the court, facilitating the 
Crown prosecutor in making a correct and reasoned charging decision.  
All of the abovementioned can minimize the possibility that the Crown prosecutor will 
make the same mistakes again if he or she has carefully contemplated the flaws identified 
by the court. Therefore, disallowing second internal review and employing a higher 
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standard respects the principle of presuming that Crown prosecutors act in good faith and 
function well. Concerning second judicial review, by redirecting reconsideration without 
finding ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the Crown prosecutor, the court disrespects 
the judgement and capability of the Crown prosecutor to make a proper charging decision, 
which is an inappropriate intervention into administrative decision-making. 
Second, if victims prove that the Crown prosecutor acts flagrantly improperly in 
reconsidering the original decision not to prosecute, the court can issue a mandamus to 
force him or her to prosecute. If the Crown prosecutor deliberately disregards the 
concerns pointed out by the reviewing court when reconsidering the decision not to 
prosecute or refuses to re-assess such a decision, he or she is considered acting in bad 
faith and in contempt of a court‘s order. These actions should be categorized as ―flagrant 
impropriety‖. As explained in Section 6.3.3.2, if a Crown prosecutor acts flagrantly 
improperly during the charging decision-making process, directing reconsideration is less 
effective. In this case, a second judicial review would be more efficacious than a second 
internal review given that the accused flagrantly improper acts involve the whole Crown 
prosecutor‘s office. As a result, a second internal review seems to be redundant. 
Third, this approach can avoid a victim‘s endless applications for reconsideration, or 
internal review, of a decision not to prosecute. It is true that there might be situations 
where a victim can identify a flaw in the second decision not to prosecute that is different 
than the flaw that affected the first decision, which would not demonstrate flagrant 
impropriety and would leave the victim without a remedy. However, as mentioned above, 
the chance that the prosecutor will err twice, and differently, in a single case is very rare, 
and such error is even harder for victims to prove than the first time. It increases the 
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possibility that victims file unsustainable applications for either internal or judicial review, 
which will definitely further prolong the review process and increase the anxiety and 
stress of the accused. This would put the accused in a worse situation if the multiple 
applications finally result in the re-institution of the prosecution. In addition, endless 
applications may significantly increase the possibility of the Crown prosecutor finally 
commencing a prosecution because he or she is tired of responding to the court 
concerning a case. In this case, the decision to prosecute will be made under undue 
influence from the court and victims, which will significantly impair the Crown 
prosecutor‘s ability to act independently in charging decision-making. In addition, this 
provides the accused ammunition to attack the decision to prosecute and seek a stay of 
prosecution.
405
  
If the trial judge stays the proceedings, victim‘s endless applications will not make the 
situation better than the situation I proposed here. The costs of endless applications 
clearly outweigh the benefits. Hence, no second internal review is allowed, and the 
acceptable grounds to review a second decision not to prosecute in court are that the 
Crown prosecutor deliberately maintains the decision not to prosecute by acting flagrantly 
improperly, namely in bad faith, corruption, violation of the law, or bias against or for a 
particular individual or offence. 
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5.3.3.4 Termination of a private prosecution: quash a decision to stay 
a private prosecution 
In both the UK and the US, extremely low standards of review are employed to review 
the termination of a private prosecution based on evidential sufficiency as compared to a 
public one. It seems that these two countries give high levels of respect to the individuals‘ 
exercise of the right to prosecute an alleged lawbreaker, and therefore strictly limit the 
intervention of the public prosecutor into a private prosecution. In both countries, 
different standards of review are applied when a public prosecutor bases his stay of 
private prosecution on the reasonable prospect of conviction and on public interest.  
In reference to these two countries, in this proposed judicial review system, the same 
approach should be employed for reviewing the termination of private prosecution. The 
Crown Prosecutor should not be allowed to stop a private prosecutor because of the lack 
of a reasonable prospect of conviction. In contrast, if the Crown prosecutor stays a private 
prosecution, claiming that such a prosecution is against public interest, the court should 
apply the ―flagrant impropriety‖ standard of review used in section 6.3.3.2.  
5.3.3.4.1 Evidential Sufficiency 
The Crown prosecutor should not stop a private prosecution because it does not have a 
realistic prospect of conviction, which is required for the institution of a public 
prosecution. As well, failure to meet the evidentiary standard set in Crown prosecutor‘s 
charging guidelines should not fall under the public interests test.
406
  
Like in Canada, public prosecutors in the US and the UK have the power and 
responsibility to stop a private prosecution in public interests. However, contrary to 
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Canadian courts,
407
 courts in these two countries are inclined to restrain the power in 
order to protect an individual‘s right to institute a private prosecution when a public 
prosecutor fails to act. In the UK, the prosecutor can only take over a private prosecution 
and stop it on the grounds of evidential insufficiency when there is ―clearly no case to 
answer‖.408 In the US, if the public prosecutor disapproves a private prosecution on these 
grounds, the court can decide, once a complaint is lodged, to review and assess whether 
the private prosecutor has established a prima facie case.
409
 The basic principle is that the 
public prosecutor should not prevent an individual from bringing charges against the 
potential lawbreaker merely on the grounds that, based on the same set of evidence, he or 
she would not have prosecuted. A public prosecutor who does so is inappropriately 
encroaching on and impairing citizens‘ right to institute a private prosecution. 
Similarly, in Canada, both the individual‘s right to a private prosecution and the Attorney 
General‘s power to supervise a private prosecution are fundamental parts of the criminal 
justice system.
410
 As well, the right to a private prosecution is also recognized as ―a 
valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on the part of authority‖.411 
In other words, individuals can take actions to get justice done in situations where public 
prosecutors fail or are reluctant to initiate a prosecution. However, the legislation does not 
require private prosecutors to make charging decisions consistent with the charging 
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standards used by the Crown prosecutor. In addition, ―realistic prospect of conviction‖ is 
too high of an evidential standard with which a private prosecutor can comply. This 
standard is mainly used to facilitate the Crown prosecutor‘s effective distribution of the 
available prosecutorial resources. However, an average citizen is not a trained Crown 
prosecutor. It is not fair to expect him or her to behave and think exactly like a Crown 
prosecutor. As well, he or she has no duty to consider the procedural and economic 
efficiency of the administration of justice when making a charging decision. Therefore, a 
―prima facie case‖ is enough to avoid the situation where an accused is forced to stand 
trial when there is clearly no case to answer. Plus, in the current Canadian system, the 
existence of an initial review of a privately laid Information can avoid such situations. 
According to the Criminal Code, any private citizen is eligible to submit an Information 
to a justice if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed 
by the accused person.
412
 The Code then leaves it to a Justice to decide whether to issue 
process.
413
  
While citizens have a right to institute a private prosecution, the Attorney General has a 
duty to protect the public and honour and express the community‘s sense of justice.414 
However, this duty does not permit the Crown prosecutor to force a private prosecutor to 
comply strictly with the evidentiary sufficiency standard applied by the Crown prosecutor. 
It is even inappropriate to draw a conclusion that a private prosecution is against public 
interests merely because, after re-examining the available evidence, the Crown prosecutor 
believes such a prosecution does not meet his or her criteria of prospect of conviction.  
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First, the initial review of the Information by the Justice can make sure that an allegation 
is at least supported by some evidence. According to the Crown prosecutor, if the case 
does not meet his or her ―reasonable prospect of conviction‖ standard, putting an 
individual on the stand would be outrageous or arbitrary, which is inconsistent with 
public interests. However, in order to commence a private prosecution, the private 
prosecutor needs to have some evidence for each element of an alleged crime.
415
 After 
that, a Justice is obliged to determine whether there is admissible evidence of all the 
elements of the alleged offence and make a determination whether a process should be 
issued.
416
 Even though this process is very different from assessing the likelihood of 
conviction, the Justice at least establishes the fact that there is some evidence for the 
accused to answer. The Crown prosecutor cannot be one hundred percent sure that the 
informant raises the allegation falsely or arbitrarily against the accused merely because 
the information does not meet the requirement in the charging guidelines.    
Second, if the Crown prosecutor can stop a private prosecution because the Information 
does not meet the standards in his or her charging guidelines, this is equivalent to asking 
the private prosecutor to comply with the charging guidelines. This is because the 
Information may be taken over and stopped by the Crown prosecutor if the private 
informant does not do that. This is similar to asking a private informant to think and act 
like a Crown prosecutor when instituting a private prosecution, which further limits an 
individual‘s right to a private prosecution.   
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Third, if the Crown prosecutor can always stop a private prosecution based on the 
evidential sufficiency test laid down in the charging guideline, the initial review of the 
Information by the Justice will be meaningless. The Justice assesses the Information 
based on a comparatively lower standard than the charging guidelines of the Crown 
prosecutor, which means the Crown prosecutor can always use evidentiary sufficiency as 
a legitimate reason to stop a private prosecution. An initial review by the Justice, in fact, 
cannot determine whether a case can finally go on without the acquiescence of the Crown 
prosecutor.  
What, then, is the point of the initial review by the Justice? In that case, would it not be 
better if the Justice of Peace applied the Crown prosecutor‘s evidentiary sufficiency 
standard when determining whether to issue process? Or would it not be better if every 
private information should receive consent from the Crown prosecutor before it was laid? 
In addition, it is possible that, in cases where there are multiple cases that cannot meet the 
evidentiary sufficiency standard applied by the Crown prosecutor, the Crown prosecutor 
stays only the case that is particularly interesting to him or her. Would this selection be 
unfair to the private prosecutor of that particular case? In conclusion, in my opinion, the 
Crown prosecutor‘s unlimited power to intervene does not make the operation of private 
prosecution system more coherent and fair, but turns some functions such as the existence 
of Justice of Peace redundant.  
Fourth, a private prosecutor normally acts when the Crown prosecutor or the police fail to 
act. In this way, the interests of a private prosecutor can be well protected from the inertia 
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or partiality of the Crown prosecutor.
417
 If the Crown prosecutor can stop a private 
prosecution merely because he or she would never have prosecuted the case based on the 
same set of evidence, the effect of giving individual rights to a private prosecution is 
undermined.  
The current set up for an individual to commence a private prosecution is an appropriate 
standard to provide a real guarantee against prosecutorial inaction caused by inertia or 
partiality on the part of the Crown prosecutor. The Crown prosecutor should not always 
have a final say on whether a case should be brought to trial based on the available 
evidence. Otherwise, a private prosecutor may not exercise the right to bring charges 
against lawbreakers effectively. Instead, he or she proceeds with a prosecution as if he or 
she is an agent or subordinate of the Crown prosecutor. This makes the distinction 
between private prosecution and public prosecution completely meaningless. 
It would be, however, different if the Crown prosecutor could prove to the court that there 
is ―clearly no case to answer‖. In this situation, the private life and reputation of the 
accused person would be inappropriately impaired because of the ungrounded accusation. 
Meanwhile, allowing an ungrounded accusation would compromise the integrity of the 
criminal justice system. Citizens would live in fear of not knowing when and where they 
might be put on a stand in court by others for no reason. Therefore, this type of private 
prosecution is clearly against public interests. Nonetheless, this situation is not likely to 
happen in the current Canadian system because an initial review made by a Justice can 
guarantee that there is a case to answer.  
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In the case where the stay of a private prosecution is based on evidentiary insufficiency, 
should a court directly quash a decision to stop a private prosecution, or have a fresh 
review of an Information laid by the informant to determine whether it meets the Crown 
prosecutor‘s charging guideline? In both the UK and the US, the court limits the public 
prosecutor to the use of ―evidential insufficiency‖ as grounds to strike down a private 
prosecution to some extent. In contrast to the UK practice, a court in the US can conduct 
a de novo review if the DA claims that the disapproval of a private prosecution is based 
on evidential insufficiency, which I do not recommend.  
First, as previously mentioned, it is overly rigorous to require a private informant to 
comply with the charging guidelines of the Crown prosecutor. Second, when legislators 
give average citizens the right to a private prosecution, they also allow them to exercise 
that right at their discretion. Similar to public prosecution, the court should not instill its 
own wisdom into the original charging decision made by the private prosecutor by 
conducting a de novo review. A court can also easily reach an equally reasonable but 
different conclusion contrary to that of the private prosecutor and a Justice of Peace. 
Since both the court and the private prosecutor can reach equally reasonable decisions, 
there is no reason for the court to override the decision. In addition, it is unfair to private 
prosecutor if the court denies the possibility of a criminal prosecution because it believes 
that the private prosecutor‘s decision is less reasonable than its own, not that the decision 
is incorrect or unreasonable. As a result, a de novo review would undermine individuals‘ 
right and ability to institute a private prosecution.  
In conclusion, the Crown prosecutor should not be allowed to strike down a private 
prosecution based on evidentiary insufficiency. In the proposed review system, the court 
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can only directly nullify a decision to stay a private prosecution if it finds that the nature 
of the reasons behind such a stay is related to evidentiary insufficiency.  
5.3.3.4.2 Public Interests 
The ―reasonableness‖ standard is available for the applicant to seek quashing the decision 
to stay a private prosecution. The ―public interests‖ threshold is more closely linked to the 
Crown prosecutor‘s expertise and duty to protect the public. The Crown prosecutor has 
better knowledge of the interests of the public. As a result, in general, the court should 
respect the Crown prosecutors‘ judgement on whether a private prosecution takes place in 
the interest of the public. Therefore, a corresponding level of deference to the original 
decision not to prosecute should be back on the table in this case.   
In general, the court should not interfere with the Crown prosecutor‘s exercise of 
discretion in deciding when, how, and in which case a policy concerning public interests 
should be applied. As well, the court needs to refrain from determining for the Crown 
prosecutor what is to be public interest. If the stay of a private prosecution is so irregular 
that no reasonable person will consider the institution of such a prosecution as against 
public interests or relevant policies for public interests, the court can quash a decision to 
stay based on the ―reasonableness‖ standard of review. An unreasonable decision to stay a 
prosecution inappropriately impairs individuals‘ right to private prosecution rather than 
protecting the interest of the public.  
However, in cases where the issue in dispute is a matter of law, such as whether a policy 
used in the public interests test is constitutional or lawful, lower deference should be 
applied. The court can quash a decision to stay a private prosecution if the claimed policy 
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with regards to public interests itself is not legally valid, such as when it is violations of 
international obligations, constitutional rights, or legislation. This type of issue belongs to 
legal issues rather than the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and the court has full 
jurisdiction to decide on the matter in order to maintain the integrity of the criminal 
justice system and uphold the rule of law. 
Finally, lack of sufficient evidence and existence of adequate civil remedies cannot be 
considered as a valid reason to justify a stay of private prosecution on the grounds of 
public interests. Obviously, in this proposal, a rejection of a private prosecution based on 
lack of sufficient evidence is impermissible. For one reason, if such grounds are 
categorized as a part of the public interest test, the Crown prosecutor can always stop a 
private prosecution based on the issue of evidential sufficiency and block the court from 
effectively reviewing such a decision by disguising it with the public interests test.
418
 For 
another reason, the distinction between these two grounds will be eliminated.  
For the issue concerning the existence of civil remedies, they cannot always replace the 
significance of criminal prosecution to the victims. In addition, the Crown prosecutors are 
not in a position to determine whether civil remedies are adequate for the victims because 
they are not the ones who suffer from the accused‘s act. Moreover, in most cases, civil 
remedies are always available to the victims, and there is no fixed definition to determine 
when and how such remedies are considered adequate. Does this mean a criminal 
prosecution is in fact supplementary to the civil recourses? Does this mean a criminal 
prosecution should only be instituted when civil recourses are not adequate? To allow the 
Crown prosecutor to stay a private prosecution based on these grounds amounts to giving 
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him or her unlimited power to stop a private prosecution concerning most types of 
offences.  
5.3.4 Potential Impact on the Accused 
The proposed reform has a negative impact on the prospective accused but tries to 
minimize the degree of possible negative impact. Notification about the possibility of the 
reversal of a decision not to prosecute should be given to the accused. This can prevent 
the accused from stopping the investigation or disposing his defence strategy and valuable 
evidence. In most situations, the whole review process, including internal review and 
judicial review, will not exceed a maximum of one year. This can shorten the period the 
prospective accused would suffer from not knowing whether a prosecution will restart 
and from other inconveniences in his or her normal life. In addition, this can reduce the 
chance of losing evidence critical for the prospective accused‘s defence as the result of 
time passing. If the delays in the judicial review process are caused by victims, as a part 
of his participatory rights laid down in section 6.1.3.3, the accused can raise these issues 
in court, both reviewing court and trial court, asking for corresponding remedies.  
However, it is impossible to eliminate all negative impact. Some negative impact cannot 
be avoided due to force majeure, some of which might be detrimental to the defence of 
the prospective accused. In those cases, some remedies should be given to the accused. 
For example, a critical witness may be not available because he or she dies, is in a coma, 
or becomes unavailable for other reasons. As well, in some cases, the memory of the 
critical witness may be called into question given that it has been a while since the alleged 
crime was committed. A witness cannot always be expected to make an effort to 
memorize an event merely for the defence of the prospective accused. In these cases, if 
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the testimony of such witness is so critical to proving the innocence of the prospective 
accused, a sworn and signed document, voice record, or video tape can be accepted as 
evidence without being corroborated through cross-examination in court.  
In other situations, a lawyer who originally handled the case may not be available or is 
not willing to take the case anymore. It will take time for the accused to locate a new 
lawyer and re-build his defence. In these cases, the court should grant an extra time for 
the accused to prepare his defence. In any case, if the damage is irreparable and is so 
detrimental that the accused is not able to receive a fair trial, the court can stay the 
proceeding because continuing the case will cause fundamental injustice to the accused. 
Of course, one year of review is not a short period, which, as previously mentioned, can 
cause inconveniency to the prospective accused‘s daily life. For instance, the qualification 
for a profession of the prospective accused might be kept on hold until the resolution of 
the criminal charge, which makes him or her difficult to be employed, or maybe he or she 
is not able to access his or her children or family because of the pending criminal charges, 
or maybe the prospective accused suffers from extraordinary stress as a result of the 
pending charges. In these situations, the court should be allowed, at its discretion based 
on the severity of the suffering of the accused due to the judicial review, to order the 
victim to pay the accused a certain amount of money in order to compensate his loss if the 
court finds the victim does not have enough evidence to support his or her allegation. In 
addition, this can prevent the victim from filing applications for judicial review that have 
no prospect of success. 
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With regards to the full disclosure of reasons behind the decision not to prosecute, 
something in the disclosed reasons may place the accused‘s safety in danger. Therefore, 
during the judicial review, in cases where it is necessary to verify information through an 
oral hearing, a closed session should be held in order to keep the information classified. 
In addition, in any case, victims should sign a confidentiality agreement to promise not to 
release the relevant documents to third parties. If victims fail to keep the agreement, the 
court can refuse to review the decision not to prosecute. I assume that, in normal 
situations, victims would choose to keep the confidentiality agreement given that they do 
not want to ruin the prospective criminal prosecution or to be sued in a civil suit.   
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CHAPTER VI 
6 Conclusion 
The proposed reform of the review system for decisions not to prosecute can effectively 
protect victims‘ interests in criminal prosecutions from unjust and unfair decisions not to 
prosecute made by Crown prosecutors. In Canada, victims of crime are often in 
vulnerable positions because they must passively wait in the charging decision-making 
process. In principle, we all presume that Crown prosecutors make decisions of whether 
or not to prosecute with due diligence, objectivity, integrity, and good motive. If the 
Crown prosecutor is not trusted by the public, generally, he or she is unlikely to function 
efficiently and effectively. However, in actuality, decisions not to prosecute are not 
always just, fair, and rational due to the motives, attitudes, experience, or other factors 
behind the Crown prosecutor‘s charging decisions.  
For example, even though charging guidelines encourage the Crown prosecutor to 
consider victims‘ interests in making charging decisions, the character or other features of 
victims might still affect the degree of impartiality and dedication of the Crown 
prosecutor on a case, which means he is not able to judge on a case in the professional 
way he is supposed to. In cases where the decision is unjust and unfair to victims, they 
can currently only accept the decision without protest. This is because they do not have 
effective means to have such a decision overturned. 
Judicial review is an available option for victims to overturn the problematic decision not 
to prosecute in the competent court. However, judicial review was not originally designed 
for victims to challenge decisions not to prosecute, and so the system does not adequately 
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meet the victims‘ needs were they to challenge the decision. First of all, the court is 
usually extremely reluctant to judge a discretionary decision not to prosecute made by the 
Crown prosecutor. ―Flagrant impropriety‖ is still the sole ground for victims to challenge 
such decisions. In addition, this term is strictly limited to three instances, corruption, 
violation of the law, and bias against or for a particular individual or offence.
419
 Second, 
majority of the strongest jurisprudence concerning judicial review of charging decisions 
centres around the challenges to the decision to prosecute.
420
 It seems that, in comparison 
to the accused making cases against decisions to prosecute, victims are less likely to make 
a strong case against a decision not to prosecute. Finally, it is difficult for victims to prove 
misconduct on the part of the Crown prosecutor in the decision-making process given that 
they only receive notification of non-prosecution and basic information about the decision 
in most situations. 
Legislators and scholars usually take less notice of the fact that victims will be personally 
affected by the decision not to prosecute. For one reason, they believe that victims‘ main 
interests and the significance of a trial proceeding for them are conditional on the 
conviction of the accused. For another reason, they consider that the accused‘s right to be 
presumed innocent and the independence of the Crown prosecutor to make charging 
decisions should be primary concerns, which distracts attention from the interests of the 
victims in charging decisions. However, it is also possible that the accused is convicted 
through a criminal prosecution. In this case, victims are able to maintain these interests 
and benefit from other emotional healing that is a part of the criminal proceedings. It is 
important to emphasize that this chance is conditional on whether a criminal prosecution 
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will be instituted in the first place. Therefore, an unjust and unfair decision not to 
prosecute will improperly take away victims‘ chances to receive potential benefits from 
criminal proceedings.  
As well, some Crown prosecutors and scholars consider that civil recourses are enough 
for the victims to get over decisions not to prosecute. They underestimate the importance 
of, and several irreplaceable features of, the criminal prosecution for some victims and 
some offences. For example, in some situations, a criminal prosecution better serves the 
victims‘ psychological needs and healing. At some point, a public prosecution might 
comfort victims because they feel that the state is protecting them by prosecuting their 
violators. 
Therefore, I suggest that the victims should have an effective remedy to overturn unjust 
and unfair decisions not to prosecute. Apart from the abovementioned reasons, I also 
believe that this remedy can give victims a certain level of control over the decision not to 
prosecute, which might increase victims‘ satisfaction concerning the charging decision-
making regardless of the outcome. Even if the decision not to prosecute remains, victims 
are able to move on because they have made every effort to see justice done. As well, it is 
also one method to protect victims‘ equal protections right from discriminatory decisions 
not to prosecute.  
The practices of reviewing decisions not to prosecute in the UK and in the US in recent 
years have informed the proposed reform. The reform mainly includes three parts. The 
first change is that an internal review system should be provided in Crown prosecutor‘s 
office as it is in the UK. An internal review is effective and convenient for victims to 
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challenge decisions not to prosecute. Through internal review, the reviewing unit will 
identify the flaws, if any, in the decision not to prosecute, which is similar to what a court 
does in a judicial review. However, the reviewing unit has fewer limitations than the court 
when examining the decision that was complained about. A reviewing unit can conduct a 
fresh review of a decision not to prosecute without giving any deference to the original 
decision. Moreover, for victims, internal review is simpler in procedure, easily accessible 
and less time-consuming. The most important thing is that it is free, which means indigent 
victims can afford such a review. Furthermore, it will reduce the incidents of victims 
applying a judicial review to a court, which can ease the workload of the court.  
Then, some changes should also be made for judicial review of the decision not to 
prosecute. First, the discretionary power of the Crown prosecutor and Attorney General 
concerning whether to institute a prosecution should become statutory. If the scope of the 
discretionary power is clearly written down, it will be easier for the court to determine 
whether a decision is made consistent with the law. Then, the standards of review for 
reviewing administrative discretionary decision-making should be extended to judicial 
review of decisions not to prosecute. This reform does not apply to challenges to 
decisions to prosecute.  
For a ―compelling prosecution‖ type of review, I agree with the US‘s approach that the 
highest standard of review should be employed. In Canada, ―flagrant impropriety‖ should 
be the sole ground to allow the court to compel a prosecution. This is because, on these 
grounds, it is probable that the Crown prosecutor is not genuinely willing to reconsider 
the decision not to prosecute when a court directs reconsideration. Therefore, a court has 
to compel the Crown prosecutor to act in that case.  
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For a ―direct reconsideration‖ type of review, ―reasonableness‖ and ―correctness‖ as 
standards of review should be allowed, which means that the court can dig up the deeper 
reasons behind the decision not to prosecute. This follows the practice in the UK, which 
upholds a position that lower standards of review for decisions should be employed 
because it is the last remedy for victims to have such a decision reviewed and it is always 
hard to find that a decision not to prosecute is flawed.
421
   
For quashing a termination of private prosecution, a Crown prosecutor cannot use ―no 
realistic prospect of conviction‖ or ―existence of civil remedies‖ as reasons to stop a 
private prosecution. These two grounds cannot be categorised as reasons to reject a 
private prosecution for public interests. I believe that, while it is the duty of the Attorney 
General and its agent to protect the public, it is also important to respect the individual‘s 
right to a private prosecution. Even though they employ different methods, courts in the 
US and the UK also try to limit the power of the public prosecutor to stop a private 
prosecution on the grounds of the lack of evidence. If the Crown prosecutor claims that a 
stop of private prosecution is because such a prosecution is against public interests, the 
decision can be subject to a ―reasonableness‖ standard of review. Whether or not a court 
should give a level of deference to the Crown prosecutor‘s judgment on the original 
decision depends on the nature of issue in dispute. 
Finally, I recognize that the proposed reform might negatively affect the prospective 
accused in many ways. Certain remedies, such as accepting exceptional evidential rules, 
extra time for the accused preparing a defence, termination of a judicial review process 
and signing confidentiality agreement by victims, should be given to the accused if the 
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damage is critical. In extreme cases where the principles of justice cannot be upheld if the 
prosecution is continued, a court can stop a proceeding.  
6.1 Limitation of the study 
I did not address several issues in this study: 
 any evidentiary issues (e.g., what sort of evidence would be admissible/used at a 
review hearing) and the precise burden of proof by victims in challenging 
decisions not to prosecute 
 issues concerning whether the reasons behind victims‘ opportunities to challenge 
decisions not to prosecute will provide legitimate grounds for them to challenge 
decisions to prosecute 
 issues about whether a government should pay the indigent victims, or at least 
provide a free lawyer  
6.2 Significance 
In conclusion, even though currently victims‘ interests and rights in the charging stage 
have not been fully recognized and given weight in Canada, they are receiving attention 
gradually following the global victims‘ rights movement. The fact that victims will be 
personally affected by decisions not to prosecute is already formally recognized in the EU 
and some other countries. In order to protect victims‘ interests, the EU officially granted 
victims a right to review a decision not to prosecute.
422
 EU Member States more or less 
have provided a workable framework for victims to challenge decisions not to prosecute. 
Eventually, the check on decisions not to prosecute will be a major concern to ensure 
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victims‘ interests in the charging stage. The proposal I make in this thesis can provide a 
direction or framework for future reform in this area in Canada. 
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